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German Summary / Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Entrepreneurship wird als entscheidender Mechanismus ökonomischer Entwicklung 
betrachtet – als treibende Kraft hinter Beschäftigung, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Wachstum 
in einer globalisierten Wirtschaft. Der ökonomische und gesellschaftliche Stellenwert von 
Entrepreneurship spiegelt sich seit den 1990er Jahren in Schlagworten wie der 
„entrepreneurial economy“ wider (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). Audretsch (2003) 
argumentiert, dass sich im Zuge der Globalisierung Hochlohnländer auf wissensbasierte 
innovative Aktivitäten konzentrieren müssen, wenn sie gleichzeitig hohe Löhne und hohe 
Beschäftigung sicherstellen wollen. Wissen kann im Gegensatz zu anderen 
Produktionsfaktoren nämlich gerade nicht ohne Weiteres global verlagert werden: Die 
regional- und innovationsökonomische Literatur hat gezeigt, dass die Aneignung von 
Wissen absorptive Fähigkeiten voraussetzt und auf ein relativ kleines Gebiet um die 
Wissensquelle (wie Universitäten oder Forschungseinrichtungen) beschränkt ist. Der 
Politikfokus sollte daher in der Generierung und dem Transfer von Wissen liegen. Das 
umfasst auch, den Einzelnen zu unterstützen, unternehmerische Möglichkeiten 
wahrzunehmen und umzusetzen. Unternehmensgründungen stellen dann einen wichtigen 
Mechanismus der Kommerzialisierung von Wissen dar – und bilden damit die Verbindung 
zwischen lokalen Investitionen in Bildung, Forschung und Entwicklung einerseits und 
regionalem Wirtschaftswachstum andererseits. 
Viele verschiedene Politikmaßnahmen – von der Einwanderungspolitik bis zur 
Steuergesetzgebung – wirken auf das Gründungsgeschehen. Als „Entrepreneurship 
Policies“ werden jedoch nach Hart (2003a) diejenigen politischen Initiativen verstanden, 
die mittelfristig Gründungsaktivitäten beeinflussen. Die vorliegende Arbeit folgt 
Lundström und Stevenson (2005, S. 45ff.) in ihrer Definition von Gründungsförderung: 
Die Gründungsförderung umfasst demnach Maßnahmen, die die Motivation und 
Fähigkeiten der (potenziellen) Gründer sowie deren unternehmerische Möglichkeiten zu 
beeinflussen suchen. Sie wendet sich so an (potenzielle) Gründer in der Vorgründungs-, 
Gründungs- und Nachgründungsphase. Ziel der Maßnahmen ist es, mehr Menschen zu 
einer unternehmerischen Karriere zu ermutigen und aus ihnen erfolgreiche Unternehmer zu 
machen. Im Freistaat Thüringen existieren verschiedenste Fördermaßnahmen, die der 
Gründungsförderung zugerechnet werden können, oft aber z.B. der Innovationspolitik, der 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik oder der Mittelstandspolitik entstammen. Diese Arbeit untersucht 
finanzielle Fördermaßnahmen wie Zuschüsse, geförderte Darlehen und Bürgschaften 
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(Kapitel 2), öffentlich geförderte Beratung für werdende Gründer (Kapitel 3) sowie 
Subventionen für die Forschung und Entwicklung junger Unternehmen (Kapitel 4 und 5). 
Die vorliegende Arbeit entstand im Rahmen der „Thüringer Gründer Studie“, eines 
interdisziplinären Forschungsprojekts an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität und der 
Fachhochschule Jena, das mit dem Projekttitel „Erfolg und Misserfolg innovativer 
Unternehmensgründungen – Eine prozessorientierte Analyse ökonomischer und 
psychologischer Faktoren“ im September 2006 startete. Von Januar bis Oktober 2008 
führte das Projektteam nahezu 800 persönliche Interviews mit Thüringer Gründern durch, 
wobei auch werdende Gründer und Gründer, die ihr Unternehmen aufgegeben hatten, 
befragt wurden. Die Interviews umfassten zum einen Fragen zur Person des Gründers, z.B. 
zu unternehmerischen Interessen in der Jugend, zur Ausbildung und Berufserfahrung und 
zur Motivation der Gründung. Zum anderen wurden unternehmensbezogene Daten 
erhoben, etwa zu beanspruchten Fördermaßnahmen, zur Mitarbeiterentwicklung und zur 
Finanzierung der Gründung. Diese Daten bilden die Grundlage für die empirischen 
Analysen dieser Arbeit. Je nach Fragestellung konzentrieren sich die folgenden Teile der 
Arbeit auf verschiedene Untergruppen der durch eine Zufallsstichprobe ausgewählten 
Gründer. Die jeweilige Datenbasis wird dann in den entsprechenden Kapiteln beschrieben. 
Nach einer Einführung werden in Kapitel 2 allgemeine finanzielle Subventionen 
untersucht, die mit Fällen von Marktversagen begründet werden. Auf Basis der 
theoretischen Erklärung und der empirischen Evidenz für Marktversagenstatbestände 
werden Charakteristika von Gründern und ihren Gründungen herausgestellt, die am ehesten 
von Kreditmarktversagen betroffen sind und / oder von denen positive externe Effekte 
ausgehen. Darüber hinaus wird in diesem Kapitel untersucht, ob die Allokation der 
Fördermittel diese Fälle von Marktversagen adressiert. Die empirische Analyse deutet 
darauf hin, dass sich die Förderung nicht auf Unternehmen konzentriert, die wahrscheinlich 
von Marktversagen betroffen sind. Die mangelnde Zielgenauigkeit der Fördermittelvergabe 
kann mit den Schwierigkeiten, ex-ante Kapitalmarktversagen und positive externe Effekte 
zu identifizieren sowie Public-Choice-Überlegungen erklärt werden. Auch können 
sozialpolitische Gründe die Fördermittelgabe bestimmen (z.B. Gründungsförderung als 
arbeitsmarktpolitisches Instrument). In Kapitel 2 wird argumentiert, dass die nicht 
zielgenaue Förderung in Ineffizienz resultiert, da so junge Unternehmen, die nicht von 
Marktversagen betroffen sind, unnötig Fördermittel bekommen. Mit einem Matching-
Verfahren wird zu jedem geförderten ein ähnlich aufgebautes, nicht gefördertes 
Unternehmen gesucht. Die Performance-Unterschiede dieser Zwillingsunternehmen, die 
sich nur im Erhalt von Fördermitteln unterscheiden, können dann als Effekt der Förderung 
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interpretiert werden. Das Matching-Verfahren kann keinen Effekt der Fördermittel (in 
Form allgemeiner Zuschüsse, geförderter Darlehen oder staatlicher Bürgschaften) auf 
Beschäftigungswachstum oder Bonitätsindex bei den geförderten Unternehmen zeigen – 
eine Indikation für ineffiziente Subventionierung. Fehlende Beschäftigungseffekte oder 
Verbesserungen des Bonitätsindexes implizieren aber keine völlige Wirkungslosigkeit der 
Förderung. Vielmehr sind von wenig zielgenauer Förderung Marktverzerrungen zu 
erwarten: Subventionen verschaffen geförderten Unternehmen einen künstlichen 
Wettbewerbsvorteil. So besteht die Gefahr, dass geförderte Unternehmen effizientere – 
aber nicht geförderte – Unternehmen aus dem Markt drängen. 
Das Kapitel 3 evaluiert öffentlich geförderte Beratung von Gründern im 
Gründungsprozess und basiert auf einem gemeinsamen Arbeitspapier mit Dipl.-Psych. 
Martin Obschonka. Angesichts der Vielzahl von einzelnen Beratungsangeboten für 
werdende Gründer und der ausgeprägten Selbstselektion in Beratungsmaßnahmen, 
untersucht Kapitel 3 in einem ersten Schritt die tatsächliche Inanspruchnahme in Bezug auf 
Inhalte und Intensität der Beratung. Eine Clusteranalyse zeigt, dass Gründer entweder 
intensive Beratung zu operationalen und strategischen Fragen in Anspruch nehmen, oder 
sich ihre Inanspruchnahme auf einmalige Beratung in operationalen Fragen beschränkt. 
Regressionsrechnungen deuten zweitens darauf hin, dass werdende Gründer mit 
mangelnden unternehmerischen Voraussetzungen intensivere und umfassendere 
Beratungsleistungen in Anspruch nehmen und diese auch als nützlicher empfinden. 
Mangelnde unternehmerische Voraussetzungen zeigen sich in geringem 
unternehmerspezifischem Humankapital (z.B. Mangel an unternehmerischen 
Vorerfahrungen oder Rollenvorbildern), mangelndem Sozialkapital (z.B. Fehlen von 
Gründungsunterstützung aus dem Bekanntenkreis) sowie einer wenig ausgeprägten 
unternehmerischen Persönlichkeitsstruktur. Das subjektive Nützlichkeitsempfinden der 
Gründer zeigt potenzielle Wirkungsmechanismen der Beratung auf, da sich 
Beratungsangebote an die Person des Gründers richten (im Gegensatz zu finanziellen 
Förderinstrumenten, die dem neu gegründeten Unternehmen selber zukommen). Öffentlich 
finanzierte Beratungsangebote werden meist mit positiven externen Effekten gerechtfertigt, 
die von innovativen Unternehmen gut ausgebildeter (beratener) Gründer ausgehen. Der 
Vergleich von Unternehmen mit Beratung im Gründungsprozess zu gleichartigen 
Unternehmen ohne Beratung im Gründungsprozess (Matching-Ansatz) kann jedoch keinen 
Effekt der Beratung auf den späteren Unternehmenserfolg (gemessen anhand der Höhe des 
Startkapitals zu Beginn des ersten Geschäftsjahres sowie Beschäftigung und Bonitätsindex 
im dritten Geschäftsjahr) feststellen.  
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Grundlage für Kapitel 4 und Kapitel 5 bilden zwei Arbeitspapiere zu 
Fördermaßnahmen für Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) in neu gegründeten 
Unternehmen, die zusammen mit Prof. Dr. Uwe Cantner entstanden. In Kapitel 4 wird die 
Allokation von FuE-Subventionen untersucht und argumentiert, dass Politiker und 
Programmverantwortliche eine Strategie des „picking the winner“ verfolgen. Angesichts 
der Informationsprobleme, im Vorhinein Fälle von Marktversagen zu identifizieren, 
werden Förderentscheidungen zugunsten der ex-ante am Erfolg versprechendsten 
Gründungen gefällt. Dadurch werden Marktverzerrungen durch die Subventionierung 
nicht-effizienter Gründungen vermieden. Auch minimiert sich für Politiker und 
Programmverantwortliche das Risiko, später die Förderung gescheiterter Projekte vertreten 
zu müssen. Logistische Regressionen unterstützen diese Argumentation nur teilweise. 
Einerseits erhalten diejenigen Unternehmensgründungen mit den innovativeren 
Geschäftsideen – besonders akademische Ausgründungen – eher Fördermittel. Andererseits 
haben die Motivation und die Patenterfahrung der Gründer keinen Einfluss auf die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Förderung, obgleich auch diese Charakteristika als Prädiktoren 
für späteren Unternehmenserfolg gewertet werden können.  
Kapitel 5 untersucht die Effektivität von FuE-Subventionen anhand ihrer Wirkung 
auf Patentierungsaktivität und Beschäftigungswachstum. Matching-Verfahren berück-
sichtigen die Selektionsverzerrung zwischen subventionierten und nicht-subventionierten 
Unternehmen und zeigen, dass die Subventionierung von FuE bei neu gegründeten 
Unternehmen zu einem gleichzeitigen Anstieg des Beschäftigungswachstums von 66 
Prozent führt. Des Weiteren weisen subventionierte Start-ups eine um 2,8-fach höhere 
Patentierungsaktivität auf. Diese Schätzungen deuten kaum auf die viel zitierten 
Mitnahmeeffekte hin. Bei der Analyse sticht die Gruppe der akademischen Ausgründungen 
durch ihre Innovativität und Patentierungsaktivität hervor. Für manche dieser High-tech 
Start-ups können keine nicht-subventionierten Zwillingsunternehmen gefunden werden, 
was einem erfolgreichen Politikfokus der letzten Jahre auf akademische Ausgründungen 
zugeschrieben werden kann. 
Angesichts der Vielzahl von sich stetig ändernden Programmen und 
Fördermittelinstitutionen basieren alle Untersuchungen auf Angaben der befragten Gründer 
zur Inanspruchnahme einzelner Fördermittelarten in den einzelnen Phasen des Gründungs- 
und Unternehmensprozesses. So wurden keine Daten zur Inanspruchnahme einzelner 
Programme bestimmter Fördermittelgeber erhoben. Dieses Vorgehen schränkt die 
Fähigkeit konkreter Politikempfehlungen ein, weist aber auf ein Problem der 
Gründungsförderung hin: die sehr kleinteilige Programmlandschaft mit verschiedensten 
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Förderinstitutionen und stetige Änderungen in den Programmen verkleinern Fallzahlen und 
erschweren damit quantitative Evaluationen. Gleichzeitig sollte zukünftig schon bei der 
Konzeption und Implementierung von Förderprogrammen die spätere Evaluation durch 
(quasi-)experimentelle Designs berücksichtigt werden. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and relevance 
Schumpeter, in his seminal work in 1911, recognized entrepreneurial initiative as an 
important microdeterminant of economic growth, a concept that has become increasingly 
influential. Today, entrepreneurship is considered a crucial mechanism of economic 
change. Entrepreneurs introduce innovation and by doing so challenge and displace less 
innovative incumbents, a process Schumpeter dubbed “creative destruction”. In this way, 
innovative entry accelerates structural change. Furthermore, products and services offered 
by new firms offer greater variety to consumers and have the potential to better match 
consumer preferences (Fritsch, 2008). These effects are not necessarily limited to the 
region or the industry of entrepreneurial start-up activity. Indeed, much research 
investigates the effect of entrepreneurship on employment, competitiveness and structural 
change, and finally, on economic growth in a globalized economy (see, e.g., Audretsch et 
al, 2006; Carree and Thurik, 2003). 
The impact of entrepreneurial activity on economic performance differs across 
countries (Wennekers et al., 2005; Thurik et al., 2008) and becomes apparent only in the 
long run: the time lag between start-up activity and subsequent economic performance can 
be as long as 10 years (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; Thurik et al., 2008; van Stel and Suddle, 
2007). Moreover, Koellinger and Thurik (2009) show that entrepreneurship not only 
stimulates long-run economic growth, but also plays an active role in the business cycle. 
Employing data from 22 OECD countries between 1972–2007, they find that 
entrepreneurship is a leading indicator of the business cycle and Granger-causes increases 
of GDP. This suggests that entrepreneurship is also an important mechanism in recovering 
from economic recessions. 
The entrepreneurs’ role in an economy has not only been considered by Schumpeter 
but dates back to the work of Richard Cantillon (1755) as well as Jean-Baptist Say (1803), 
and has been of interest to economists ever since (van Praag, 1999).1 However, it was not 
until the 1990s that the impact of entrepreneurial initiative gained the attention of society at 
large and became the focus of policy. In the 1950s and 1960s, both Western Europe and 
North America were characterized by a high concentration of economic activity in 
conglomerates in order to exploit economies of scale, a period known as the “era of mass 
production” (Audretsch, 2003, p. 22). In the mid-1970s, however, a shift in the industrial 
structure away from large corporations and toward small enterprises started to become 
                                                          
1 For an overview of classic views on entrepreneurship, see van Praag (1999) and Hébert and Link (1988). 
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evident (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1993). Audretsch and Thurik (2001) interpret this change 
as indicating a shift from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy, which can be seen 
as an effect of globalization. The information and communication technology revolution 
made it possible to easily shift standardized economic activity to low-cost locations, 
especially to locations that are also relatively skill-intensive, i.e., countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as Asia. These forces of globalization explain the loss of 
comparative advantage that was formerly based on the production factors of land, labor, 
and capital, as well as the exploitation of economies of scale. Therefore, Audretsch (2003) 
argues that high-wage countries now must focus on knowledge-based innovative economic 
activity if they want to secure both high wages and high levels of employment. 
Unlike most other production factors, knowledge, due to its very nature, cannot be 
transferred costlessly across the globe, especially considering the high uncertainty of and 
high information asymmetries involved in its value. Knowledge is only partly codifiable 
(Polanyi, 1966) and therefore embodied in persons. Its successful transmission requires 
certain absorptive capacities of the recipient (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and frequent 
(face-to-face) interaction (von Hippel, 1994; Stephan, 1996). The costs of transmitting 
knowledge thus increase with distance which is supported by Jaffe et al. (1993) who traced 
knowledge flows via patent citations, which turned out to be geographically localized. 
Given the cumulative character of knowledge, these authors’ results further suggest that 
regionally developed knowledge spurs the accumulation of further knowledge within the 
same region. In short, “proximity and location matter” (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996, 
p. 630). 
In their Theory of Knowledge Spillover Entrepreneurship, Audretsch et al. (2006) 
argue that an environment with more knowledge will generate more entrepreneurial 
opportunities and, likewise, that an environment with less knowledge will generate fewer 
entrepreneurial opportunities.2 Entrepreneurial activity then aims to exploit these 
opportunities and thus to commercialize knowledge. This could occur, for instance, 
through spin-off formation out of incumbent firms or research institutions when former 
employees commercialize the knowledge they acquired therein and that would otherwise 
remain uncommercialized (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Shane, 
2004; Buenstorf, 2009). By increasing innovation, fostering competition, spurring diversity 
in sectors and firms, and offering a wider choice to consumers, entrepreneurship positively 
affects economic growth (Audretsch and Thurik, 2004; Fritsch, 2008). In other words, 
                                                          
2 Linking the creation and pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities to the broader economic context, Buenstorf 
(2007) emphasizes that opportunities often emerge as by-products of market competition, e.g., opportunities 
evolve (mostly unintended) from (other) people’s prior activities in the market process. 
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“entrepreneurial activity is the conduit between investments in knowledge and economic 
growth at the particular location” (Audretsch, 2003, p. 38). 
The above mechanism of entrepreneurship as a conduit for knowledge spillovers 
makes clear that positive effects on structural change and economic growth do not emanate 
from every kind of entrepreneurial activity (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Fritsch and 
Schroeter, 2009). Entrepreneurship is highly heterogeneous and can lead not only to 
Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”, but also to “market churning”, which is reflected in 
the positive correlation between entry and exit rates found in many empirical studies 
(Bartelsman et al., 2005; Geroski, 1995). In particular, ill-equipped firms continuously 
enter and exit the market and these firms tend to be the recipients of, rather than 
contributors to, knowledge spillovers (Shaver and Flyer, 2000). Conversely, high-quality 
start-ups are argued to contribute most to economic performance (Fritsch, 2008; Fritsch 
and Schroeter, 2009). Characteristics of a start-up that give it the potential to be one of high 
quality and thus able to challenge incumbents, include, for example, the entrepreneur’s 
qualifications, the start-up’s innovativeness, and resource strength. Since these 
characteristics often go hand in hand,3 high-quality entrepreneurship is in this thesis 
considered by the notion of “innovative entrepreneurship” (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). 
 
Policy responses to the entrepreneurial economy 
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) posit that government policy plays a different role in an 
entrepreneurial economy compared to the part it acts in a managed economy. In a managed 
economy, policy intervention is needed to balance the tradeoff between efficiency (gained 
by increased concentration and economies of scale) and competition, and often takes the 
form of decentralizing policies like regulation, competition policy, and antitrust. In an 
entrepreneurial economy, however, this type of constraining policy is less relevant 
compared to enabling policies that target education, foster skills and human capital, and 
facilitate individual mobility, all of which are intended to enhance individuals’ ability to 
start new and innovative firms (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). 
This goal can be pursued by various types of policy, ranging, e.g., from fiscal 
policy and labor market policy to innovation policy (Audretsch et al., 2007). For example, 
education policy might take a long-term view and be aimed toward skills deemed necessary 
to successful entrepreneurship. Macroeconomic policy, on the other hand, could be 
designed to have a more immediate effect by, for example, increasing the availability of 
                                                          
3 For instance, human capital is needed to recognize innovative business opportunities (Ucbasaran et al, 2009) 
while resources such as financial capital are needed to pursue such opportunities successfully (e.g., Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989; Cooper et al., 1994). 
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venture capital. Whereas the former impacts on background conditions and the latter on 
short-term conditions for entrepreneurship, the field of “entrepreneurship policy” emerged 
in the 1990s whose instruments aim to shape intermediate conditions for entrepreneurship 
(Hart, 2003a; Pages et al., 2003), i.e., they should impact within a period of years. 
Entrepreneurship policies aim to create an entrepreneurial climate that will be 
conducive to successful entrepreneurial activity (Lundström and Stevenson, 2005). 
Lundström and Stevenson (2005) point out that entrepreneurship policy must focus on all 
phases of the individual entrepreneurial process, which is limited to the time 42 months 
after start-up. This time constraint corresponds to the definition of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor and allows for the fact that new firms are especially vulnerable 
during their first up to five years in business (Minniti et al., 2005; Geroski, 1995). 
Entrepreneurship policy often complements policy measures for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) that were established, mainly for political and social reasons, during the 
time of the managed economy (Audretsch and Beckmann, 2007). Lundström and 
Stevenson (2005) point out four major areas of divergence between the two types of policy. 
First, entrepreneurship policy focuses on individuals, whereas SME policy focuses on 
firms. Second, entrepreneurship policies are targeted at the early phases of the founding 
process (pre-start-up to early post-start-up); SME schemes and measures are intended to 
help established firms. Third, “soft” policy measures like mentoring and entrepreneurship 
promotion are popular elements of entrepreneurship policy; “hard” policy instruments (e.g., 
financial subsidies) are more characteristic of SME schemes and measures. Finally, 
entrepreneurship policy involves a wide range of support: educators, the media, and 
various public institutions all play a role in creating a favorable entrepreneurial 
environment. In contrast, SME policies make greater use of financial and fiscal incentives, 
which can be provided by a narrower set of economic institutions. 
Of all the policy instruments analyzed in this thesis, only business assistance in the 
nascent phase of the entrepreneurial process can be regarded as a genuine instrument of 
entrepreneurship policy (business assistance schemes are evaluated in Chapter 3). Financial 
incentives in form of, e.g., grants, soft loans, and loan guarantees (examined in Chapter 2), 
as well as financial incentives for R&D (analyzed in Chapter 4 and 5), are more likely to be 
found in conjunction with SME or innovation policy. Furthermore, labor market policies 
offer start-up incentives and wage subsidies to nascent and young entrepreneurs. This 
thesis focuses on entrepreneurs in the founding process, that is, just before and just after the 
actual set-up of a venture. A useful discussion of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship is not 
possible without first defining those terms since they have been specified in various ways. 
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In fact, defining entrepreneurship happens to be “one of the most difficult and intractable 
tasks” (Parker, 2004, p. 5). In this thesis, the notion of the entrepreneur is generally 
synonymous with the firm founder (if not stated otherwise). Likewise, persons who engage 
in the start-up of a venture (i.e., those active during the time between the first steps in the 
founding process up to the first business year) are referred to as “nascent entrepreneurs”, 
and the founders of new firms (defined as those up to three business years old) are called 
“young entrepreneurs”. Start-ups are eligible for a broad range of financial support 
schemes (analyzed in Chapters 2, 4, and 5). These financial programs form the relevant 
subsidy environment for start-ups and thus, in this thesis, are considered to be 
“entrepreneurship policies” in a wider sense. 
 
Policy support along the founding process delivered in Thuringia 
In East Germany, start-ups and small and medium enterprises have played a crucial role 
ever since German Reunification. Industrial disruption, asset stripping, and spin-off 
formation out of former state combines have resulted in an economic structure 
characterized by small companies (Legler et al., 2004). Therefore, policy instruments 
employed in Thuringia must be considered in the context of German Reunification and the 
transition process of the East German economy. Since the pool of firms in East Germany is 
still smaller than it is in West Germany, entrepreneurial activity can be seen as a 
mechanism of the catching-up process (DIW et al., 2003).4 
In an attempt to foster regional economic development in East Germany, the 
investment allowance (Investitionszulage) constitutes the base of the subsidization. Eligible 
firms are legally entitled to this allowance, which has been in effect in East Germany since 
1990. A great many East German companies have taken advantage of this program, i.e., 
they receive a tax-free cash settlement in the amount of the reimbursement rate (Heimpold, 
1998). However, the average intensity of policy support is relatively low as long as the 
investment allowance is not combined with other kinds of subsidies (DIW et al., 2003). 
Similar to DIW et al. (2003), in this thesis, I do not consider the receipt of the investment 
allowance, but instead investigate only those support schemes that are delivered within the 
framework of labor market policy, innovation policy, SME policy, and entrepreneurship 
policy. These support policies for nascent and young entrepreneurs and their start-ups are 
usually discretionary in their administration, i.e., the funding authorities can decide 
whether or not to make an award and, if so, the level of award made (Heimpold, 1998). 
Compared to West Germany, East Germany and, especially, Thuringia shows a similar 
                                                          
4 For an in-depth comparison of the role of entrepreneurship and the performance of new businesses in East 
and in West Germany during the 1990s, see Fritsch (2004). 
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structure of support schemes during the period under study in this thesis (1994–2006). 
However, the intensity of subsidization is generally higher in East Germany due to the 
special priority of East German applicants in some federal programs and the additional 
availability of the investment allowance. Furthermore, some programs focus exclusively on 
East German firms (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005; Koschatzky and Lo, 2005). 
Table 1.1 contains an overview of the policy measures evaluated in the following 
chapters, their general eligibility criteria, and examples of available schemes in Thuringia. 
Table 1.1 also shows under which policy area the support scheme is offered. Since many of 
the policy support schemes described below can be combined, the individual policy take-up 
of founders and their start-ups can be diverse and may cover the entire founding process. 
Policy Area 
 Instruments 
Target 
group / 
eligibility 
Exemplary programs available 
in Thuringia 
L
ab
or
 M
ar
ke
t 
Po
lic
y 
In
no
va
tio
n 
Po
lic
y 
SM
E 
Po
lic
y 
E
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
hi
p 
Po
lic
y 
 Soft loans 
 Loan guarantees 
 Equity financing 
No general 
restriction 
Various programs provided by 
KfW, Thüringer Aufbaubank, 
Bürgschaftsbank Thüringen (see 
Bundesregierung, 2008; 
Thüringer Aufbaubank, 2008) 
  x  
Grants used as wage 
subsidies  
No general 
restriction 
Einstellungszuschuss bei 
Neugründungen (Hujer and 
Caliendo, 2003) 
x    
Grants as a temporary means 
of subsistence and for social 
security contributions 
Start-ups 
by the un-
employed 
Überbrückungsgeld, 
Existenzgründungszuschuss, 
Gründungszuschuss (see 
Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008) 
x   x 
Financial 
support 
schemes 
Grants as a temporary means 
of subsistence for nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Academic 
spin-offs 
EXIST Seed / Gründerstipendium 
(see Kulicke et al., 2006)  x  x 
Business 
assistance Public advisory services 
No general 
restriction 
Thüringer Gründer Netzwerk (see 
Chapter 3)    x 
R&D 
support 
schemes 
 Wage subsidies for R&D 
personnel 
 R&D-project-specific 
subsidies 
 Grants and equity 
financing for technology-
oriented start-ups 
Innovative 
start-ups / 
academic 
spin-offs 
Various programs provided at the 
European, federal, and Länder 
level (see Koschatzky and Lo, 
2005; Belitz et al., 2001) 
 x  x 
Note: Whether a particular instrument can be attributed to a financial support scheme in general or to an R&D support 
scheme is not always obvious, e.g., in the case of policy instruments targeted at academic spin-offs. 
Table 1.1: Policy measures available for entrepreneurs along the founding process 
 
Financial support schemes. Financial support schemes are diverse. First, SME policy 
measures comprise mainly soft loans, loan guarantees, and equity financing. Soft loans 
provide better conditions to the debtor in terms of, e.g., interest rates and repayment 
obligations. Additionally, they can be often regarded as a mezzanine instrument. By 
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accepting less than customary collateral, this type of loan makes it possible for young and 
small enterprises to obtain financing.5 Loan guarantee schemes are aimed at entrepreneurs 
who have no collateral and thus cannot signal their creditworthiness (Cowling and 
Mitchell, 2003). Semi-public institutions like the Bürgschaftsbank Thüringen offer loan 
guarantees to SMEs and therefore release the intermediate bank or the equity investor from 
part of its liability. Additionally, equity capital financing is made available to young firms 
by the ERP-Startfonds (Bundesregierung, 2008). Second, labor market policies have the 
dual-purpose goal of both encouraging the actual start-up of ventures by (formerly) 
unemployed persons and supporting the employment of (formerly) unemployed persons in 
new firms. Start-up incentives for the unemployed are made available via two different 
schemes, the Existenzgründungszuschuss (so called Ich-AG) and the Überbrückungsgeld.6 
Start-up incentives are not unique to German labor market policies; they can be found in 
most OECD countries (OECD, 2003). The Einstellungszuschuss bei Neugründungen 
provides a grant amounting to 50% of an employee’s gross wage for at up to 12 months if 
the start-up fills a newly created job with a formerly unemployed person for an unlimited 
period (Hujer and Caliendo, 2003). Third, innovation policies and entrepreneurship policies 
are designed to encourage scientists to commercialize their research output via academic 
spin-offs. For example, EXIST Seed, which began in 2001, provides a financial backup for 
the pre-seed phase by financing half-time positions for academic nascent entrepreneurs 
(Kulicke and Schleinkofer, 2008).7 Chapter 2 examines financial support schemes in more 
detail. 
 
Business assistance. Publicly funded business assistance schemes are targeted at nascent 
and young entrepreneurs. They aim to assist nascent entrepreneurs in developing and 
growing viable businesses (European Commission, 2001). The services are organized as 
partnerships between government institutions and the chambers of industry and commerce; 
alternatively, the entrepreneur is given a voucher that can be used for private consulting.8 A 
network of universities, business incubators, and the chambers of commerce (Get-up / 
                                                          
5 Applications for soft loans are made through the borrower’s bank. Therefore, the applicant must satisfy its 
bank as to the viability of the project such that the bank stands as guarantor for the loan vis-à-vis the funding 
authority (Heimpold, 1998). 
6 In 2006, these two schemes were merged and now constitute the Gründungszuschuss (Caliendo et al., 
2008). 
7 In May 2007, EXIST Seed was replaced by EXIST Gründerstipendium, which introduced some minor 
modifications (Kulicke and Schleinkofer, 2008). 
8 The wide range of consulting initiatives with diverse responsibilities and complementary as well as 
substitutable foci has led to a shift in policy. Beginning in 2007, the federal level is solely responsible for 
advisory services to start-ups that are younger than five business years. Advisory services targeted at nascent 
entrepreneurs are under the responsibility of the Länder authorities (Bundesregierung, 2008). 
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Thüringer Gründer Netzwerk), established in 1998, concentrates on advisory services for 
the founders of technology-oriented and knowledge-based start-ups (TMWAI, 2003). 
Coaching is also integral part of EXIST Seed, a financial support program for academic 
spin-offs (Kulicke and Schleinkofer, 2008). Business assistance schemes are evaluated in 
Chapter 3. 
 
R&D support schemes. R&D support schemes are mainly provided within the framework 
of innovation policy (Koschatzky and Lo, 2005) and involve discretionary grants directly 
funding R&D projects and R&D personnel (Czarnitzki et al., 2003). Between 1994 and 
2000, public funds amounting to an average of 1,100 million Deutsche mark per year were 
spent on R&D support schemes in East Germany (Belitz et al., 2001). The German High-
Tech Strategy, announced in 2006, led to considerable increases in R&D-related public 
expenditure (planned spending of € 14,600 million in the years 2006 through 2009). In 
addition to technology-specific funding, funds are given to improve conditions for 
innovative SMEs (planned budget of € 1,840 million between 2006 and 2009) and to 
support technology start-ups (planned budget of € 220 million between 2006 and 2009) 
(BMBF, 2006). Federal funds are complemented by support schemes of the German 
Länder. In 2007, Thuringia provided an additional € 28 million to fund research and 
innovation (Thüringer Aufbaubank, 2008). Research and development is subsidized with 
reimbursement rates ranging from 25% to 70%9 (TMWA, 2008a). 
Since the mid-1990s, new policy initiatives have emerged that aim to build up 
innovation networks (Audretsch and Beckmann, 2007). Policy support for setting up 
innovation networks is thought desirable because big companies – whose R&D activities 
play an important role in innovation systems – are largely absent in East Germany (Fritsch 
et al., 2009).10 Programs such as InnoRegio and BioRegio intend to develop regional 
networks that have a distinguished economic profile and research reputation. Public funds 
are allocated within a “contest for cooperation” (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005), in which 
funding authorities invite local actors to submit proposals for cooperative R&D, with the 
most promising proposals receiving public funding.11 Since 2005, research-based high-
opportunity start-ups can also apply for equity capital financing, which is provided by a 
partly state-financed fund (Bundesregierung, 2008). The set-up of the High-tech 
                                                          
9 For cooperative R&D, subsidy rates can be from 40% to 80% (TMWA, 2008b). 
10 The few big companies that do exist in East Germany are mostly subsidiaries directed from headquarters in 
West Germany or abroad (Legler et al., 2004). 
11 For a more detailed overview on contest-oriented programs, see Eickelpasch and Fritsch (2005). 
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Gründerfonds can be attributed to initiatives from innovation policy and entrepreneurship 
policy. R&D support schemes as outlined here are investigated in Chapter 4 and 5. 
 
Need for evaluation 
The increased use and public funding of entrepreneurship support policies calls for 
rigorous evaluation to guide future policy-making. Such evaluation should assess the 
appropriateness of the measure, i.e., evaluators should scrutinize the economic rationale for 
the intervention. Furthermore, its effectiveness (Does the program achieve its objectives?) 
and its efficiency (Does the program achieve its objective at lower costs than other 
potential initiatives?) should be investigated (Lattimore et al., 1998). A key criterion for 
evaluating public policy measures is the concept of “additionality” (also known as 
“incrementality”). Additionality measures show the extent to which policy programs 
stimulate additional activity (e.g., additional employment) as opposed to subsidizing what 
would have taken place anyway (Hsu et al., 2009). 
To date, policy schemes targeted at start-ups have mainly been monitored (Storey, 
2000), i.e., the take-up of schemes and recipients’ opinions have been documented. 
However, these studies do not compare the performance of assisted firms with that of 
nonassisted firms and thus cannot reveal whether the public policy measures are making 
any economic difference (i.e., their additionality). Storey (2000) particularly emphasizes 
the problem of selection bias arising due to founders’ self-selection into assistance, as well 
as the potential bias that arises due to the selection of applicants “best” suited to a program 
by policymakers and program administrators (i.e., committee selection). Matching 
procedures have been developed to correct for selection bias in comparing assisted and 
nonassisted units on basis of identical initial positions described by, e.g., founders’ ex-ante 
characteristics and industry. The differential performance is then attributed to the receipt of 
assistance. However, the validity of matching procedures crucially depends on being able 
to identify all relevant ex-ante characteristics that have an impact on both the probability of 
receiving assistance as well as on the respective outcome measure. If there are unobserved 
characteristics, the differential performance of assisted and nonassisted firms may be 
incorrectly attributed to the scheme, when it is, in fact, due to the unobserved factors 
(Caliendo, 2006). Furthermore, matching approaches can identify only direct effects of a 
policy scheme and have to abstract from indirect market effects or knowledge spillovers 
that might result from a particular policy intervention.12 
                                                          
12 This assumption is commonly known as the stable unit treatment value assumption (Rubin, 1991). 
 10 
Matching methods such as propensity score matching are popular in labor 
economics for evaluating labor market policies (Heckman et al., 1999). They are also 
applied in this thesis and are explained in more depth in Chapter 5. Storey (2000) argues 
that rigorous evaluations require extensive high-quality data that include information on 
both assisted and nonassisted units (Storey, 2000). Heckman et al. (1997) point out that 
matching methods substantially reduce bias when, first, information is collected using the 
same questionnaire for both the assisted and nonassisted firms and, second, both types of 
firms are drawn from the same random sample (see Michalopoulos et al. (2004) for 
experimental evidence in support of these arguments). Both requisites are fulfilled by the 
dataset at hand. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to evaluate policy support for the entrepreneurial 
process. Specifically, this thesis is comprised of four papers that all empirically analyze 
policy support provided to nascent and young entrepreneurs in innovative industries in the 
East German state of Thuringia. The chapters are based on working papers that were 
presented at workshops of the research training group “The Economics of Innovative 
Change” (DFG-GK-1411) in Jena as well as at national and international conferences.13 
More specifically, this thesis first discusses the rationale for the various policy 
interventions. Since positive external effects accruing from entrepreneurship and credit 
rationing are mainly put forward as a rationale for public policy intervention, Chapter 2 
examines the evidence for these cases of market failure. This rather neoclassical 
perspective of rationales for policy intervention is supported by Schroeter (2009), who 
argues that the systems of innovation approach does not offer any additional rationale for 
policy intervention. Second, this thesis focuses on the allocation of policy measures across 
founders and their start-ups (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), taking a close look at the selection bias 
that arises from program selection and founders’ self-selection into such programs. Third, 
Chapters 2, 3, and 5 analyze the effects of the various public support measures on 
                                                          
13 The conferences include the G-Forum (12. G-Forum – Interdisziplinäre Jahreskonferenz zur Gründungs-
forschung, November 6–7, 2008, Dortmund), EMAEE 2009 (Sixth European Meeting on Applied 
Evolutionary Economics, May 21–23, 2009, Jena), AFSE Thematic Meeting (“Firms, Markets and 
Innovation”, French Economic Association (AFSE), June 24–25, 2009, Sophia-Antipolis / France), FIRB-
RISC Conference (Università Bocconi – KITeS “Research and Entrepreneurship in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy”, September 7–8, 2009, Milan), Technology Transfer Society’s Annual Meeting (“The 
Entrepreneurial Enterprise”, October 1–2, 2009, Greensboro (NC / USA)), and DIME Workshop (“Regional 
Entrepreneurship as Source of Perpetuation and Change”, October 15–17, 2009, Jena). 
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subsequent business performance. Additionally, founders’ perceived usefulness of business 
assistance schemes serves as outcome measure in Chapter 3. 
These three areas of policy evaluation are closely intertwined. Given highly 
heterogeneous start-up activity with regard to ex-ante characteristics such as founders’ 
human and financial capital or start-ups’ innovativeness, the rationale for policy 
intervention should determine the allocation of public funds. In turn, the allocation of 
policy measures should affect their effectiveness. If policymakers and program officials 
can more precisely target public funds to remedy market failure, the funding will be 
expected to be more effectively (and probably also more efficiently) spent. 
In this context, various policy instruments are evaluated in this thesis: financial 
subsidies in general (Chapter 2), publicly financed business assistance (Chapter 3), and 
earmarked subsidies for R&D (Chapters 4 and 5). Due to a generally fragmented subsidy 
environment, the result of ever-changing policy schemes and funding institutions, it is not 
feasible to analyze single schemes as the number of observations would be insufficient for 
quantitative analyses. Therefore, the thesis takes an aggregate view of individual policy 
programs and analyzes a mix of different, albeit similar, schemes. 
Different policy measures are available at different stages of the entrepreneurial 
process. The policy instruments evaluated in this thesis are either available at the nascent 
phase (i.e., the time between the first steps of the founding project and the beginning of the 
first business year) or within the first three business years. The different timing of policy 
measures also implies different recipients: that is, measures available within the first three 
business years are provided to the new firm itself, whereas business assistance schemes 
target the individual nascent entrepreneur. 
Table 1.2 provides an overview of the policy instruments investigated in each 
chapter and also sets out when, along the founding process, each type of assistance has 
been evaluated. 
Chapter Policy instrument 
Timing of assistance 
within founding 
process 
Chapter 2 Subsidizing start-ups – Policy targeting and policy effectiveness 
Financial subsidies, 
e.g., grants, soft loans, 
and loan guarantees 
First three business 
years 
Chapter 3 
Building winners? Perceived usefulness and 
economic effects of public business assistance 
in the founding process 
Business assistance 
First steps in founding 
project until start of 
first business year 
Chapter 4 Picking the winner? Empirical evidence on the targeting of R&D subsidies to start-ups R&D subsidies 
First three business 
years 
Chapter 5 R&D subsidies to start-ups – Effective drivers of employment growth and patent output? R&D subsidies 
First three business 
years 
Table 1.2: Overview of analyzed policy instruments (and the phases of the founding process in which 
they have been evaluated) 
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The evaluation of entrepreneurship policies in this thesis is based on data collected by the 
Thuringian Founder Study (Thüringer Gründer Studie). This interdisciplinary project on 
the success and failure of innovative start-ups collected various databases containing 
information on potential academic entrepreneurs, nascent entrepreneurs, and actual 
entrepreneurs. The empirical analyses presented below are based on face-to-face interviews 
with actual entrepreneurs (who might have closed their businesses meanwhile). The 
database draws from the commercial register of commercial and private companies 
(Handelsregister, Abteilung A/B) in the East German state of Thuringia and includes 2,971 
start-ups in innovative industries registered between 1994 and 2006. Innovative industries, 
according to ZEW classification (Grupp and Legler, 2000), are those engaged in “advanced 
technology” and “technology-oriented services”. The survey population consists of 4,215 
founders (first registered owner-managers) who registered a new entry in the 
Handelsregister between 1994 and 2006. This design made it possible not only to 
interview founders of active companies but also founders of ventures that failed. 
A random sample of 3,671 founders was selected from the survey population. Due 
to team start-ups, this corresponds to 2,604 start-ups in innovative industries. Between 
January and October 2008, 639 face-to-face interviews were conducted with solo 
entrepreneurs or with one member of a start-up team (a response rate of about 25%). On 
average, an interview took one and a half hours. The structured interviews covered a broad 
set of questions regarding sociodemographic and psychological data of the founder. 
Moreover, inquiry was made as to the founder’s activities along the founding process. 
Retrospective data relating to events in the founder’s life and business history were 
collected using guided recall.14 In each of the following chapters, a different subsample of 
respondents is examined, the details of which can be found in the chapters themselves. The 
following subsections provide a brief overview of these chapters. 
 
1.2.1 Targeting and effectiveness of financial support schemes 
There is a wide range of financial subsidies (e.g., grants, soft loans, and loan guarantees) 
available to newly founded firms in Thuringia. Chapter 2 examines the rationale behind 
these financial support schemes, their overall allocation, and their effectiveness. Apart 
                                                          
14 Specifically, we utilized mnemonic techniques drawn from the Life History Calendar method (Caspi et al., 
1996). This method has been shown to collect more valid and reliable retrospective information than 
traditional questionnaires (Belli et al., 2004). We employed a study-specific version of the Life History 
Calendar, which is a data-collection tool developed by psychologists and sociologists. It is based on the 
principles of autobiographic memory. In a first step, we asked interviewees to fill in the timing of well-known 
life events, sequences, and transitions (e.g., marriage, birth of children, education, or career structure). In a 
second step, these events served as anchors for the recall of our retrospective study variables. 
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from labor market policies, most policy measures targeted at (nascent) entrepreneurs in the 
founding process are justified by alleged market failure resulting from positive external 
effects and capital market imperfections. On the one hand, start-ups are argued to lead to 
positive external effects (Audretsch and Thurik, 2004) since they give rise to knowledge 
spillovers, increase competition and contribute to diversity as they commercialize 
otherwise unused knowledge (Fritsch, 2008). On the other hand, credit market failure is put 
forward as a rationale for policy intervention. Asymmetric information between 
entrepreneurs and lenders is argued to restrict young and small firms’ access to capital and 
thus hinder entrepreneurial performance (van Praag et al., 2005). However, the extent of 
potential credit rationing will differ across heterogeneous founders (Blumberg and Letterie, 
2008). Similarly, positive external effects do not accrue from every entrepreneurial project 
(Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Fritsch and Schroeter, 2009). 
A literature review shows that theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence do not 
unambiguously reveal incidences of market failure (Auerswald, 2007; Parker, 2002). 
Therefore, the characteristics of start-ups are pointed out which are most likely affected by 
credit market failure and / or which are most likely to give rise to positive external effects. 
Positive external effects can be expected from innovative start-ups that are also more likely 
to be affected by credit rationing. The policy focus on remedying market failure leads to 
inconsistent recommendations for policy intervention. Whereas a rich endowment of 
human and financial capital has the potential to create positive external effects in the long-
run, start-ups with these characteristics are not usually affected by capital market 
imperfections. The empirical analysis in Chapter 2 investigates whether the allocation of 
subsidies reflects a policy focus on addressing market failure occurrences. However, 
(multinomial) logistic regressions reveal that subsidies are not allocated toward those start-
ups most likely affected by market failure. The lack of policy targeting can be explained by 
the existence of serious information problems in identifying ex-ante incidences of credit 
rationing and positive external effects. Furthermore, public choice considerations suggest 
that policymakers and program officials have an incentive to pursue a strategy of “picking 
the winner”, i.e., to assist the most promising start-ups, so that they can take credit for 
success. However, this approach of “picking the winner” misses the opportunity to target 
market failure. 
Furthermore, a lack of appropriate policy targeting will lead to ineffective and 
inefficient subsidization since start-ups that are not affected by market failure will obtain 
subsidies even though they do not need them. Propensity score matching suggests that, 
indeed, subsidized start-ups would have survived and thrived in any case, an indication of 
 14 
deadweight losses of start-up subsidies. However, a lack of employment effects and no 
improvement of subsidized start-ups’ credit rating does not imply a total lack of impact. 
Start-up subsidies might lead to market distortions, since subsidies give their recipients an 
artificial competitive edge, possibly allowing them to crowd out more efficient but 
unsubsidized start-ups (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). 
 
1.2.2 Public business assistance in the founding process 
Publicly financed business assistance services that offer advice, coaching, and training to 
nascent entrepreneurs are a popular policy instrument in many countries of the world 
(Bosma et al., 2008). These measures are designed to help nascent founders develop and 
grow viable businesses. Given that start-up quality matters for inducing positive external 
effects in the long-run, the hope is to “build winners” who will later contribute to structural 
change and economic growth. Chapter 3 evaluates publicly funded business assistance 
schemes targeted at nascent entrepreneurs.15 
The evaluation approach employed in Chapter 3 overcomes certain shortcomings of 
previous research on this topic. First, we explore the actual scope and intensity of business 
assistance, irrespective of which particular program is used. This procedure is followed 
because of the wide range of assistance schemes with different underlying funding 
authorities in Thuringia over the sample period (1994–2006), as well as strong self-
selection into the kind and intensity of actual business assistance. A cluster analysis shows 
that if founders make use of business assistance at all, it takes the form of either intensive 
strategically-oriented support or one-off operational assistance. Second, we analyze the 
predictors of policy take-up and perceived usefulness of business assistance. Our results 
suggest that a lack of entrepreneurial resources is behind both the decision to take 
advantage of comprehensive business assistance and the perception that such assistance has 
been useful. Low entrepreneurial resources are defined as a lack of entrepreneurial 
experience or role models, a lack of social capital, or a weak entrepreneurial personality 
profile. 
However, business assistance schemes should be considered successful only when 
they help weak nascent founders start and grow economically viable ventures. This implies 
that business assistance must sustainably compensate for and develop the entrepreneurial 
resources that are argued to impact entrepreneurial success at the micro level (e.g., 
Markman and Baron, 2003) as well as foster structural change and economic growth at the 
macro level (e.g., Fritsch and Schroeter, 2009), because the positive external effects that 
                                                          
15 Chapter 3 is based on a working paper written in conjunction with Martin Obschonka. 
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accrue from innovative economically viable start-ups are the main justification for the 
public provision of business assistance. Therefore, in a third step, we assess the economic 
impact of business assistance by studying subsequent business performance employing 
propensity score matching, which corrects for selection bias. We do not find any effect of 
business assistance on subsequent business performance as proxied by initial capital (at the 
beginning of the first business year), employment, and credit rating (in the third business 
year). Further research is desirable to track nascent entrepreneurs along the entire founding 
process; our data provide information only about the founding process of young 
entrepreneurs, i.e., those founders who successfully completed the nascent phase (survivor 
bias). 
 
1.2.3 Targeting of R&D subsidies 
The allocation of R&D subsidies to start-ups is investigated in Chapter 4.16 Neo-classical 
as well as Neo-Schumpeterian approaches argue that research and development (R&D) in 
new firms is affected by incidences of market failure or system failure, respectively. If 
entrepreneurs cannot raise the capital for R&D to (reasonable) costs or if they cannot 
appropriate the returns from R&D, they will conduct less R&D than is socially optimal. 
R&D subsidies thus aim to reduce these costs and risks in order to induce higher R&D 
activity, so called “additionality”. Therefore, the projects that should be subsidized are 
those that promise high social returns but that, in the absence of a subsidy, would not be 
undertaken because the expected private returns are too low. Hence, projects expected to be 
privately profitable and that, therefore, will be undertaken anyway, should not receive 
public support. Subsidies are simply transfer payments for these inframarginal projects and 
will not lead to additional R&D (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000). 
Given fundamental information problems in identifying incidences of market failure 
(or system failure) ex-ante, we argue that policy is targeted toward the ex-ante most 
promising start-ups, that is, a strategy of “picking the winner” is pursued. Prior research 
shows that start-ups’ innovativeness and resource strength (in terms of human and financial 
capital), as well as founders’ growth ambitions, are early indicators of start-up success 
(Cooper et al., 1994; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). A policy targeted at these start-ups 
will minimize market distortions arising from subsidizing genuinely non-efficient start-ups 
(Shane, 2009). Furthermore, public choice considerations suggest a policy focus on 
promising start-ups because such reduces the risk for policymakers and program officials 
of having to justify their subsidization of failed projects. 
                                                          
16 Chapter 4 is based on a joint working paper written in conjunction with Uwe Cantner. 
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Our empirical analyses provide ambiguous support for the above argument. R&D 
subsidies are given to start-ups with innovative business ideas, especially academic spin-
offs. On the other hand, however, the ambitions and the patent stock of the founder have no 
influence on the receipt of R&D subsidies. This pattern of support is attributable not only 
to the decisions of policymakers and program officials but also to self-selection of 
founders, which can be at least partially explained by the costs incurred by founders in 
applying for policy programs. 
Insights into the overall allocation of R&D subsidies do not reveal anything about 
policy effectiveness and efficiency, but they are an important prerequisite for evaluating 
effectiveness (which is done in Chapter 5) since non-random subsidization constitutes a 
selection bias. The implied difficulties of policy targeting give rise to some doubt as to the 
advisability of massively subsidizing private R&D. Policy schemes run the risk of blocking 
the emergence of a private market for R&D (e.g., venture capital). Ironically, therefore, 
providing public subsidies for R&D may very well guarantee the existence of such 
subsidies in the future. 
 
1.2.4 Effectiveness of R&D subsidies 
To date, the evidence is mixed as to the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, a situation 
possibly due to the great diversity of schemes evaluated and methodologies used in 
conducting the evaluations. Although there is a fair amount of work on R&D subsidies to 
established firms, subsidies to start-ups have not yet been analyzed,17 even though public 
subsidies for R&D are widespread among new firms that conduct R&D within their first 
three business years: 42.5% of these start-ups receive R&D subsidies. Chapter 5 
investigates the effectiveness of R&D subsidies to start-ups.18 Taking an aggregate view 
rather than evaluating a single program, we estimate the impact of R&D subsidies on start-
ups’ employment growth and patent output. Employment growth is an input-oriented 
indicator of additional R&D activity. Since salaries for scientists and engineers constitute 
the bulk of R&D expenditure in small firms (Hall, 2002), public funds should especially 
lead to increased R&D employment. Conversely, patents are a popular output-oriented 
measure of the invention process and can be regarded as a proxy for positive external 
effects. 
We conduct propensity score matching to address the selection bias between 
subsidized and non-subsidized start-ups (as analyzed in Chapter 4). We find that R&D 
                                                          
17 One exception is Koga (2005), who analyzes the effectiveness of R&D schemes for young firms. 
18 The underlying working paper of Chapter 5 is co-authored with Uwe Cantner. 
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subsidies lead to an increase in employment growth of about 66%. Furthermore, subsidized 
start-ups show a 2.8 times higher patent output. These estimates provide evidence for the 
additionality of R&D subsidies within the first three business years. This evidence is 
bolstered by the self-report of windfall gains. We asked each founder of a start-up that 
received an R&D subsidy: “Would you have been engaged in R&D anyway?” Only 19.2% 
answered “yes, readily”, 47.5% said “yes, perhaps or on a reduced scale”, and the 
remaining third (32.3%) said “no”. The last two responses point to the additionality of 
R&D subsidies. 
The analysis also highlights a special group of academic spin-offs that excels in the 
novelty business ideas and patent activity. For some of these high-tech start-ups, no non-
subsidized counterparts can be found. This might be attributed to the policy focus on 
academic spin-offs, which has led to a successful targeting of R&D support schemes. 
However, these exceptional academic spin-offs do not excel with respect to employment 
growth, which points to the early development of the spin-offs with respect to the 
marketability of their products. 
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2. Subsidizing start-ups – Policy targeting and policy effectiveness19 
2.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship plays an increasingly prominent role in both academic and policy circles. 
It is regarded as the driving force behind structural change that links investments in 
knowledge with economic growth (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). The increased role of 
new and small enterprises has led to an increase in entrepreneurship policies aimed at 
encouraging more people to consider entrepreneurship as an option and act on a business 
idea (Lundström and Stevenson, 2005). Especially in East Germany, which still lags behind 
West Germany in all economic performance indicators, policymakers pin their hopes on 
various policy instruments (Bundesregierung, 2007). Although entrepreneurship policies 
focus on soft policy instruments like consulting services, the overall subsidy environment 
is dominated by soft loans, loan guarantees, and grants – offering start-ups an extensive 
choice of support (Thüringer Aufbaubank, 2008). The policy focus on hard policy 
instruments is also reflected in the allocation of public funds. For example, although 5.3 
million Euro were allocated to public initiatives offering consulting services to Thuringian 
business founders in 2005 and 2006, direct financial subsidies for business set-ups in 
Thuringia amounted to more than 104 million Euro during that same period (TMWTA, 
2007).20 
Apart from labor market policies, policy intervention in favor of nascent and young 
entrepreneurs and their start-ups is traditionally justified by presumed market failure. First, 
positive externalities accruing from entrepreneurship create a disparity in the valuation of 
(potential) entrepreneurs by investors and policymakers (Audretsch et al., 2007). Whereas 
individual entrepreneurs and investors are only interested in single firm performance, 
policymakers should be more interested to allow for positive external effects. Second, 
policy intervention aims at remedying asymmetric information, which has been argued to 
restrict young and small firms’ access to capital and thus hinder entrepreneurial 
performance (van Praag et al., 2005). Start-ups differ in both their ex-ante characteristics, 
such as economic and environmental features, and by the individual characteristics of their 
founders and, therefore, capital constraints will also vary (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). 
Similarly, positive external effects do not accrue from every entrepreneurial project 
(Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Fritsch and Schroeter, 2009). 
                                                          
19 This chapter is based on Kösters (2009). 
20 The latter figure comprises only those funds from the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe “Verbesserung der 
regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur” (GA) (TMWTA, 2007), which are allocated for genuine business start-ups 
and for setting up new branches of existing businesses. Although the GA is the most important scheme of 
German regional policy, there are other programs that offer soft loans, loan guarantees, and grants to 
Thuringian start-ups (TMWTA, 2007; Thüringer Aufbaubank, 2008). 
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The identification of market failures that hamper the start-up and growth of 
otherwise efficient ventures is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective 
and efficient policy intervention. When deciding on policy intervention, policymakers 
should be aware of the market distortions that can result from subsidization. Market 
distortions arise because policymakers and program officials do not have complete 
information which would allow to fund marginal projects. In the absence of complete 
information, public support schemes give subsidized start-ups an artificial competitive edge 
that could lead to their substitution for other start-ups or incumbents that are ex-ante more 
efficient but nonsubsidized. In general, the distortions arising from substitution effects are 
larger than those resulting from deadweight losses: not only is public money spent 
ineffectively, but the subsidy enables the subsidized start-up to crowd out a potentially 
more efficient firm (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). 
The start-up subsidy environment is diverse. Various subsidization policies coexist, 
leading to a broad range of support schemes administered by a similarly broad range of 
agencies (TMWTA, 2007). In this study, I do not examine a specific scheme but take an 
aggregate view of the receipt of any kind of financial subsidy within the first three business 
years of a start-up. I use data from 162 start-ups in innovative industries in the East 
German state of Thuringia.21 More than 45% of these start-ups make use of financial 
subsidies which are primarily given as soft loans, loan guarantees, or grants. A broad set of 
ex-ante characteristics allows me to analyze the allocation of subsidies. Does the allocation 
of subsidies provide evidence of policy geared toward positive external effects? Or is the 
policy instead focused on remedying capital market imperfections? The answer to both 
questions turns out to be “no”. Logistic regressions reveal that the allocation of subsidies is 
neither based on the rationale of positive external effects nor on subsidies’ potential to cure 
capital market imperfections. Instead, the inconsistent allocation reveals likely substitution 
effects. Moreover, I apply propensity score matching to identify the causal effect of 
subsidization and find neither a significant effect of subsidies on business survival nor on 
employment growth. The matching results suggest that subsidized start-ups would have 
survived and thrived in any case and thus indicate deadweight losses. These findings 
highlight the relevance of information and incentive problems when designing and 
allocating start-up subsidies, since policy targeting affects potential market distortions and 
policy effectiveness. 
                                                          
21 This subset of a larger survey does not contain start-ups that engage in R&D within the first three business 
years, since they are eligible for R&D subsidies whose effectiveness is examined in Chapter 5. R&D 
subsidies have been found to be highly effective, leading to an increase in employment growth of about 66% 
and a rise in patent output of 184%. However, start-ups that do not engage in R&D are also widely subsidized 
and therefore justify a separate analysis. 
 20 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section contains a 
review of the literature that examines the market failure argument to justify start-up 
subsidies. Ex-ante characteristics of start-ups that are most likely to be affected by market 
failure are derived and the market distortions resulting from policy intervention are 
discussed. In the empirical analysis (Section 2.3), a logistic regression first investigates the 
characteristics of subsidized start-ups. Second, I employ propensity score matching to 
examine the effectiveness of financial subsidies in the survival and growth of start-ups. 
Section 2.4 concludes. 
 
 
2.2 Rationale for (no) policy intervention 
Incidences of market failure constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy 
intervention. Market failure arises from a lacking appropriability of returns from 
entrepreneurial activity (Section 2.1) as well as from asymmetric information leading to 
capital market imperfections (Section 2.2). In these two sections, the ex-ante characteristics 
of start-ups that will likely lead to market failure, and that thus should guide subsidy 
allocation, are derived. Section 2.3 then summarizes these conjectures for subsidy 
allocation and discusses the implications of policy targeting for market distortions and 
policy effectiveness. 
 
2.2.1 Positive external effects 
Audretsch and Thurik (2004) identify three channels through which entrepreneurial activity 
has an impact on economic growth. First, entrepreneurship spurs knowledge spillovers, 
since it is a mechanism by which knowledge – captured in founders and their business 
ideas – is commercialized. According to Marshall (1890), other firms of that particular 
industry benefit from these knowledge spillovers (amongst others) when they are 
geographically concentrated. Second, entrepreneurship is accompanied by firm entry, exit, 
and turnover, which implies increased competition. Increased competition will be more 
conducive to knowledge externalities (Jacobs, 1969; Porter, 1990) because it increases the 
pressure to innovate. Third, a start-up contributes to diversity since it is an attempt to 
commercialize knowledge that otherwise would have remained uncommercialized 
(Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004). Increased diversity among firms and a higher variety of 
enterprises are argued to enhance regional growth since knowledge spillovers external to 
an industry are believed to be the most valuable kind (Jacobs, 1969; Glaeser et al., 1992). 
However, industry characteristics can create a tradeoff between the benefits of diversity 
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resulting from a high number of small firms and large firms’ advantage of appropriating 
the returns from innovative activity (Cohen and Klepper, 1992). For instance, an industry 
structure dominated by many small firms will be socially beneficial if the respective 
technology is characterized by a number of different approaches to innovation and if 
appropriability can be ensured by rapid growth, licensing, and other mechanisms. 
The above mechanisms make clear that entrepreneurship does not always contribute 
to economic growth. Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007) point out that new firm formation 
leads not only to Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, but also to “market churning”, 
which occurs when ill-equipped firms continuously enter and exit the market. Market 
churning is reflected in the positive correlation between entry and exit rates that is found in 
many empirical studies (Bartelsman et al., 2005; Geroski, 1995). High-quality start-ups are 
argued to contribute most to economic performance (Fritsch, 2008). The characteristics and 
impact of these high-quality start-ups include the following. First, innovative start-ups 
commercialize knowledge and thus give rise to knowledge spillovers. Their innovations 
imply greater variety for customers and better matching customer preferences and will, 
ultimately, result in higher utility for customers (Fritsch, 2008). Innovative start-ups are 
additionally characterized by a high endowment of human capital because a rich 
knowledge base enables the recognition and exploitation of high-quality entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Ucbasaran et al., 2009; Baron, 2006). Entrepreneurs’ human capital 
positively affects the post-entry performances of their start-ups and will thus contribute to 
static and dynamic efficiency (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Fritsch, 2008). The empirical 
evidence supports the view that innovative start-ups and/or start-ups with a high 
endowment of human capital make a strong contribution to structural change (Acs and 
Mueller, 2008; Baptista and Preto, 2006). Conversely, less innovative start-ups and start-
ups with lower endowments of human capital are rather recipients rather than contributors 
to knowledge spillovers (Shaver and Flyer, 2000). 
Second, start-ups with superior financial resources have higher survival chances 
and better performance (Cooper et al., 1994; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Brüderl et al., 1992). 
Cooper et al. (1994) argue that initial capital has both direct and indirect impacts on 
performance. As a direct effect, financial resources allow start-ups to pursue more capital-
intensive strategies (which might be more efficient and better protected from imitation) and 
to realize venture growth. Furthermore, financial resources constitute a buffer against 
random shocks. Indirectly, superior financial resources might reflect higher endowments of 
human capital and more extensive planning that has attracted outside lenders and investors. 
Start-ups with high endowments of financial capital are thus able to mount a greater 
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challenge to incumbents and, in this way, will ensure efficiency and stimulate productivity 
(Fritsch, 2008). 
Third, the rare phenomenon of high-growth entrepreneurship accounts 
disproportionately for innovative change and economic growth (Autio, 2005; Henrekson 
and Johansson, 2008; Wong et al., 2005; Stam et al., 2009). There are various definitions of 
and terms used to describe high-growth entrepreneurship (Buss, 2002), ranging from 
“gazelles” (Birch, 1979) to “high-expectation” (Autio, 2005) and “ambitious” start-ups 
(Stam et al., 2009).22 All these definitions, though, have in common that they combine the 
above characteristics (innovativeness, rich endowment with human capital, and financial 
capital) with an ambition to grow.  
 
To sum up, the impact of heterogeneous start-up activity on economic performance is 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that innovative, well-equipped (in terms 
of a rich knowledge base and financial strength), and growth-oriented start-ups yield 
positive external effects in the long run.23 This is especially true if they are started in a 
supportive regional environment (Fritsch, 2008). For instance, Fritsch and Mueller (2004) 
find that new business formation has a particularly strong impact on employment change in 
agglomerations and high-productivity regions, whereas even a negative impact can be 
observed in regions with low productivity. Entrepreneurial activity varies not only within 
but across countries. Cross-country studies find that the impact of entrepreneurial activity 
on a country’s innovative capacity (Wennekers et al., 2005), as well as on its macro-
economic performance, increases with per capita income (Thurik et al., 2008; van Stel et 
al., 2005; Stam et al., 2009). This work thus suggests that entrepreneurship plays different 
roles in different countries, depending on their stage of economic development. It is 
important to note, also, that positive external effects only become apparent in the long run: 
the estimated time lag between entrepreneurial activity and subsequent economic 
performance can be as much as 10 years (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; Thurik et al., 2008; 
van Stel and Suddle, 2007). 
                                                          
22 For instance, high-potential innovative start-ups are defined by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor as 
ventures that fulfill the following criteria: (1) start-up aims to employ at least 20 employees in five years; (2) 
the start-up indicates at least some market creation impact; (3) the start-up targets international markets to the 
extent that at least one-fourth of its customer base is abroad; and (4) the applied technologies had not been 
widely available more than a year ago (Wong et al., 2005). 
23 Even failed start-ups may give rise to positive externalities since they may have challenged incumbents and 
given rise to knowledge externalities, e.g., when the ideas and experiences of their former employees become 
an integral part of products made by successful firms (Audretsch et al., 2007; Fritsch, 2008). Similarly, 
Buenstorf and Fornahl (2009) suggest that temporarily successful start-ups could have lasting impact on 
regional development. They find that Intershop, a software start-up from Jena which drastically declined after 
2000, initiated a software cluster by spawning spin-offs, attracting human capital to the region and inducing 
investment in software-related infrastructure. 
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More generally, Auerswald (2007) questions whether potential social returns from 
innovative entrepreneurial activity are a suitable rationale for policy intervention. He 
argues that innovative start-ups can give rise to knowledge spillovers but, at the same time, 
can reap considerable private returns from their innovation due to legal protection in the 
product market or because of high entry costs for potential imitators. Furthermore, the 
social benefits accruing from innovative entrepreneurship are uncertain and will generally 
lie far in the future. They are thus unlikely to much of a motivating factor in the 
entrepreneur’s decision-making process. Therefore, Auerswald argues that information 
asymmetries affect (technology) entrepreneurship far more than positive external effects 
do. I thus turn next to capital constraints, which result from information asymmetries. 
 
2.2.2 Capital constraints 
Information imperfections leading to credit market failure are accused of creating a barrier 
to the acquisition of loan capital by nascent and young entrepreneurs. If this is indeed the 
case, such imperfections thus impede the actual start-up of a venture as well as jeopardize 
both its survival and growth. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that credit rationing 
characterizes the equilibrium state if banks cannot observe borrowers’ risks. In the 
presence of imperfect information, the price (i.e., the interest rate) affects the nature of the 
transaction since increasing interest rates or collateral requirements attract riskier 
entrepreneurs (adverse selection) and induce borrowers to invest in riskier projects (moral 
hazard). Therefore, it may not be profitable for a bank to raise interest rates to clear the 
market, but it will rather limit the number of loans. In other words, credit rationing implies 
that banks grant credit only to a fraction of observationally identical projects. A project 
could still be denied credit even if it offered to pay a higher interest rate (Parker, 2002). 
The likelihood of credit rationing is, ceteris paribus, higher for start-ups and small firms 
because the fixed costs of granting and servicing loans lower the profit margin on lending 
to smaller businesses. Furthermore, according to Blumberg and Letterie (2008), the fewer 
the number of repeat transactions, the less the incentive for business analysts to collect 
information and the fewer the instruments with which start-ups can signal their credibility. 
Asymmetric information can be resolved by commitments such as collateral, the 
investment of own resources, and the provision of costly information that increase the 
credibility of the credit application. Additionally, founders can signal good prospects for 
later business success since banks are interested in long-term relationships with successful 
start-ups (Storey, 1993; Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). However, the theoretical case for 
credit rationing is ambiguous. De Meza and Webb (1987) diagnose the problem as 
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overlending rather than credit rationing when just slightly modifying the assumptions of 
the Stiglitz and Weiss model.24 This theoretical debate has spawned a huge body of 
empirical literature analyzing the impact of capital constraints on the decision to start a 
venture as well as on the performance of newborn firms (Cressy, 2002; van Praag et al., 
2005). 
The extent of credit constraint will vary across heterogeneous start-ups, depending 
on individual characteristics of the founders and their start-ups (Blumberg and Letterie, 
2008). First, innovative start-ups are argued to be particularly affected by asymmetric 
information in capital markets (Colombo and Grilli, 2007; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; 
Guiso, 1998) since the returns from innovative activity are uncertain, highly skewed, and 
difficult for outsiders to evaluate. Additionally, investment in innovative activity mainly 
encompasses salaries and the acquisition of highly specialized assets, neither of which 
provide much collateral value in the event of failure (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Parker 
and van Praag (2006) find that entrepreneurs in capital-intensive industries are significantly 
more likely to be affected by credit constraints. Since this effect is in addition to the scale 
effect from higher capital needs, they argue that banks’ screening errors are systematically 
greater in industries in which production techniques are more complicated and involve 
intangible capital. Still, innovative start-ups might self-select into other forms of lending 
(Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2003; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002), therefore easing potential 
capital constraints. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) argue that equity financing has a number 
of advantages over debt for highly innovative firms since equity financing allows 
unbounded upside returns for investors. Furthermore, it neither increases a start-up’s 
probability of financial distress nor does it induce managers to engage in excessively risky 
projects. However, Lerner (2002) points to the limited scope of the venture capital 
industry, which backs only a tiny fraction of technology-oriented start-ups. 
Ventures started by founders with limited financial resources might be a second 
group that suffers from capital constraints. Poor people’s restricted access to credit markets 
can be explained by their inability to commit themselves by investing own resources. The 
commitment of personal wealth is another important mechanism for mitigating asymmetric 
information (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). This implies that collateral-based lending tends 
to discriminate against the poor, regardless of the quality of the project itself (Cowling and 
Mitchell, 2003). Van Praag et al. (2005) summarize studies that relate personal wealth to 
various performance measures of entrepreneurial ventures, all of which finds either a 
                                                          
24 De Meza and Webb (1987) allow the expected return to vary across firms, whereas Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) assume that all firms have the same expected return but that the dispersion of returns is different. 
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positive or no impact of assets on performance. This literature can be traced back to Evans 
and Jovanovic (1989), who estimate that the capital stock that entrepreneurs can invest is 
restricted to 1.5-fold of their initial assets. In this way, liquidity constraints prevent people 
with few assets from either engaging in entrepreneurship altogether, or force them to start a 
business with less than the optimal amount of capital. On the other hand, however, a lack 
of personal assets may suggest a lack of human capital, implying, in turn, deficient 
economic viability of the venture (Parker and van Praag, 2006). This endogeneity problem 
is solved when the relationship between windfall gains (e.g., inheritances or lottery prizes) 
and performance is analyzed. Nevertheless, such studies still point to the presence of 
liquidity constraints, since the receipt of windfall gains increases the probability of 
becoming self-employed and enhances start-up performance (Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996; 
Taylor, 2001, Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994). 
Finally, capital constraints might particularly affect start-ups endowed with low 
human capital, since they are deprived of an important signaling mechanism that helps 
overcome asymmetric information. Low human capital implies both a limited chance of 
success of the start-up and low post-failure earning capacity. However, a positive 
assessment of the potential for success and the consequently increased probability that the 
founder will be able to repay the debt is crucial in overcoming a bank’s reluctance to lend 
(Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). Empirically, Åstebro and Bernhardt (2005), as well as 
Parker and van Praag (2006), show that higher endowments of human capital lower initial 
capital constraints. Åstebro and Bernhardt (2005) find this effect to be nonlinear, that is, a 
high-school diploma offsets the credit constraint, but higher levels of education have only 
limited impact on reducing capital constraints. In contrast to the studies discussed above, 
Cressy (1996) finds that the positive relation between financial capital and survival 
disappears once human capital is controlled for. This finding throws doubt on the case for 
credit rationing since financing decisions made on the basis of observable characteristics 
such as human capital merely reflect the bank’s desire to allocate funds wisely. 
 
In summary, although credit rationing cannot be rejected on theoretical grounds, the 
empirical evidence for it appears to be rather limited at best, no doubt in part due to the 
difficulty of identifying credit rationing. On the one hand, there are at least two reasons 
why a positive effect of financial variables on performance does not necessarily imply 
credit rationing (Parker, 2002; van Praag et al., 2005). First, these studies make the initial 
assumption that there is no direct way of obtaining external finance (van Praag et al., 
2005). Second, the problem of endogeneity is often neglected. Endogeneity arises because 
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assets could have been accumulated by superior entrepreneurial ability (human capital), 
which is in turn responsible for above-average entrepreneurial performance. On the other 
hand, survey studies measure the extent of credit constraints more directly. Levenson and 
Willard (2002) analyze survey data from the United States in the late 1980s and find that 
6.36% firms are credit-rationed, which is stated to be an outside estimate because this 
figure includes discouraged borrowers and unsuccessful applicants who might not be 
creditworthy. Using Dutch survey data from the mid-1990s, Parker and Van Praag (2006) 
find that 19% of new founders obtained less finance than they required. However, self-
reports of credit constraints bear the risk of bias, since entrepreneurs might see the lack of 
external finance as the main cause of their problems, whereas it might be just a symptom of 
other deficiencies of the start-up (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Parker, 2002). 
Additionally, empirical studies differ in their definitions of credit rationing.25 Parker (2002) 
thus questions whether credit rationing is a suitable rationale for policy intervention and 
points to positive external effects of entrepreneurship, thereby contradicting Auerswald 
(2007). Having in mind data and measurement limitations, the literature summarized above 
nevertheless suggests that innovative start-ups as well as start-ups with few financial 
resources and low endowments of human capital are more likely to be affected by capital 
constraints. 
 
2.2.3 Targeting of policy intervention 
Although the previous subsections have shown that the existence (and if so the extent) of 
positive external effects and capital market imperfections is disputed (Auerswald, 2007; 
Parker, 2002), their existence still constitute a necessary condition for policy intervention. 
However, the information requirements for identifying incidences of market failure are 
extremely demanding. Not only do policymakers and funding agencies need to know social 
and private returns ex-ante in order to discern external effects, they also have to identify 
the information asymmetries that lead to capital market imperfections. Incidences of 
market failure have to be identified ex-ante for every single project that applies for 
subsidization. If exact policy targeting of the individual marginal entrepreneur is not 
possible, it is questionable whether policy intervention will do any good at all. Subsidies 
give their recipients an artificial competitive edge and might thus lower the intrinsic 
                                                          
25 For instance, Parker (2002) defines credit rationing as a situation where some entrepreneurs are denied 
credit although they are willing to pay a higher interest rate and even though they are observationally 
identical to entrepreneurs who receive credit. In contrast, Evans and Jovanovich (1989) estimate the multiple 
of the founder’s assets that can be devoted to the business. This multiple is then used as a measure of the 
degree of liquidity constraints. For an overview of definitions of credit rationing, see Jaffee and Stiglitz 
(1990). 
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difference between ex-ante less efficient and more efficient start-ups. In this way, 
subsidization distorts market selection as well as the learning processes inherent in a new 
business. Market selection remains the crucial mechanism for singling out innovative 
entrepreneurship from less viable start-ups and ridding the market of less efficient 
incumbent firms (Fritsch, 2008; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Moreover, actual subsidy 
allocation has implications for policy effectiveness. If policy does succeed in targeting the 
marginal entrepreneur, subsidies will be granted where most needed and thus will produce 
the best results, leading to high effectiveness. Additionally, a specific policy focus will 
increase efficiency because it allows realizing the most economic impact with the least 
amount of funds (Stam et al., 2009; Bridge et al., 2003). 
Given the implications of policy targeting, the actual allocation of start-up subsidies 
is of crucial importance in assessing likely market distortions and evaluating policy 
effectiveness and efficiency. Assuming that the primary policy aim is addressing positive 
external effects (cf. Section 2.2.1), policy should primarily support innovative founders and 
founders with high endowments of human and financial capital. Potential high-growth 
entrepreneurship should be especially targeted. If, on the other hand, the primary policy 
aim is addressing capital market imperfections (cf. Section 2.2.2), policy should be 
designed chiefly to support, again, innovative founders, but this time also those founders 
with low human capital and a lack of financial resources. Table 2.1 summarizes the 
expected patterns of correlation between start-up characteristics and the receipt of subsidies 
depending on whether the policy goal is creation of positive external effects or, 
alternatively, addressing capital market imperfections. It is unclear whether high-growth 
entrepreneurship is affected by capital market imperfections, since relationship banking 
and private venture capital firms can be expected to circumvent this problem (Binks and 
Ennew, 1996; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Therefore, this relation is denoted with a 
question mark. Apart from innovative entrepreneurship, potential sources of market failure 
thus point to diverging target groups of policy initiatives. 
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Policy targeting: Expected signs 
according to policy goal 
 
Positive external 
effects 
Capital market 
imperfections 
Innovativeness + + 
High-growth entrepreneurship + ? 
Human capital + ─ 
Financial resources + ─ 
Table 2.1: Start-up characteristics and expected policy support according to policy goal 
 
Policy targeting that aims to realize positive external effects has the positive side-
effect of minimizing the risk of substitution effects because it implies a policy focus on the 
ex-ante most promising start-ups – in terms of both social and private returns (Santarelli 
and Vivarelli, 2007; Shane, 2009). If policy intervention is successful in “picking winners”, 
subsidies will not protect inefficient start-ups from market competition. Therefore, this 
policy strategy is least likely to interfere with market selection, which forces inefficient 
start-ups out of business. However, if policymakers cannot sufficiently distinguish between 
social returns and private returns ex-ante, a policy focus on innovative high-growth start-
ups that are endowed with superior human and financial capital runs the risk of enormous 
deadweight losses because these firms might survive and thrive regardless of whether they 
receive a subsidy (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). 
In the next section, I investigate empirically whether policy allocation follows the 
rationale of positive external effects or is based on addressing capital market imperfections. 
Alternatively, the difficulties in quantifying social and private returns and identifying 
information imperfections ex-ante might blur the actual targeting of policies (Stiglitz and 
Wallsten, 2000). Therefore, it could turn out that the diverse subsidy environment, with its 
myriad programs, engages in no coherent targeting strategy whatsoever. The use of start-up 
incentives as labor market instrument could also blur a policy targeting towards incidences 
of market failure. However, subsidization which does not target incidences of market 
failure will distort market selection and is likely to be ineffective and inefficient. 
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2.3. Empirical analysis 
In the empirical analysis, I first examine the allocation of subsidies to start-ups within their 
first three business years. The logistic regressions shall indicate whether policy targeting 
either addresses positive external effects potentially accruing from entrepreneurship or 
focuses on alleged capital market imperfections resulting from asymmetric information. 
Additionally, insights about actual policy targeting shed light on the likelihood of market 
distortions arising from substitution effects. In a second step, I analyze the effectiveness of 
subsidization with respect to employment growth and survival. To detect potential 
deadweight losses, I employ propensity score matching. 
 
2.3.1 The data 
Data for this study were collected by the Thuringian Founder Study (Thüringer Gründer 
Studie), an interdisciplinary project on the success and failure of innovative start-ups in the 
East German state of Thuringia. The survey population consists of 4,215 founders (first-
registered owner-managers) who registered 2,971 start-ups in innovative industries in the 
Thuringian Handelsregister between 1994 and 2006. Innovative industries, according to 
ZEW classification (Grupp and Legler, 2000), encompass “advanced technology” and 
“technology-oriented services”. This design made it possible to interview not only founders 
of active companies but also founders of ventures that had failed. From the survey 
population, we selected a random sample of 3,671 start-up founders. Due to team start-ups, 
this corresponds to 2,604 start-ups in innovative industries. Between January and October 
2008, we conducted 639 face-to-face interviews with solo entrepreneurs or with one 
member of a start-up team (a response rate of about 25%). 
The structured interviews were conducted by the members of the research project. 
We were supported by student research assistants who were trained in various sessions in 
December 2007. On average, an interview took one and a half hours. The interviews 
covered a broad set of questions regarding sociodemographic and psychological data of the 
founder. Moreover, we inquired into the founder’s activities along the founding process. 
Economic data focused on the time before the first business year and the first three 
business years. Retrospective data relating to events in the founder’s life and to the 
business history were collected using a modified version of the Life-History Calendar 
(Belli et al., 2004), which increases the validity of retrospective data.26 
                                                          
26 This method is based on the principles of autobiographic memory. In a first step, we asked interviewees 
about the timing of well-known events (e.g., marriage). In a second step, these events served as anchors for 
less well represented events (e.g., first interest in entrepreneurship). 
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I analyze 162 genuinely new start-ups that were all founded later than 199327 and 
that did not engage in R&D within their first three business years. However, they might be 
still innovative and growth-oriented since Bhidé (2000) points out that promising start-ups 
are rather characterized by the personal capacity of their founder or promising market 
opportunities rather than deep R&D. Financial subsidies were given to 73 of these firms 
(45.1% ) at sometime during the first three business years. The mere receipt of any subsidy 
within the first three business years is denoted with the dummy variable Subsidy. Since 
start-ups can make use of several policy instruments simultaneously, policy take-up is 
further specified by five policy instruments: soft loans, loan guarantees, grants, public 
equity financing, and other support. Soft loans and grants are the most widespread 
instruments (see Fig. 1). Loan guarantees are only used in combination with soft loans. 
Therefore, these two instruments are closely related and thus are pooled in the following 
analysis. 
Three observations are dropped from further analysis: the only observation that 
received public equity funding and two observations that received “other” policy support. 
All remaining subsidized start-ups receive either soft loans (possibly combined with loan 
guarantees) and/or grants. Founders were asked which instrument was the most important. 
These answers are captured by the variable Subsidy_type, which distinguishes between “no 
subsidies”, “soft loan/loan guarantee”, and “grant”: 17.0% of founders received soft loans 
(potentially combined with loan guarantees) and consider these as the most important 
policy support. Grants constitute the most important policy support for 27.0% of the start-
ups investigated. 
                                                          
27 This is done to exclude any effects of German Reunification in 1990. Additionally, 88 start-ups were 
removed because they were not genuinely new (e.g., they were a new branch or new business area of an 
existing company) or because they suffered from poor interview quality. 
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Note: N = 162; start-ups can make use of more than one policy instrument 
Figure 2.1: Take-up of policy instruments within the first three business years 
 
 
2.3.2 Targeting of policy support 
Does actual policy allocation follow the rationale of positive external effects or do 
policymakers focus on remedying capital market imperfections? In the following, the 
targeting of policy support is analyzed with a logistic regression. 
 
Variables 
The variables below specify ex-ante characteristics that describe whether policy targeting is 
oriented toward innovativeness, high-growth entrepreneurship and endowments of human 
capital, and/or financial resources. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics are given 
in Table 2.2; Table 2.3 sets out the intercorrelations. 
 Overall take-up of  
101 policy instruments 
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 Variables Variable description Mean Sd 
Innovativeness Novelty 
The novelty of the business idea refers to the degree of its 
newness. Five categories were given: novelty (0), regional or 
local (1), supra-regional but national (2), European (3), and 
global novelty (4). 
0.62 1.01
High-growth 
entrepreneur-
ship 
Growth 
goals 
Interviewees had to classify their goals at the beginning of 
the first business year given the following contradictory pair 
with a 5-level scale in-between: to generate constant 
revenues vs. to generate constantly rising revenues. If 
founder’s growth goals are above the mean, the dummy 
variable is coded 1. 
0.60 0.49
University 
degree 
The dummy variable indicates if the interviewed founder had 
(at least) a university degree at the beginning of the first 
business year. 
0.70 0.46
Previous 
self-
employment 
The dummy variable indicates if the interviewed founder was 
self-employed at any time before the first steps in the 
founding process. 
0.39 0.49Human 
capital 
Team start-
up 
Team start-ups are defined as venture set-ups where more 
than one person was actively involved in the founding 
process and was intended to become an owner of the 
company. This dummy variable is coded 0 in the case of a 
single founder, and 1 in the case of a team start-up. 
0.65 0.48
Financial 
resources 
Initial 
capital 
The amount of starting capital at the beginning of the first 
business year was asked for with the help of the following 
categories: 1,000 EUR or less (1), more than 1,000 to 10,000 
EUR (2), more than 10,000 to 50,000 EUR (3), more than 
50,000 to 100,000 EUR (4), more than 100,000 to 250,000 
EUR (5), more than 250,000 to 500,000 EUR (6), more than 
500,000 EUR (7). 
3.14 1.10
Control variables 
Year 1994–
1997 0.44 0.50
Year 1998–
2001 0.36 0.48Year dummies 
Year 2002–
2006 
Dummy variables that capture the time of business start, i.e., 
the first business year of the company when accounting 
started either because of obligations from the commercial 
register or because of first revenues. 
0.19 0.40
Nace 2 Chemical industry, metalworking industry, engineering 0.16 0.37
Nace 3 Electrical engineering, fine mechanics, and optics 0.19 0.40
Nace 7 Information and communication technology, R&D, services 0.33 0.47
Nace industry 
dummies 
(NACE, 1 
digit) Nace x Miscellaneous industries 0.31 0.47
N = 159 
Table 2.2: Variable definition and descriptive statistics 
 
Founders’ ambitions have been found to be positively related to subsequent firm growth 
(Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003), thus justifying Growth goals as an ex-ante characteristic of 
high-growth entrepreneurship. Three variables describe the start-up’s endowment with 
human capital. The variable University degree captures general human capital, whereas 
Previous self-employment is regarded as an important indicator for specific human capital 
(Brüderl et al., 1992). For instance, experienced entrepreneurs have been found to identify 
more opportunities and exploit more innovative opportunities with greater wealth creation 
potential (Ucbasaran et al., 2009). A team start-up accumulates the human capital of its 
members; therefore, it is controlled for multiple founders. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Employment growth -      
(2) Credit rating -0.15 * -     
(3) Subsidies 0.19 ** 0.04  -    
(4) Novelty -0.14 * -0.03  -0.04  -     
(5) Growth goals 0.07  0.10  -0.05  -0.08  -    
(6) University degree -0.13 * -0.11  0.06  0.04  -0.09  -    
(7) Previous self-employment -0.18 ** 0.18 ** -0.14 * 0.35 *** -0.03  -0.04  -    
(8) Team start-up -0.09  0.12  0.06  -0.06  -0.08  0.01  0.04  -   
(9) Initial capital -0.04  -0.07  0.23 *** -0.07  0.14 * -0.02  -0.12  0.10  -   
(10) Year 1994–1997 0.04  -0.02  -0.12  -0.10  -0.10  -0.02  -0.14 * 0.01  0.12  -   
(11) Year 1998–2001 0.01  -0.00  0.04  0.08  0.20 ** 0.10  0.20 ** -0.03  -0.11  -0.67 *** -   
(12) Year 2002–2006 -0.06  0.03  0.11  0.03  -0.11  -0.09  -0.07  0.02  -0.03  -0.44 *** -0.37 *** -   
(13) Nace 2 0.24 *** -0.11  0.26 *** 0.21 ** 0.05  -0.12  -0.04  -0.11  0.15 * -0.05  0.05  -0.00  -   
(14) Nace 3 -0.04  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.08  -0.13  -0.07  0.09  0.19 ** 0.08  -0.08  -0.00  -0.22 *** -   
(15) Nace 7 -0.07  0.02  0.06  0.01  -0.06  0.20 ** 0.02  0.03  -0.13  -0.05  0.03  0.03  -0.31 *** -0.34 *** -  
(16) Nace x -0.09  0.09  -0.25 *** -0.17 ** -0.05  0.00  0.07  -0.02  -0.15 * 0.03  -0.01  -0.03  -0.30 *** -0.33 *** -0.47 *** - 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
N = 159; however, due to missing values for the credit rating, the intercorrelations with the survival indicator comprise only 125 observations. 
Table 2.3: Correlation matrix 
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Logistic regressions 
The following regressions reveal the characteristics which influence subsidization. In a first 
step, the logistic regression analyzes whether innovativeness, high-growth 
entrepreneurship, human capital, and/or financial resources indicate subsidization. 
Therefore, the variables described in Table 2.2 are employed as independent variables. The 
estimates of the logistic regression are given in the first column of Table 2.4. The novelty 
of the business idea (Novelty), founder’s Growth goals as well as the human capital 
variables have no impact on the probability of receiving subsidies. The amount of Initial 
capital exerts a positive and highly significant impact on the probability of receiving 
subsidies. Having been founded more recently increases the probability of subsidization 
(significant at the 10% level). Subsidies are more likely to be given to start-ups operating 
in the chemical industry, metalworking industry, and engineering (Nace 2) (r: 1.912; 
p = 0.002). Furthermore, the coefficient of Nace 7 (information and communication 
technology, R&D, services) indicates a positive relationship to subsidization at the 5% 
significance level. 
  Logistic regression  Multinomial logistic regression (base outcome: no subsidization) 
Subsidy Subsidy_type 
Dependent variable 
 
Take-up of 
subsidies yes/no 
 Soft loans (and loan 
guarantees) Grants 
Novelty  -0.067  -0.084 -0.098  
Growth goals  -0.553  -0.455 -0.650  
University degree  0.348  -0.168 0.684  
Previous self-
employment  -0.557
  -1.285** -0.187  
Team start-up  0.370  0.626 0.234  
Initial capital  0.569***  0.586** 0.553 ** 
Year 1998–2001  0.757*  0.156 1.160 ** 
Year 2002–2006  0.923*  -0.115 1.507 *** 
Nace 2  1.912***  2.204*** 1.714 ** 
Nace 3  0.529  0.435 0.563  
Nace 7  0.922**  1.138 0.824  
Constant  -3.130***  -3.582*** -4.039 *** 
27 43 Number of 
observations  159 
 
159 
Log likelihood  -91.888  -131.934 
Pseudo-R2  0.1575  0.1529 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
89 nonsubsidized start-ups form the base outcome in the multinomial logistic regression. 
Table 2.4: Logistic regressions 
 
In a second step, a multinomial analysis is conducted to distinguish between the two 
major policy instruments – soft loans (combined with loan guarantees) and grants. The 
results of the multinomial logistic regression are shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.4. A 
history of previous self-employment reduces the chances of receiving a soft loan/loan 
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guarantee (r: -1.285; p=0.035), but has no effect on the receipt of a grant. Grants are given 
significantly more often to start-ups founded more recently (time dummies significant at 
1% and 5% levels). Otherwise, the separate analysis of grants and soft loans/loan 
guarantees in the multinomial logit regression does not reveal different characteristics 
which influence subsidization compared to the aggregate measure Subsidies.28  
 
Results 
The logistic regressions fail to reveal that subsidy allocation is based on start-ups’ ex-ante 
characteristics as hypothesized in Table 2.1. Hence, the analysis sheds no light on whether 
policy is focused on remedying capital market imperfections or on the creation of positive 
external effects. Apart from a positive impact of the amount of financial resources (Initial 
capital) on subsidization, which indicates policy targeting of start-ups likely to yield 
positive external effects, all other indicators of the rationale for policy targeting are 
insignificant (Novelty, Growth goals, University degree, Team start-up). Hence, the 
allocation achieved by policy schemes does not suggest that the schemes are working to 
address market failure. Furthermore, the multinomial logistic regression reveals no distinct 
differences between subsidies in the form of soft loans/loan guarantees and grants, thus 
raising doubts as to the necessity of different instruments. 
However, it is not only policymakers and program officials that play a role in the 
selection of subsidy beneficiaries; founders and their start-ups might self-select into the 
programs (Storey, 2000). Figure 2.2 shows the self-reported reasons for non-subsidization. 
The first two categories, which represent 74.2% of nonsubsidized founders, can be viewed 
as founder self-selection. Self-selection is thus the primary driver of selective policy 
support which might be (partly) explained by founders’ costs (working time) associated 
with the application for support schemes.29 The other categories can be more or less 
regarded as committee selection. The founders of 7.9% of nonsubsidized ventures reported 
that is was the too-complicated application procedures that prevented them from applying. 
This category probably blurs with the fourth category (“not eligible, therefore not 
applied”), as both are simply different forms of dropping out of the information and 
                                                          
28 Given the relatively low number of observations in each category of the variable Subsidy_type and the 
descriptive character of the logistic regressions, the multinomial logistic regression was also run with a 
reduced set of independent variables, resulting in only minor changes of the coefficients. 
29 A policy evaluation of innovation support schemes in Saxony (IWH, 2008) reveals considerable 
expenditure needed for the application of the Einzelbetriebliche Innovationsförderung. About 24% of 
respondents stated that they spent more than 20 working days for the application, 35% needed between 11 
and 20 working days and another 18% dedicated between 6 and 10 working days. Only 14% of interviewed 
firms needed 5 working days or less. There is no correlation between the expenditure for the application 
procedure and the subsequent amount of the subsidy. 
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application process. The applications of 5.6% of nonsubsidized founders were rejected, 
indicating clear-cut committee selection. 
1.1%
15.7%
58.4%
7.9%
11.2%
5.6%
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
Not available /
known
No interest / need Application
procedure too
complicated,
therefore not
applied
Not eligible,
therefore not
applied
Applied, but
rejected
Do not know
 
N = 89 (i.e., all nonsubsidized observations) 
Figure 2.2: Reasons for non-subsidization 
 
Hence, the allocation of start-up subsidies could be driven by both demand and supply and 
might thus reflect changes in the availability and the design of policy schemes, as well as 
changing policy take-up over time. For instance, the increased subsidization via grants over 
time matches the introduction and the increased popularity of start-up subsidies for the 
unemployed starting in 2002, all of which are grant-based (Caliendo et al., 2008). 
To explore the extent of self-selection and program selection I conduct an 
additional multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable of the multinomial 
logistic regression differentiates between three groups of start-ups: those, who are 
subsidized, those who self-selected not to apply (i.e., who either specified “not available / 
known” or “no interest / need”) and those who were – more or less – put off by program 
selection (i.e. those who stated a too complicated application procedure, that they were not 
eligible or had been rejected). The estimates suggest that the selectivity in favor of 
particular industries can be attributed to program selection exerted by policymakers and 
program officials. Having less Initial capital makes start-ups more likely to absent 
themselves from subsidy programs (i.e. they self-select out of subsidization). Start-ups 
founded before 1998 are also more likely to absent themselves from subsidization which 
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might be explained by the lower availability of subsidies at that time. The regression table 
and a more detailed description can be found in Appendix A.1. 
 
 
2.3.3 Effectiveness of policy support 
The previous section demonstrates that subsidies are given neither based on the rationale of 
positive external effects nor on the rationale of capital market imperfections. Therefore, the 
necessary condition for policy intervention does not appear to be met. Furthermore, a 
inconsistent allocation of subsidies is argued to be ineffective. Hence, I additionally assess 
the effectiveness of subsidization with respect to employment growth and survival. First, 
employment growth is a prominent indicator of firm growth and prosperity; moreover, 
employment growth is an important policy goal. Second, the long-run survival of a start-up 
indicates a sustainable policy intervention. 
 
 
(Outcome) Variables 
A start-up’s employment growth and survival probability are captured by the following 
variables: 
Employment growth within the first three business years is defined as 
yearstyearstyearrd EmploymentEmploymentEmploymentgrowthEmployment 113 )( −= . 
Here Employment includes work by founders, active partners, conventional employees, 
hired labor, and trainees. The measure is normalized on full-time positions, thereby 
considering part-time jobs. 
Long-term survival is proxied by the start-up’s credit rating five years after 
founding, which we obtained for each start-up from Creditreform, the leading rating 
agency in Germany. The variable Credit rating thus contains Creditreform’s rating index, 
which ranges from 100 (best) to 600 (worst). Creditreform uses several sources of 
information in making its ratings, for example, financial and structural risks such as 
industry, firm size, and productivity, as well as payment history, quantity of orders, firm 
development, and management quality.30 The credit rating aims to proxy the start-up’s 
default risk and, indeed, credit rating and survival within the first 5 business years are 
                                                          
30 For more information on the Creditreform’s credit rating system, see Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007). 
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highly correlated in the present sample (r: -0.462, p = 0.000)31. The credit rating thus 
serves as a continuous variable for the highly skewed dichotomous variable survival.32 
 
Matching approach 
To identify the causal effect of subsidization, the performance of subsidized and 
nonsubsidized start-ups cannot be compared directly. Although the findings set out in 
Section 2.3.2 did not reveal distinct policy targeting, the first two columns of Table A.3 
(see Appendix A.4) show differences in previous self-employment, initial capital, and 
industry between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups. These differences, i.e., the 
selection bias, might lead to different outcomes even in absence of subsidies. Therefore, 
the counterfactual outcome must be discovered, that is, the outcome of a nonsubsidized 
start-up if it were subsidized. 
Matching procedures based on the potential outcome approach of Roy (1951) and 
Rubin (1974) have been developed to address the selection bias in observational data. To 
approach the counterfactual outcome, these authors assume that the selection of firms into 
subsidization is completely based on observable characteristics. The conditional 
independence assumption (CIA) states that, given a set of observable exogenous (not 
affected by the treatment) characteristics, potential outcomes are independent of the 
treatment assignment (Smith and Todd, 2005). In other words, if one wants to attribute the 
differential performance to the receipt of subsidies, subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups 
should not differ in any other characteristics that impact on the outcome variable. Implicit 
in this matching approach is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which 
states that subsidization does not impact on any start-ups other than those that are explicitly 
treated (Rubin, 1991). In the present context, this implies that subsidies do not impact on 
nonsubsidized start-ups via market effects or knowledge spillovers. Thus, SUTVA rules 
out general equilibrium effects of subsidies. 
It can be difficult, however, to find a nonsubsidized control unit if there is a great 
number of characteristics on which matching takes place. To solve this “curse of 
dimensionality”, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose the use of propensity score 
matching. The basic idea is not to match on covariates directly, but to match on a function 
of the covariates that describes the propensity to receive subsidies. This predicted 
                                                          
31 9.4% of start-ups of the analyzed sample did not survive the first five years. 8.8% of start-ups in the sample 
are younger than five years, so nothing can be said about their later survival. 
32 Creditreform does not routinely generate credit ratings for each new start-up, but only if there is an external 
request from other firms. Because of missing credit ratings, I exclude 34 observations when analyzing the 
outcome variable Credit rating. These nonrated start-ups turn out to have significantly less initial capital than 
rated start-ups. Hence, it should be borne in mind that the credit rating might imply a systematic bias in favor 
of the larger start-ups. 
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probability of group membership is usually obtained from logistic regression. There are 
various matching algorithms, all of which contrast the outcome of a subsidized start-up 
with a weighted average of the outcome of (some) nonsubsidized observations. 
Asymptotically, all matching algorithms should yield the same results (Smith, 2000). 
I apply kernel matching, which uses all nonsubsidized start-ups to construct a match 
for each subsidized start-up. This method is the best choice for my data, since the sample is 
small and there are almost as many subsidized as nonsubsidized start-ups. Basically, kernel 
matching juxtaposes the outcome of each subsidized start-up to the weighted sum of all 
nonsubsidized start-ups. The weights assigned by the weighting function to the 
nonsubsidized start-ups are higher the closer the nonsubsidized start-ups match the 
subsidized start-up with respect to the observed characteristics that are captured by the 
propensity score. The total weight of all controls adds up to 1 for each subsidized start-up. 
The implementation of kernel matching involves two choices: the choice of a kernel 
function and the choice of the bandwidth parameter. DiNardo and Tobias (2001) note that 
the kernel employed is relatively unimportant in practice, but that choice of the bandwidth 
parameter matters. The bandwidth parameter determines a tradeoff between “few but good 
matches” (yielding higher variance) and “many but potentially bad matches” (leading to 
biased estimates). Here, Silverman’s (1986) rule of thumb is used to determine the 
bandwidth parameter and thus to balance bias and variance. The exact matching protocol is 
set out in Table 2.5. Estimations are made with the psmatch2 Stata ado package by Leuven 
and Sianesi (2003). 
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Step 1. A logit model for both outcome variables (employment growth and credit rating) is specified and 
estimated. In this way, the propensity scores for each observation are obtained. The choice of variables and the 
estimation of the propensity score are explained in Appendix A.2. 
Step 2. The sample is restricted to the region of common support. The common support condition ensures that 
any set of characteristics of subsidized start-ups (as captured by the propensity score) can also be observed for 
nonsubsidized ones. The region of common support is determined by a minimum-maximum comparison of the 
distribution of the propensity score. The imposition of the common support requires dropping 9 (4) observations 
from the analysis of employment growth (credit rating). The distributions of the propensity score that determine 
the region of common support can be found in Appendix A.3. 
Step 3. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) (Table 2.6) is the difference between the mean outcome 
of subsidized start-ups and matched nonsubsidized start-ups. Following the notation of Caliendo (2006), the 
average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) can be stated as ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
−=
1 0
0
]),([1 01
1 Ii Ij
jNi YjiWYN
ATT  with 1iY  
denoting the outcome of the subsidized start-up i and 0jY  the outcome of nonsubsidized start-ups j. N1 (N0) is the 
number of observations in the subsidized group I1 (control group I0). The outcome of i is thus contrasted with the 
average weighted outcome of the control group, where the weights are given by ∑ ∈= 00 ),( Ik ik
ij
N G
G
jiW . Thereby, 
ikG  denotes a Gaussian kernel ]/)[( hPPG ki −  with Pi (Pk) standing for the propensity score of subsidized 
(nonsubsidized) start-ups. The bandwidth parameter h  is determined with the following formula, 
2.09.0 −⋅⋅= nAh  (Silverman, 1986), in which n denotes the number of observations and the term 
)
34.1
,min( rangeileinterquartdeviationstandardA =  accounts for the distribution of the propensity score.33 
Step 4. The standard error of the matching estimators is calculated using bootstrapping (200 replications).34 The 
estimates for the average treatment effect (ATT) as well as their bootstrapped standard errors and p-values are set 
out in Table 2.6. 
Step 5. The matching quality is assessed by analyzing the mean differences between nonsubsidized and 
subsidized matched start-ups. After matching, there should be no significant differences regarding any 
characteristics that are assumed to have an impact on both the receipt of subsidies and the respective outcome 
variable. A comparison of mean differences between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups is given in Appendix 
A.4. 
Step 6. To check the robustness of the results, Steps 3, 4, and 5 are repeated for different bandwidth parameters 
h , which are employed in the kernel matching algorithm in Step 3. 
Table 2.5: Matching protocol 
 
Results 
The employment growth of subsidized start-ups exhibits an ATT of 0.3650, i.e., the 
difference between the mean employment growth of subsidized start-ups (0.9831) and 
matched nonsubsidized start-ups (0.6180). However, the higher employment growth of 
subsidized start-ups is not significant. Looking at the indicator for survival, subsidized 
                                                          
33 The calculation is as follows. For the analysis of employment growth, 2037.0)
34.1
0.2937,.20370min( ==A  is inserted 
in 511489.0 −⋅⋅= Ah . Hence, the optimal bandwidth is 0675.0=h . Analogous to the previous calculation, the 
optimal bandwidth for the analysis of our survival indicator is derived by estimating 
1657.0)
34.1
0.2220,.17520min( ==A  and 0571.01219.0 5
1 =⋅⋅= −Ah . 
34 Although a distribution theory for the cross-sectional and difference-in-difference kernel and local linear 
matching is derived in Heckman et al. (1998), standard errors for matching estimators are in practice 
generated using bootstrap resampling methods. The use of bootstrapping is backed by Abadie and Imbens 
(2008), who suggest that the standard bootstrap can be applied to assess the variability of kernel matching 
estimators. 
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start-ups have a mean credit rating of 302.63 compared to the mean rating of 291.45 of 
their nonsubsidized matched counterparts. Again, the worse credit rating of subsidized 
start-ups fails to reach significance. Table 2.6 shows that other bandwidth parameters also 
result in insignificant estimates.35 
The matching procedure thus does not reveal any impact of subsidies on 
employment growth or credit rating and thus indicates deadweight losses. Interviewees’ 
self-report of windfall gains is in line with these mixed results. Each founder of a 
subsidized start-up was asked: “Would you have continued your start-up [or, alternatively, 
important business projects] without the subsidies?” About one-third (32.9%) answered 
“yes, readily”; 37.0% said “yes, perhaps or on a reduced scale”; only 26.0% said “no”.36 
 
Mean outcome of 
matched 
# 
Observations 
 
Matching algorithm 
subsidized 
start-ups
non-
subsidized 
start-ups 
ATT S.E. p-value 
Sub-
sidized
Non-
subsi-
dized 
Kernel 
Optimal bandwidth (0.0675) 0.9544  0.6087  0.3456 0.2809  0.218  64 84 
Bandwidth 0.02 0.9544  0.5751  0.3793 0.2806  0.177  64 84 
Bandwidth 0.04 0.9544  0.6075  0.3469 0.2714  0.201  64 84 
Bandwidth 0.06 0.9544  0.6130  0.3414 0.2686  0.204  64 84 
Bandwidth 0.08 0.9544  0.5991  0.3553 0.2349  0.130  64 84 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
gr
ow
th
  
Bandwidth 0.10 0.9544  0.5838  0.3706 0.2780  0.183  64 84 
Kernel 
Optimal bandwidth (0.0571) 302.63 291.45  11.18 19.12  0.559  67 54 
Bandwidth 0.02 302.63 306.23  -3.60 29.23  0.902  67 54 
Bandwidth 0.04 302.63 296.55  6.08 21.74  0.780  67 54 
Bandwidth 0.06 302.63 290.86  11.77 19.28  0.542  67 54 
Bandwidth 0.08 302.63 288.25  14.37 18.14  0.428  67 54 C
re
di
t r
at
in
g 
– 
Su
rv
iv
al
  
Bandwidth 0.10 302.63 287.23  15.40 20.21  0.446  67 54 
Note: No estimate reaches the 0.1 significance level. 
Table 2.6: Overview of results obtained from kernel matching employing various bandwidth 
parameters  
 
Matching relies on strong untestable assumptions, particularly the conditional 
independence assumption. The validity of the conditional independence assumption relies 
crucially on the possibility of comparing subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups on the 
basis of pretreatment characteristics. Given the rich dataset, which includes personal data 
for the founder and the founding team as well as characteristics of the start-up and the 
business idea, it is plausible to assume that the outcomes and the allocation of subsidies are 
independent, conditional on observed attributes. Heckman et al. (1997) point out that 
matching methods substantially reduce biases when, first, all information is collected with 
                                                          
35 The use of other matching algorithms, such as radius matching, does not yield significant results either. 
These results are not shown here, but can be obtained from the author. 
36 Due to three refusals, the percentages do not add up to 100. 
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the same questionnaire for both the subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups and, second, 
these are drawn from the same random sample (which is supported by the experimental 
evidence of Michalopoulos et al. (2004)). Both requisites are met by my dataset. Moreover, 
the sample is considerably homogenous, since I only consider genuinely new start-ups in 
innovative industries in the East German state of Thuringia that were not engaged in R&D. 
 
2.4 Discussion and conclusions 
In general the results of this chapter indicate policy failure. The logistic regressions suggest 
that alleged market failure is not targeted and, furthermore, the matching analysis shows no 
impact of subsidization in terms of higher employment growth or higher chances of firm 
survival. Ineffective subsidies do not imply that subsidies have no effects at all, however, 
since subsidies might provide inefficient start-ups with an artificial competitive edge and 
thus distort market selection. However, I can only speculate about substitution effects 
because the matching approach explicitly ignores the market effects of subsidies.37 The 
present study has several limitations. To begin with, the likelihood and the extent of 
substitution effects depend on the amount of subsidies, information I do not have. This also 
implies that I cannot analyze a potential targeting that bases the amount of subsidy on start-
up characteristics. Furthermore, small sample sizes and high standard errors provide good 
reasons to interpret the present results with some caution. 
Still, the analysis has significant implications for future evaluations. Although I 
cannot distinguish between individual programs and funding agencies, my study does point 
out the limited potential of policy targeting. Since no distinct differences between grant-
based intervention and loan-based intervention are found, it is worth asking whether the 
myriad programs and the diverse structure of funding agencies mitigate intricate 
information problems in allocating subsidies. If the wide range of different schemes and 
funding agencies do not, in practice, improve policy targeting, they very well may be quite 
successful at increasing administrative costs and enhancing the difficulty of policy 
evaluation, the latter problem arising because each program serves so few beneficiaries that 
analysis of effectiveness is hampered by low sample sizes (a problem this study ran up 
against itself). 
Moreover, the present findings question fundamentally the general subsidization of 
start-ups as an instrument to tackle market failure. First, the existence of market failure is 
far from clear and cannot be claimed to universally hamper entrepreneurship. This is true 
both for positive external effects (Auerswald, 2007) and capital market imperfections 
                                                          
37 This is due to the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). 
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(Parker, 2002). Moreover, some authors state excessive participation in entrepreneurship 
resulting from overlending and overoptimism and thus argue for discouraging 
entrepreneurship (de Meza, 2002; Parker, 2007; Shane, 2009). Even though subsidies do 
not seem to be an appropriate instrument to tackle market failure, they might be still 
justified by social policy objectives. Start-up subsidies for the unemployed have been 
positively evaluated recently. Caliendo et al. (2008) show that minimum 20 months after 
the phase-out of the assistance between 50-67% of (former unemployed) recipients are still 
self-employed. Recipients of start-up subsidies are also more likely to be employed and 
generate higher earnings. However, these partial analyses cannot tell about overall market 
distortions arising due to subsidies which do not target incidences of market failure. 
Second, if policy intervention is agreed upon, incidences of market failure have to 
be identified individually ex-ante to guide subsidy allocation. Precise policy targeting, 
however, is unlikely due to fundamental information problems (Holtz-Eakin, 2000). 
Presumably, banks use the best screening technology available to minimize information 
asymmetries that cause capital market imperfections, and Parker and van Praag (2006) 
doubt that government can do a better or even equal job at this, an ability that would be 
necessary for successful policy intervention. Similarly, Stiglitz and Wallsten (2000, p. 47) 
describe the “monumental task” of identifying marginal projects that have the potential to 
yield social returns but that will not be realized in the absence of subsidies because the 
private returns are too low. Moreover, the extent of self-selection into subsidization 
(remember that 58.4% of founders indicated no interest and/or need for policy support) 
limits policymakers’ potential of selective policy targeting. 
Third, public-choice considerations suggest that policymakers and funding 
authorities may have incentives that actually conflict with a policy targeting market failure. 
On the one hand, policymakers and funding authorities are keen on portraying themselves 
as the engineers of success and are thus motivated to fund projects that would have 
succeeded even without their help (Lerner, 1999). This situation is further aggravated by a 
different culture of risk-taking in the public sector. Stiglitz and Wallsten (2000) point out 
that program officials may have a tendency to focus on choosing projects that have a high 
probability of success instead of funding projects for which even higher returns can be 
expected but that are riskier. On the other hand, start-up subsidies also serve as a labor 
market instrument and thus are given to the potentially less promising ventures (Caliendo 
et al., 2008; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Additionally, the myriad of funding schemes 
results in numerous program officials who have to justify their existence. Rather than doing 
nothing, they are thus induced to subsidize any start-ups – regardless of whether the 
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rationale of policy intervention does apply or not. The low rejection rate (remember that 
only 5.6% of nonsubsidized founders were rejected) supports this view.  
 The difficulties in identifying incidences of market failure as well as the interplay of 
policymakers, program officials, and potential awardees blur the actual targeting of 
policies. However, inconsistent policy allocation has severe implications for policy 
effectiveness and market distortions. On the one hand, if market failure does not exist, 
recipients probably do not need subsidization and taxpayers’ money spent on such is 
wasted (Stam et al., 2009). Conversely, a previous evaluation of R&D subsidies finds a 
distinct policy focus on innovative start-ups and academic spin-offs as well as a high 
effectiveness of R&D subsidies regarding patent output and employment growth (see 
Cantner and Kösters (2009a, b) or Chapter 4 and 5, respectively). The findings for the 
present subset of non-R&D start-ups put the highly positive effects of subsidies earmarked 
for R&D into perspective and show how important the analysis of subsets of heterogeneous 
start-ups is. On the other hand, market distortions arise if subsidies cannot be limited to 
selectively remedy market failure. Therefore, some authors suggest a policy strategy of 
“picking the winner” because then subsidies are least likely to interfere with market 
selection (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Shane, 2009). Yet, those start-ups that exhibit the 
most promising characteristics are probably the ones that need government support the 
least. 
The information needs for policymaking can be alleviated by choice of policy 
instrument. Human-capital-based policy instruments are favored by most economists (e.g., 
Fritsch, 2008; Audretsch and Thurik, 2001), since start-ups with high endowments of 
human capital are less likely to face capital constraints and, at the same time, are more 
likely to yield social returns. Moreover, Schmitt-Rodermund and Vondracek (2002) 
emphasize that career interests are formed early in adolescence. They thus suggest policy 
action that helps adolescents discover their interests and abilities and makes them aware of 
entrepreneurship as a career option. This kind of entrepreneurship education should be 
offered to all adolescents, i.e., all potential future entrepreneurs. Thereafter, special training 
should be provided for those who have the right combination of personality and 
entrepreneurial orientation. In this way, the targeting problem is more clear-cut and, 
additionally, such a policy initiative will not distort market selection, since it targets the 
individual before the actual start-up of the venture. However, such a policy focus would 
require a major shift in actual policymaking – away from targeting start-ups and 
established firms and toward empowering the individual (potential) entrepreneur. 
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3. Building winners? Perceived usefulness and economic effects of public business 
assistance in the founding process38 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Publicly financed programs offering advice and training to nascent entrepreneurs are 
popular policy instruments across the globe (Bosma et al., 2008). Support, in the form of 
specialized training and provision of information, advice, and various kinds of practical 
assistance, aims to assist “entrepreneurs to successfully develop their business activity and 
to respond effectively to the challenges of their business, social and physical environment” 
(European Commission, 2001, p. 7; Lundström and Stevenson, 2005). In short, the nearly 
universally employed human-capital-based approach to business assistance is designed to 
“build winners” rather than choose them. For example, between 2007 and 2013, the 
European Social Fund will spend € 45,000,000 on advice and coaching to support 
entrepreneurship in the federal German state of Thuringia alone (ESF, 2009). In fact, it is 
the business assistance provided to start-ups by this German state that will be the empirical 
base of the present article. Given various other additional funding sources, the volume of 
public expenditure calls for rigorous evaluation of these assistance programs (European 
Commission, 2001). 
Business assistance schemes can be assessed along two dimensions. First, from an 
economic perspective, publicly financed business assistance targeted at nascent 
entrepreneurs is justified by the positive external effects accruing from entrepreneurship 
(Audretsch et al., 2007; Storey, 2003).39 Social benefits arise when start-ups introduce 
innovation, increase variety, and spur competition, thus leading to increased productivity 
and economic growth (Fritsch, 2008). However, many (potential) entrepreneurs lack the 
managerial and technical skills necessary for developing an organization (Shane, 2004, p. 
241; Chrisman et al., 2005). Since entrepreneurial competence can be acquired – at least 
partly – through training and mentoring (Markman and Baron, 2003; Chrisman et al., 
2005), one goal of publicly financed business assistance is to teach nascent entrepreneurs 
how to successfully launch a competitive and innovative venture. Therefore, the success of 
                                                          
38 This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Obschonka. 
39 Additionally, a lack of recognition and asymmetric information are put forward as a rationale for publicly 
financed business assistance schemes (Storey, 2003). Founders ignore the private benefits of external advice 
and are thus usually averse to paying fees for any advice or training from outsiders. However, the argument 
of asymmetric information justifies only a one-off “taster” subsidy, and not general public provision of 
advisory services (Storey, 2003). Moreover, business assistance schemes sometimes are implemented for 
sociopolitical reasons and thus aim to promote the economic status of disadvantaged groups (Reynolds, 
2007). 
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such policy must be judged on the basis of the positive external effects created by the 
assistance. 
Second, in addition to external effects, understanding how business assistance 
operates is a central aim of public-policy-related entrepreneurship research (Chrisman et 
al., 2005). Generally, business assistance is targeted at the individual nascent entrepreneur, 
who, in turn, should be able to transform this assistance into a tangible, or at least 
measurable, economic outcome (Chrisman et al., 2005). Understanding why one nascent 
entrepreneur perceives business assistance as efficacious, whereas another does not, could 
provide new information on the person-specific impact of business assistance. 
Studying both objective (economic) and subjective (personal) performance 
measures in entrepreneurial evaluation research is not a new idea (Storey, 2000), but a 
close look at the extant literature shows up several shortcomings of this work. First, 
previous studies employing subjective assessments of business assistance have been mainly 
restricted to monitoring policy delivery (Storey, 2000). Second, prior research focuses 
mainly on the assessment of one particular scheme (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2005; Chrisman 
and McMullan, 2000; Chrisman, 1999; Wren and Storey, 2002), which limits the 
generalizability of the results given the diverse range of real-world business support 
schemes. This is particularly true for Germany, where a broad selection of such schemes – 
administered by various providers and funded by various institutions – offer a wide and 
diverse range of support (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2008). 
Hence, evidence as to the actual use of business assistance is needed to discover the unit of 
investigation, i.e., the effects of a particular kind of business assistance. Finally, most 
evaluations fail to account sufficiently for selection bias (Storey, 2003). 
In view of these limitations of previous research, the aims of our study are the 
following. First, this study will explore patterns of actual policy take-up. Our representative 
sample of Thuringian start-ups allows us to take an aggregate view of business assistance 
schemes and characterize the scope and intensity of assistance along the founding process. 
Second, we analyze the predictors of policy take-up and perceived usefulness of business 
assistance and thus seek to provide insights into both policy targeting and the person-
related effects on the assisted entrepreneurs. Finally, this study aims to assess the economic 
impact of business assistance on subsequent business performance employing propensity 
score matching, which allows us to correct for selection bias. 
We find distinct patterns in the use of business assistance, which emphasizes the 
importance and necessity of our investigation into this topic. Our results suggest that a lack 
of entrepreneurial resources (as indicated by a lack of human and social capital and a less 
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distinct entrepreneurial personality make-up) makes people select into comprehensive 
business assistance and perceive such assistance as more useful. However, propensity score 
matching cannot reveal that the use of business assistance results in better start-up 
performance in terms of amount of initial capital, long-run employment, and credit rating. 
The findings further emphasize the need for interdisciplinary evaluations: even though 
business assistance does not seem to have an impact on a start-up’s long-run performance, 
it still might be useful to individual founders who lack personal entrepreneurial resources 
(such as entrepreneurial human and social capital or an entrepreneurial personality) in 
actually starting a business. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the range of business 
assistance schemes and previous evaluation studies. In Section 3.3, we set out our 
evaluation approach, which is designed to overcome the shortcomings of previous work. 
Empirical analyses are conducted in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter with a 
discussion of our results. 
 
 
3.2 Public business assistance in the founding process 
3.2.1 Range of business assistance schemes 
Nearly every developed country provides subsidized business support to nascent and young 
entrepreneurs, as well as to small and medium-sized enterprises (Bosma et al., 2008). 
Large-scale initiatives of this type include the Small Business Development Center 
program in the United States (SBDC), the ALMI in Sweden (Hjalmarsson and Johansson, 
2003; Storey, 2003), and the Business Links framework in the United Kingdom (Mole et 
al., 2008). Advisory services targeted at small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been 
in existence since the 1980s (Storey, 2003), but it is only more recently that there has been 
a reorientation of these types of programs toward nascent and start-up entrepreneurs 
(Lundström and Stevenson, 2005). Lundström and Stevenson (2005) find, moreover, not 
only a trend toward supporting the early phases of the entrepreneurial process, but also that 
business support schemes are increasingly targeted at very specific segments of 
entrepreneurship, for example, technology-oriented nascent entrepreneurs, women or 
minorities. 
 This segmentation is accompanied by a great variety of public assistance services, 
which are mainly provided by (subsidized) private-sector consultants, colleges, and 
universities, as well as by chambers and industry associations (Storey, 2004; TMWTA, 
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2009).40 Innovative technology-oriented or knowledge-based projects are one of the targets 
of policy initiatives; this is true for the East German state of Thuringia, which is the 
empirical base for our analysis. For example, a network of universities, business 
incubators, and the Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Get-up / Thüringer Gründer 
Netzwerk), established in 1998, concentrates its business assistance on founders of 
technology-oriented and knowledge-based start-ups (TMWAI, 2003). This implies that 
each Thuringian university has a contact point for potential and nascent academic 
entrepreneurs. Coaching is also an integral part of EXIST Seed, a (financial) support 
program for academic spin-offs (Kulicke and Schleinkofer, 2008). Moreover, start-up 
assistance to the unemployed often includes consulting services. Since the Federal 
Employment Office gives start-up grants only to founders with a sound business plan, 
applicants can be required to make use of (subsidized) external consulting services 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2009). 
The subsidy environment is confusing due to not only the great variety of public 
support schemes, but also to the various types of business assistance offered. Generally, 
business assistance can be categorized as either operational or strategic support 
(Hjalmarsson and Johansson, 2003; Barney et al., 1996; Chrisman and Leslie, 1989). 
Operational services are objective and encompass known knowledge among experts; 
strategic advice is more individually oriented and is developed interactively between 
consultants and clients (Hjalmarsson and Johansson, 2003). Then, information previously 
unthought-of emerges whose communicability is limited. Strategic assistance can be thus 
expected to be more time-intensive (Chrisman and Leslie, 1989). Although most advisory 
services are designed for particular groups, the scope and intensity of assistance actually 
provided can be expected to be strongly determined by self-selection of founders. In 
particular, Hjalmarsson and Johansson (2003) argue that strategic services are developed in 
a symmetric relation between clients and consultants. The use of strategic services implies 
a strong commitment on the part of the founder, considering that a certain amount of effort 
(and time) will be needed to choose the appropriate advisor and convey enough 
information to make the service selected worthwhile. 
 
                                                          
40 The wide range of initiatives with diverse funding institutions has led to a shift in policy. Beginning in 
2007, the federal level is solely responsible for business assistance to start-ups that are younger than five 
business years. Business assistance targeted at nascent entrepreneurs is now the responsibility of the Länder 
authorities (Bundesregierung, 2008). However, this new structure of funding business assistance schemes is 
not the subject of this chapter. 
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3.2.2 Previous evaluation studies 
To date, evidence as to the effectiveness of assistance schemes has been ambiguous, 
leading Davidsson (2002) to conclude that many programs do not work. Various previous 
evaluation studies are summarized in Table 3.1, which also sets out several explanations 
for the equivocal results.41 First, previous analyses of business assistance schemes differ in 
their evaluation designs. In his examination of evaluation designs, Storey (2003) raises the 
criticism that policy initiatives in OECD countries are mainly monitored and thus lack 
rigorous evaluation. Therefore, Table 3.1 organizes evaluation studies by rigor of their 
analysis, with (a) experimental evidence ranking higher than (b) multivariate econometric 
studies that control for factors that affect the effectiveness of business assistance. This is 
not possible when conducting (c) mean comparisons or (d) monitoring business assistance 
merely by describing policy take-up. These methodological differences hamper the 
comparability across studies. Furthermore, less rigorous analyses cannot detect causal 
relationships. In particular, studies rarely control for self-selection (Storey, 2000, 2003), 
even though self-selection into consulting is highly plausible (Chrisman and McMullan, 
2000). Without controlling for self-selection of founders with promising (less promising) 
ventures into assistance schemes, evaluations will overestimate (underestimate) their 
impact. 
Second, the analyzed assistance is very diverse in intensity and scope, covering 
everything from intense strategically-oriented counseling to one-time operational advice. In 
addition, the various providers of business assistance, which also encompass a wide range, 
from university-based initiatives and venture capitalists to the Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce, do not only target nascent entrepreneurs but also young entrepreneurs and 
owner-managers of small enterprises. Moreover, with the exception of Parker and Belghitar 
(2006), previous studies focus on evaluating individual schemes, an approach hardly 
reflective of the “real” world, where a great many programs exist simultaneously and 
founders take up a mix of different schemes offering assistance in several subject matters. 
Third, the impact of assistance schemes in prior work is usually measured by various 
outcome variables ranging from subjective measures of recipients’ satisfaction to objective 
measures of subsequent business performance such as sales, employment, or survival 
(McMullan et al., 2001). The use of different outcome measures can be partly attributed to 
policymakers, who usually do not specify measurable objectives of assistance schemes 
(Storey, 2003). Finally, institutional setting could be important, thus hampering the 
                                                          
41 Table 1 is based on a tabulation of studies on small business assistance programs in the United States done 
by Gu et al. (2008). For a more comprehensive overview of evaluations of U.S. schemes, the reader is 
directed to the original work. 
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generalizability of findings from policy evaluations conducted in Europe, Latin America, 
and the United States. 
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Study Analyzed scheme/unit of analysis Data 
Control for 
selection bias Treatment variable 
Performance 
measure/outcome Covariates/controls Findings 
a) Experimental study 
K
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d
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a
 
(
2
0
0
6
)
 
FINCA Peru – a “village 
banking” organization 
for poor, female 
microentrepreneurs in 
Lima and Ayacucho  
Baseline survey few 
weeks prior to the training 
in 2002 and 2003; follow-
up surveys 2 years later; 
N=4,591 
 
Not needed, 
random 
assignment 
- Random 
assignment into 
either mandatory or 
voluntary 
assistance or no 
treatment at all 
- Assistance 
included general 
business skills and 
strategy training, 
not client-specific 
problem-solving 
- Weekly to bi-
weekly training 
- Institutional outcomes 
(e.g., repayment rates of 
micro credits) 
- Business skills and 
practices 
- Business outcomes 
- Household outcomes, 
including empowerment 
in decision making and 
child labor 
 
Subgroup analyses 
differentiating between 
- Location 
- Type of treatment 
(mandatory vs. voluntary) 
- Ex-ante attitude toward 
training 
- Education 
- Civil status 
- Business size 
 
Both clients and microfinance 
institutions profit from 
concomitant business 
assistance: the microfinance 
institution benefits from 
increased retention and 
repayment, and the clients 
showed greater business 
knowledge and better business 
outcomes. Interestingly, the 
effect was strongest for those 
clients who expressed the least 
interest in the training at the 
very beginning. 
b) Econometric analyses 
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Venture capital 
assistance to start-ups 
Start-ups that received 
venture capital and that 
were identified in the 
Venture Capital Journal; 
mainly high-tech firms; 
N=205 
No - Business 
management 
advice (strategic) 
- Operational 
assistance 
Venture teams’ perceived 
usefulness 
- Industry experience 
- Team tenure 
- Innovativeness 
- Engagement of venture 
capitalists 
- Year of first-round funding
Business management advice 
and operational assistance is 
assessed worse the more 
industry experience the new 
venture team has. Business 
management advice is more 
welcome when start-up teams’ 
primary experience is from 
another industry. Current firm 
performance is not related to 
new venture teams’ evaluation 
of VC assistance. 
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Small Business 
Development Center 
(SBDC)–U.S. program 
offering counseling 
assistance to nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Survey conducted in 
2001; receipt of SBDC 
counseling was 5–9 years 
prior thereto, N=159 
No Varying degrees of 
time spent in direct 
contact with SBDC 
counselor within 
nascent phase 
- Employment 
- Sales 
- Founder’s prior 
experience 
- Founder’s education 
- Scope of target market 
- Firm age 
- Industry 
Positive relationship between 
time spent in guided 
preparation and sales and 
employment 3 to 8 years after 
start-up. 
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Business Link network 
(BL)–English network 
offering publicly 
supported advisory 
services to small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises  
Telephone survey of 
2,000 firms, around half 
of which had received 
intensive assistance from 
BL between April and 
October 2003 
No Intensive assistance 
by BL 
- Employment growth 
- Sales growth 
- Firm size 
- Firm age 
- Legal form 
- Market characteristics 
- Business strategy 
- Age of owner-manager 
- Previous self-employment 
Intensive assistance from the 
Business Link network seems 
to have a positive effect on 
simultaneous employment 
growth (no significant effect on 
sales growth). 
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Study Analyzed scheme/unit of analysis Data 
Control for 
selection bias Treatment variable 
Performance 
measure/outcome Covariates/controls Findings 
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Random sample of 
nascent entrepreneurs in 
the U.S.; different 
schemes of business 
assistance – either 
government sponsored 
or funded by 
universities/business 
associations 
Panel Study on 
Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
(PSED); interviews in 
1998/1999; follow-up 
interviews 12 months 
afterward; N=340 
Control for 
ignorance 
about business 
assistance 
programs 
- Dummy variable 
for general 
participation in 
business assistance 
schemes 
- Separate dummy 
variables for either 
government-
sponsored 
programs or 
programs funded 
by 
university/business 
associations 
Status of founding process: 
being still nascent 
entrepreneur vs. having 
started venture vs. having 
quit 
 
- Durable good 
- High-tech start-ups 
- Marital status 
- Gender 
- Being homemaker 
- Industry 
Participation in business 
assistance programs does not 
appear to significantly affect 
outcomes even when 
controlling for awareness of 
programs. However, separate 
analysis of different providers 
of assistance reveals impact of 
business assistance on turning 
nascent entrepreneurs into 
actual entrepreneurs 
(significant at 10% level). 
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Venture capital 
assistance to German 
start-ups 
German start-ups that 
received venture capital in 
2002; N=106 
No Management support 
by venture capitalists 
- Absolute EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization) 
- Earnings growth 
- Subjective assessment of 
goal achievement 
- Subjective attribution of 
management support on 
firm performance 
- Subjective evaluation of 
quality of management 
support 
- Characteristics of founder 
team 
- Company age 
- Company size 
 
Quality of management support 
is positively related to 
EBITDA and the subjective 
performance measures.  
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Marketing Initiative 
within the U.K. 
Enterprise Initiative that 
aimed to provide SMEs 
with a marketing 
strategy; the program 
ran from 1988 to 1994 
All eligible small and 
medium-sized enterprises 
in the West and East 
Midland of England, the 
South West of England, 
and South Wales; survey 
in 1996; N=4,326 
Yes: two-step 
adjustment 
procedure for 
addressing 
selection bias 
Completion of 
consultancy 
- Sales turnover 
- Employment 
- Survival of SMEs 
- Prior turnover 
- Prior employment 
- Independency of firm 
- Export orientation 
- Industry 
- Region 
 
Counseling impacts on sales 
turnover, employment, and 
survival. However, the 
program is most effective for 
medium-sized companies. No 
impact on survival measure 
could be found for smaller 
firms as a group. 
c) Mean comparisons 
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Small Business 
Development Center 
(SBDC) – U.S. program 
offering counseling 
assistance to small 
businesses 
Small business clients 
from SBDC in 
1985/1986; N=76 
No Receipt of 12 or more 
hours of SBDC 
counseling in 
strategic, 
administrative, or 
operating issues; 
comprehensiveness 
of assistance 
- Sales growth 
- Subjective assessment of 
financial performance 
Control for potential 
moderating effect of the 
clients’ type of business 
In the short run, small business 
clients benefit more from 
administrative and operating 
assistance, suggesting a short-
run impact on reducing costs.  
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Study Analyzed scheme/unit of analysis Data 
Control for 
selection bias Treatment variable 
Performance 
measure/outcome Covariates/controls Findings 
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Small Business 
Development Center 
(SBDC) – U.S. program 
offering counseling 
assistance to nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Clients from SBDC in 
1992; mail questionnaire 
in 1994; N=2,025 
No Receipt of five or 
more hours of SBDC 
counseling 
Start-up of venture one 
year after SBDC assistance 
measured by either 
- having become an 
organization, 
- having hired employees, 
or 
- having made sales 
Analysis of subsamples in 
order to identify regional 
effects 
Nascent entrepreneurs who 
take up SBDC program are 
more likely to actually start the 
business. 
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Small Business 
Development Center 
(SBDC) – U.S. program 
offering counseling 
assistance to nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Clients from SBDC in 
1992 and 1994; follow-up 
surveys one year later; 
those founders were 
contacted in 1997 who 
responded to first follow-
up survey and who had 
indicated that they had 
successfully started a 
firm; N=169 
No Receipt of five or 
more hours of SBDC 
counseling 
- Survival 
- Employment growth 
- Sales growth 
- Innovativeness 
- Perceived usefulness 
Not applicable Start-ups that took up the 
SBDC program show higher 
rates of survival, growth, and 
innovation than what an 
average population of ventures 
would suggest. In retrospect, 
the vast majority perceives the 
counseling as beneficial. 
d) Monitoring 
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Small Business 
Development Center 
(SBDC) – U.S. program 
offering counseling 
assistance to nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Clients from SBDC in 
1985 and 1986; survey in 
1987; 36.8% of 
respondents did not start 
business; N=123 
No Receipt of 12 or more 
hours of SBDC 
counseling in 
strategic, 
administrative, or 
operating issues 
Clients’ perception of the 
value of SBDC assistance 
Analysis of subsamples in 
order to determine if the 
relationship between the 
perceived value and the kind 
of assistance was moderated 
by the consultant, the client, 
and the venture 
Strategic assistance (but neither 
operating nor administrative 
assistance) is positively 
associated with the perceived 
value of its service. 
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Business assistance 
provided within EXIST, 
a federal German 
program that aims to 
boost academic spin-
offs 
Founders from EXIST-
funded start-ups; 
telephone survey in 
2002/2003; N = 196 
No Analysis of scope and 
intensity of actual 
business assistance  
Perceived usefulness of 
business assistance 
Not applicable 52.9% of respondents made use 
of some kind of business 
assistance in the firm formation 
process. Three different 
patterns of policy take-up can 
be observed, with assistance 
differing in scope and intensity. 
Overall perceived usefulness of 
business assistance is high 
(51% of respondents perceive 
its usefulness as high; only 
16% indicate a low usefulness). 
Table 3.1: Previous evaluation studies of (partly publicly financed) business assistance given to (nascent) entrepreneurs as well as owner-managers of SMEs 
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3.3 Evaluation approach 
Our evaluation is designed to overcome the shortcomings of previous research by, first, 
exploring patterns of actual policy take-up (Section 3.3.1), second, investigating predictors 
of take-up and perceived usefulness (Section 3.3.2) and, third, examining the assistance’s 
impact on subsequent business performance (Section 3.3.3). 
 
3.3.1 Exploring actual policy take-up 
As shown in Table 3.1, previous evaluation studies assess the impact of one particular 
policy scheme and often model the treatment as a binary variable. Given the wide range of 
support services described in Section 3.2.1, actual take-up of policy schemes is determined 
by both self-selection and program selection. Program selection effects occur due to 
specialized programs designed for, e.g., academic entrepreneurs or the unemployed 
(Lundström and Stevenson, 2005). However, since most German business support schemes 
are open to all comers (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2008), 
program selection effects are assumed to be relatively weak. More importantly, nascent 
entrepreneurs self-select into business assistance schemes and make decisions about the 
scope and intensity of services they use (Chrisman and McMullan, 2000; Kulicke, 2004). 
This self-selection leads to the observation that there are different patterns of policy take-
up even within single assistance schemes. Examining business assistance offered by 
EXIST-funded networks in Germany,42 Kulicke (2004) finds three different types of actual 
take-up of business assistance: some founders require quick and rather general advice, a 
second group needs support in a particular subject matter, and the third type takes 
advantage of intensive support throughout the entire founding process. In summary, then, 
an exploration of actual policy take-up is necessary to discover the unit of evaluation. If 
there are distinct variations in the use of business assistance across founders, we are 
interested in whether these differences in scope and intensity of business assistance also 
cause different effects. 
 
3.3.2 Take-up and perceived usefulness of business assistance 
Having explored the actual unit of investigation, we are interested in the determinants of 
individual policy take-up and founder’s perceived usefulness of business assistance. This 
information will provide deeper insights into the effects of business assistance (McMullan 
                                                          
42 The federal EXIST program started in 1998 and aims to boost academic spin-offs as well as to create a 
regional entrepreneurial climate (Audretsch and Beckmann, 2007). 
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et al., 2001) since it is comprised of the personal judgment of the most central actor in both 
the business assistance process and the firm formation process, that is, the entrepreneur. In 
the following, we argue that a founder’s personal entrepreneurial resources as well as 
characteristics of the start-up project are crucial in explaining both patterns of take-up of 
particular business assistance and the perceived usefulness of same.43 
 
Personal entrepreneurial resources 
It is expected that differences in business assistance take-up, as well as in perceived 
usefulness, are a function of founders’ personal entrepreneurial resources. Those nascent 
founders who lack the necessary resources needed for entrepreneurship should thus select 
themselves into (specific) business assistance and should perceive this as more useful. This 
situation can be described as the “weakness hypothesis” and is based on Markman and 
Baron’s (2003) person-entrepreneurship-fit framework and psychological control theory 
(e.g., Heckhausen and Schulz, 1995). 
 Markman and Baron (2003) argue that entrepreneurs who lack important resources 
(e.g., human and social capital, entrepreneurial skills and ability, self-efficacy) have a poor 
person-entrepreneurship fit and are thus more likely to be unsuccessful in their 
entrepreneurial activity.44 In our case, nascent entrepreneurs with low resources might not 
only exhibit a poor fit, but might also perceive their weakness, motivating them to seek 
help and value this help. It seems plausible to assume that the combination of demanding, 
complex, and stressful entrepreneurial tasks (Schindehutte et al., 2006) and low personal 
entrepreneurial resources might lead to excessive demand and a sense of loss of control 
among these founders. According to control theory, however, individuals seek to exert 
control over their environment (e.g., Heckhausen and Schulz, 1995), and thus we posit that 
“weak founders” might expend a certain amount of effort to restore their sense of control, 
for example, by taking up business assistance.45 
                                                          
43 Perceived usefulness is a central evaluation outcome in past evaluation research (McMullan et al., 2001; 
Storey, 2000). 
44 Such a person-entrepreneurship-fit idea corresponds nicely with fit models in the field of general 
vocational behavior and development. Here, the fit framework is a leading perspective in contemporary 
research on individuals’ vocational choices, behavior, and success (Fouad, 2006). As an illustration, maybe 
the most frequently applied and researched fit approach is Holland’s (1997) fit theory of vocational choices 
where he states that individuals with a poor person-job fit will be less successful and less satisfied with their 
particular job than individuals with a good person-job fit. 
45 Such a challenge-response perspective on human cognition and behavior figures prominently in 
psychology and sociology (e.g., in coping theories such as the transactional stress theory (Lazarus and 
Folkman, 1984) or Elder’s concept of control cycles (Elder and Caspi, 1990)) and it has been applied to 
various fields of human behavior in critical transitions or context-situations such as rapid social change 
(Pinquart and Silbereisen, 2004) or critical life transitions (Heckhausen et al., 2001). 
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 Specifically, we argue that those founders who lack human and social capital as 
well as entrepreneurial personality traits will utilize business assistance more often than 
other founders and perceive the same to be more useful. First, a high level of human 
capital has been shown to be related to firm survival and growth (Brüderl et al., 1992) and 
thus can be viewed as an entrepreneurial resource (Markman and Baron, 2003). Brüderl et 
al. (1992) argue that knowledge gained in prior self-employment indicates entrepreneur-
specific human capital as it might be the best preparation for the entrepreneurial role. 
Entrepreneurial experience (i.e., previous self-employment) might thus enable 
entrepreneurs to draw upon routines that have worked well in the past and thus lower their 
need for external business assistance (see Cooper et al., 1995).46 Furthermore, novice 
entrepreneurs might benefit most from business assistance since the acquisition of 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills might compensate for a lack of experience 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2009). Parental self-employment can be considered as another measure 
of entrepreneur-specific human capital (Brüderl et al., 1992) as self-employed parents have 
been shown to serve as both role models and resource providers (Parker and Belghitar, 
2006; Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
 According to Markman and Baron (2003), social capital is an entrepreneurial 
resource since it proxies other resources that can be made available through social 
networks and contacts. For example, higher entrepreneurial performance might be achieved 
through better access to entrepreneurial finance, and since social ties provide a mechanism 
by which investors obtain information, social ties may facilitate venture capital funding 
(Shane and Cable, 2002). Consequently, a person’s social capital is positively associated 
with both discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities and the ability to actually take 
advantage of them (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Jack and Anderson, 2002). Since nascent 
entrepreneurs with a rich endowment of social capital have been shown to access resources 
through their personal network, endowments of social capital might lower the need for 
public business assistance. 
Finally, personality traits should also predict take-up and perceived usefulness as 
past research makes clear that entrepreneurial activity and success are related to an 
individual’s personality (see Rauch and Frese (2007) for a recent meta-analysis). In other 
words, an entrepreneurial personality is itself an entrepreneurial resource. This should hold 
true for both specific traits (e.g., need for achievement, self-efficacy, and risk-taking) and 
broad traits (e.g., the Big Five; Costa and McCrae, 1992). Although broad traits reflect only 
                                                          
46 However, Cooper et al. (1995) find that the greater search activity of novice entrepreneurs includes only 
personal sources, not professional sources. 
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a person’s very basic personality, they have been shown to be relevant predictors within the 
study of entrepreneurship (Rauch and Frese, 2007; Zhao and Seibert, 2006). Schmitt-
Rodermund (2004, 2007) could show that a specific Big Five pattern relates to 
entrepreneurship (individual entrepreneurial characteristics, activity, and success). 
Analyzing the Terman study47 data set she shows that adolescents whose Big Five profile 
was characterized as high in extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness and low in 
agreeableness and neuroticism showed higher levels of early entrepreneurial competence 
and were more likely to engage in entrepreneurial activity (Schmitt-Rodermund, 2007). 
Such an operationalization of personality is based on the so-called person-oriented 
approach (Magnusson, 1998), which has received widespread attention in psychology, but 
has to date been neglected by entrepreneurship researchers. A person’s entrepreneurial 
personality may not be adequately characterized by single traits alone, but by their 
configuration. Applying Schmitt-Rodermund’s definition of an entrepreneurial personality, 
we thus expect that founders without an entrepreneurial personality profile, which is 
characterized by high scores in extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness and low 
scores in agreeableness and neuroticism, utilize business assistance more often and, 
furthermore, perceive this assistance as more useful than do founders having a more 
entrepreneurial set of personality traits. 
 
Characteristics of the start-up 
In addition to the personal characteristics of the nascent entrepreneur, characteristics of the 
start-up may affect the take-up and perceived usefulness of business assistance. On the one 
hand, team start-ups should be less in need of business assistance because their internal 
resources are more substantial to begin with, consisting of an accumulation of all team 
members’ human and social capital (Kamm et al., 1990; Lechler, 2001). On the other hand, 
having more than one person involved in the founding process has the potential to lead to 
conflict and advice, in the form of a business assistance program, might be sought due to a 
“need for decision legitimation” (Cooper et al., 1995, p. 113). 
 Furthermore, Cooper et al. (1995) find that the need for preparation and legitimacy 
leads to an increased search for information and increased use of professional assistance. 
For example, start-up ventures having a high degree of novelty are generally more complex 
due to, e.g., uncertain markets and regulatory requirements and thus innovative ventures 
and academic spin-offs are expected to be accompanied by intensive search activities. 
                                                          
47 The Terman study is a prospective longitudinal study covering virtually the complete lives of a cohort born 
in the 1920s. It is widely considered as a landmark study in life-span research. 
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Highly educated founders of academic spin-offs face high opportunity costs in the form of 
either foregone earnings in wage employment or time that could have been spent advancing 
their academic reputation (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003). In line with an argument put 
forward by Holland (1997), business assistance might be helpful in allowing these nascent 
entrepreneurs to rationalize their entrepreneurial engagement. 
Supply-side factors also shape the pattern of policy take-up. The increased policy 
focus on entrepreneurship led to an increased availability of subsidized business assistance 
over time. Particularly, there is an extensive range of business support for academic spin-
offs, beginning with the EXIST initiative in 1998 (Audretsch and Beckmann, 2007). 
Moreover, there may be some evidence of policy induced selectivity toward the “weak” 
founders (i.e., those with few entrepreneurial resources), visible, for example, in schemes 
targeted at women, minorities, the young, and the unemployed (Lundström and Stevenson, 
2005). 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes our hypothesized directions of how founders’ personal 
characteristics and the properties of the start-up will affect the take-up and perceived 
usefulness of business assistance. The table makes clear why we focus on 
entrepreneurship-specific human capital, such as self-employed parents, since other human 
capital variables can be expected to be highly correlated with the novelty of the business 
idea or being an academic spin-off. 
 
Take-up and perceived 
usefulness of business 
assistance 
Previous self-employment Human capital Parents self-employed ─ 
Social capital ─ 
Characteristics 
of the founder 
Entrepreneurial personality profile ─ 
 
Team start-up ? Characteristics 
of the start-up Novelty / Academic spin-off + 
 
Table 3.2: Hypothesized directions of how characteristics of the person and the start-up affect 
take-up and perceived usefulness of business assistance 
 
 
3.3.3 Economic effectiveness 
Publicly financed business assistance is mainly justified by the expectation of positive 
external effects accruing from better start-up performance of assisted founders or by 
sociopolitical reasons like the advancement of certain groups, e.g., women, minorities or 
immigrants (Reynolds, 2007). Following the rationale of positive external effects, public 
advisory services are effective if they improve start-ups’ economic viability so that assisted 
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start-ups do, indeed, result in positive external effects in the long-run. Assistance provided 
during the nascent phase has the potential to create long-term benefits (Chrisman and 
McMullan, 2000) because initial founding conditions and decisions at the pre-start-up stage 
have been found to leave a long-term impact on subsequent structure (Stinchcombe, 1965) 
and performance (Bamford et al., 2000; Cooper et al., 1994). However, external effects 
accruing from individual entrepreneurial activity are very difficult to measure since they 
include fuzzy indirect effects such as introduction of innovations and securing market 
efficiency through competition (Fritsch, 2008). Furthermore, positive external effects only 
become apparent in the long run, with estimated time lags between entrepreneurial activity 
and subsequent economic performance of up to 10 years (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; 
Thurik et al., 2008; van Stel and Suddle, 2007). 
Therefore, a venture’s capital base, its employment, and long-term survival are 
often used as proxies for positive external effects in empirical studies (e.g., Chrisman and 
McMullan, 2000; Chrisman et al., 2005). These measures of success indicate start-ups’ 
economic viability, their knowledge base, and resource strength, which can be viewed as 
necessary prerequisites for subsequent positive external effects (Fritsch and Schroeter, 
2009).48 
 
 
3.4 Empirical analysis 
3.4.1 The data 
Sample. Data for this study were collected by the Thuringian Founder Study (Thüringer 
Gründer Studie), which is an interdisciplinary project on the success and failure of 
innovative start-ups in the East German State of Thuringia. The database draws from the 
commercial register for commercial and private companies (Handelsregister, Abteilung 
A/B) in Thuringia and includes 2,971 start-ups in innovative industries registered between 
1994 and 2006. Innovative industries, according to ZEW classification (Grupp and Legler, 
2000), comprise “advanced technology” and “technology-oriented services”. 
The survey population consists of 4,215 founders (first registered owner-managers) 
who registered a new entry in the Handelsregister between 1994 and 2006. This design 
made it possible not only to interview founders of active companies but also founders of 
ventures that failed. From the survey population we selected a random sample of 3,671 
                                                          
48 However, success measures such as survival or growth can only roughly indicate social returns because 
even failed start-ups may give rise to positive externalities. A failed start-up may have challenged incumbents 
and given rise to knowledge externalities, e.g., when the ideas and experiences of their former employees 
become an integral part of products made by successful firms (Audretsch et al., 2007; Fritsch, 2008). 
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founders to contact. Due to team start-ups, this corresponds to 2,604 start-ups in innovative 
industries. Between January and October 2008, we conducted 639 face-to-face interviews 
with solo entrepreneurs or with one member of a start-up team (a response rate of about 
25%). Due to a number of exclusions,49 the present analysis includes 445 start-ups, all 
founded later than 1993 so as to preclude any effects of German Reunification50. The 
structured interviews were conducted by members of the research project as well as by 
student research assistants who were trained in several sessions during December 2007. On 
average, an interview took one and a half hours. The interviews covered a broad set of 
questions regarding sociodemographic and psychological data of the founder. Moreover, 
we asked for founder’s activities along the founding process. Retrospective data relating to 
events in the founder’s life and business history were collected using guided recall. 
Specifically, we utilized mnemonic techniques drawn from the Life History Calendar 
method (Caspi et al., 1996). This method has been shown to collect more valid and reliable 
retrospective information than traditional questionnaires (Belli et al., 2004).51 
 
Measures. 43.6% of founders took-up business assistance along the founding process, 
which has been defined as the time between the first steps in the start-up project and the 
first business year. Founders were asked to specify whether they made use of business 
assistance in regard to formalities, the business plan, financing, a market analysis, or 
management support. Furthermore, inquiry was made as to the intensity of business 
assistance used. Definitions of the variables can be found in Table 3.3. 
                                                          
49 Seventy-three start-ups that turned out not to be genuinely new (e.g., they were a new branch or new 
business area of an existing company) were removed. A further 18 interviews were deleted due to concerns 
over interview quality. One-hundred start-ups were founded before 1994. Because of refusals for several 
variables, the number of observations changes across the analyses. 
50 We defined the first business year as the time when accounting started either because of legal obligations or 
because of first revenue. This does not necessarily correspond to the date of registration in Handelsregister. 
51 We employed a study-specific version of the Life History Calendar, which is a data-collection tool 
developed by psychologists and sociologists. It is based on the principles of autobiographic memory. This 
means that – in a first step – we asked interviewees to fill in the timing of well-known life events, sequences, 
and transitions (e.g., marriage, birth of children, education, or career structure). In a second step, these events 
served as anchors for the recall of our retrospective study variables. 
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 Variable Description 
Formalities This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received business assistance with regard to formalities concerning the venture set-up. 
Business plan This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received practical support for writing a business plan. 
Opera-
tional 
Financing This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received business assistance with regard to financing the start-up. 
Market This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received business assistance with regard to a market and competitor analysis. Strategic 
Management This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received business assistance with regard to management issues. 
 
Intensity 
This dummy variable indicates intensity of the interviewed founder’s take-up of 
business assistance along the founding process (in contrast to one-time 
assistance). 
Table 3.3: Variables describing kind and intensity of public business assistance 
 
Table 3.4 sets out the definitions of all other variables and their descriptive statistics. 
 mean sd 
Independent variables  
Previous self-
employment 
This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder was self-
employed at any time before the first steps in the founding process.  
0.38 0.49 
Parents self-
employed 
This dummy variable captures whether the founder’s parents were self-
employed. 
0.17 0.38 
Social capital 
(strong) 
0.37 0.48 
Social capital 
(weak) 
Founders were asked whether they were encouraged by and received 
emotional support from either close friends and/or relatives (strong) or 
acquaintances (weak), which is denoted by 1 (0 otherwise). 0.28 0.45 
We used the German 45-item questionnaire by Ostendorf (1990) to measure 
Big Five personality traits (extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, 
agreeable-ness, and neuroticism). Participants had to rate perceived 
personality attributes using 9 bipolar adjective pairs with Likert scales 
ranging from 0 to 5 for each trait: 
Conscientiousness (α=.82), e.g., “Lazy vs. Diligent” 3.65 0.59 
Extraversion (α=.72), e.g., “Uncommunicative vs. Talkative” 3.21 0.61 
 
 
 
 
 
Entrepreneu-
rial personality  Agreeableness (α=.73), e.g., “Good natured vs. Cranky”  3.09 0.57 
Openness (α=.59), e.g., “Conventional vs. Inventive” 3.18 0.55 
Neuroticism (α=.77), e.g., “Vulnerable vs. Robust” 1.37 0.50 
 
 
Entrepreneu-
rial personality 
profile 
As noted earlier, we follow Schmitt-Rodermund’s (2004, 2007) definition of 
an entrepreneurial personality profile. Higher values of this variable 
(meaning values closer to 0) describe a better fit between the individual’s 
Big Five personality profile and the defined ideal type of an entrepreneurial 
personality. 
Following Schmitt-Rodermund (2004, 2007) the variable “Entrepreneurial 
personality” was created as follows. An ideal entrepreneurial personality 
scores highest (value of 5) in extroversion, conscientiousness, and openness, 
and lowest (value of 0) in agreeableness and neuroticism. With reference to 
this ideal type, we estimated the “goodness of fit” of each person’s Big Five 
profile. First, we calculated each person’s squared differences between the 
ideal values and the personal values on each of the five scales. For instance, 
the squared difference is 9 when a person scored a 3 in neuroticism (because 
the ideal value is 0). Second, the five squared differences were added up for 
each person and, third, this sum was reversed. The resulting values then form 
the final variable entrepreneurial personality profile.52  
-21.4 5.74 
Team start-up Team start-ups are defined as ventures where more than one person was actively involved in the founding process and was intended to become an 
0.68 0.47 
                                                          
52 In contrast to all the retrospective data concerning the firm formation process (which refer to events up to 
14 years prior to the time of the interview), the Big Five traits are measured as respondents’ current traits. 
However, due to their high degree of stability, we deem these trait-measures as useful for the present study 
(Caspi et al., 2005). 
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owner of the company. This dummy variable is coded 0 in the case of a 
single founder, and 1 in the case of a team start-up. 
Novelty 
The novelty of the business idea refers to the degree of its newness. Five 
categories were given: novelty (0), regional or local (1), supra-regional but 
national (2), European (3), and global novelty (4). 
1.31 1.57 
Current life 
satisfaction 
Founders’ current life satisfaction at the time of the interview is measured 
using a Likert scale from 1 (=lowest satisfaction) to 5 (=highest satisfaction) 
(“How satisfied are you with your life right now?”). 
4.02 0.73 
Year 1994–
1997 0.40 0.49 
Year 1998–
2001 0.35 0.48 
Year 2002–
2006 
Dummy variables that capture the time of business start, i.e., the first 
business year of the company when accounting started either because of legal 
obligations or because of first revenue. 
0.24 0.43 
 Industry dummies:   
Nace 2 Chemical industry, metalworking industry, engineering 0.23 0.42 
Nace 3 Electrical engineering, fine mechanics, and optics 0.24 0.43 
Nace 7 Information and communication technology, R&D, services 0.36 0.48 
Nace x Miscellaneous industries 0.18 0.38 
Dependent variables 
Usefulness 
Founders’ perceived usefulness of business assistance was measured for each 
kind of assistance used (e.g., assistance concerning formalities or financial 
assistance) using a 5-point Likert scale with 5 (1) denoting the highest 
(lowest) perceived usefulness of business assistance. The mean of these 
ratings reflects an overall subjective evaluation of actual business assistance. 
3.48 1.17 
Initial capital 
The start-up’s initial capital (i.e., at the beginning of the first business year) 
was asked for with the help of the following categories: 1,000 EUR or less 
(1), more than 1,000 to 10,000 EUR (2), more than 10,000 to 50,000 EUR 
(3), more than 50,000 to 100,000 EUR (4), more than 100,000 to 250,000 
EUR (5), more than 250,000 to 500,000 EUR (6), more than 500,000 EUR 
(7). 
3.34 1.32 
Employment 
Employment in the third business year is defined as number of positions 
staffed by founders, active partners, conventional employees, hired labor, 
and trainees. The measure is normalized on full-time positions, thereby 
considering part-time jobs. 
9.16 11.99
Credit rating 
We obtained a start-up’s credit rating three years after founding from 
Creditreform, the leading rating agency in Germany. The variable credit 
rating thus contains Creditreform’s rating index, which ranges from 100 
(best) to 600 (worst). Creditreform uses several sources of information in 
making its ratings, for example, financial and structural risks such as 
industry, firm size, and productivity, as well as payment history, quantity of 
orders, firm development, and management quality.53 The credit rating aims 
to proxy the start-up’s default risk and, indeed, credit rating and survival are 
highly correlated in the present sample (r: -0.20, p = 0.000). The credit rating 
thus serves as a continuous variable for the highly skewed dichotomous 
variable survival.54 
 
287.93
 
75.72
Note. α refers to Cronbach’s alpha, which is an indicator of reliability 
Table 3.4: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
 
                                                          
53 For more information on Creditreform’s credit rating system, see Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007). 
54 Creditreform does not routinely generate credit ratings for each new start-up, but only when there is an 
external request from other firms. Because of missing credit ratings, we have to exclude 77 observations 
when analyzing the outcome variable Credit rating. These nonrated start-ups turn out to have significantly 
less initial capital and to be less often team start-ups than the rated start-ups. Hence, it should be borne in 
mind that the credit rating might imply a systematic bias in favor of the larger start-ups. Due to data 
availability there are also significantly fewer rated start-ups founded between 1994 and 1997. 
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3.4.2 Empirical clusters of policy take-up 
We investigate whether there are groups of founders who take up business assistance in a 
similar pattern regarding scope and intensity. Therefore, we perform an explorative cluster 
analysis to sort start-ups based on similarities in their take-up of policy support along the 
founding process (thereby employing all dummy variables set out in Table 3.3). Cluster 
analysis is a multivariate technique that sorts different objects into groups by maximizing 
within-group similarities and between-group differences. The identification of clusters is 
thus empirically based instead of guided by theory. 
We perform a cluster analysis using the “matching” similarity measure and 
employing Ward’s algorithm. This hierarchical method groups the original observations 
(stage by stage) in more aggregated groups in order to minimize the internal variance 
(within each group) and to maximize the intergroup variance with regard to all dummy 
variables describing take-up of business assistance (as given in Table 3.3). Ward’s method 
has been shown to provide generally good results compared to other clustering methods 
(Milligan and Cooper, 1987). The results are presented in the dendrogram in Figure 3.1, 
which shows at which levels of similarity observations are grouped. Starting from the 
bottom, more and more clusters are grouped together when lower levels of similarity are 
accepted (StataCorp, 2003). A visual inspection of the dendrogram suggests two different 
groups of policy take-up. The observations within these two groups have at least a 
similarity level of -6.9. 
 
Figure 3.1: Dendrogram using Ward’s method 
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Table 3.5 provides descriptive statistics on overall policy take-up and for each of the 
identified clusters. The clusters are compared using one-way ANOVA, which exhibits 
group differences in the take-up of each policy instrument that are significant at the 0.001 
level. 
Variables 
 Formali-ties 
Business-
plan Financing Market 
Manage-
ment Intensity 
N 
 
mean 0.742 0.367 0.461 0.207 0.218 0.428Business 
assistance 
in general sd 0.439 0.483 0.500 0.406 0.414 0.496
194
 
mean 0.688 0.726 0.490 0.417 0.438 0.552
Cluster 1 
sd 0.466 0.448 0.503 0.496 0.499 0.500
96
 
mean 0.796 0 0.433 0 0 0.306
Cluster 2 
sd 0.405 0 0.498 0 0 0.463
98
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics on take-up of business assistance – overall and separately for each 
cluster 
 
 
The pattern of policy support can be thus characterized as follows: 
Cluster 1. Intense assistance across all areas. 
Cluster 2. One-time assistance in operational issues (formalities and financing). 
Self-reported reasons for non-take-up confirm our conjecture of strong self-
selection into these clusters of policy take-up: “no interest/need” is the overwhelming 
reason for non-take-up of business assistance, given in 70.5% of the non-take-up cases.55 In 
18.8% of non-take-up cases, business assistance schemes were “not available/known” to 
founders. Reasons related to policy-induced selectivity play virtually no role. 
 
3.4.3 Predictors of policy take-up and perceived usefulness 
Having identified empirical clusters of policy take-up, we now analyze which 
characteristics of founders and their start-ups explain the use of business assistance in 
general as well as separately for each particular pattern of business assistance, that is, for 
Cluster 1 and Cluster 2. We then examine the predictors of perceived usefulness, again first 
for business assistance in general and then for each cluster. 
 
Policy take-up 
To predict the type of policy take-up, we employ logistic regression and multinomial 
logistic regression analysis estimating odds ratios (OR). This procedure allows estimating 
the sample-specific likelihood of being in the assistance groups, instead of the 
                                                          
55 The reasons for non-take-up were asked for each kind of business assistance separately. The percentages 
were calculated by adding the respective responses across the five subject matters. 
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nonassistance group, as a function of the independent variables. Significant ORs that are 
higher than 1 indicate a positive effect and significant ORs lower than 1 indicate a negative 
effect. Note that each regression is conducted in two steps (denoted by Roman numerals): 
the first step considers founders’ Entrepreneurial personality profile, the second step, as an 
additional analysis, considers the single Big Five traits instead of the profile. 
The independent variables are control variables (Year 1994–1997, Year 1998–
2001), our hypothesized predictors, namely, variables tapping nascent founders’ human 
and social capital as well as personality, and, finally, variables referring to the type of start-
up. The results are set forth in Table 3.6. The results from logistic regression analysis 
reveal that Previous self-employment is a relevant predictor of the overall assistance group 
(OR=0.48). Founders who had prior experience at the time they founded the venture in 
question are less likely to be in the overall assistance group than in the nonassistance 
group. Academic spin-offs are also more likely to receive business assistance.56 
The multinomial logistic regression analysis (which predicts use of assistance in 
Clusters 1 and 2) further reveals that Previous self-employment and Novelty are relevant 
predictors of assistance for both clusters. Specifically, Previous self-employment predicts 
both clusters. Founders with prior experience are less likely to be in either cluster than in 
the nonassistance group. In contrast, the Novelty of the business idea solely predicts 
inclusion in Cluster 1. Founders who start a business based on a novelty are more likely to 
be in Cluster 1 than in the nonassistance group. Similarly, being an Academic spin-off 
sharply increases the probability of taking up business assistance, that is, of being in 
Cluster 1. The coefficients of Year 1994–1997 are significantly negative in both 
regressions (i.e., OR below 1) and thus indicate that start-ups whose first business year was 
not later than 1997 made less use of business assistance, which is probably due to the 
sparser range of public assistance schemes available at that time. 
In sum, these findings provide some support for our expectations. Consistent with 
our “weakness hypothesis”, founders who had low personal entrepreneurial resources (i.e., 
no entrepreneurial experience at the time they began founding the venture in question) 
utilized public business assistance more often than those with some experience. However, 
all other variables tapping personal entrepreneurial resources appear to be irrelevant 
predictors. Regarding variables that cover the type of start-up, we find no evidence that 
being a team start-up rather than a sole founder has any effect on the take-up of business 
                                                          
56 Because of the high correlation between the variables Novelty and Academic spin-off we ran separate 
regressions for estimating the effects of each variable (not shown here). Overall, coefficients changed only 
slightly when Academic spin-off replaced Novelty. 
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assistance. However, the variable might be insignificant because of two conflicting 
underlying mechanisms, which were discussed in Section 3.3.2. Unfortunately, we cannot 
empirically distinguish between team start-ups’ potentially lower need of business 
assistance and their higher need for legitimizing decision making, which would tend to 
increase take-up of business assistance. 
Logistic regressions Multinominal regressions 
(I) (II) (I) (II) 
Assistance in 
general 
Assistance in 
general 
Cluster 1 – 
assistance vs. 
no assistance
Cluster 2 – 
assistance vs. 
no assistance 
Cluster 1 – 
assistance vs. 
no assistance 
Cluster 2 – 
assistance vs. 
no assistance
 
OR OR OR OR OR OR 
0.42 *** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.56* 0.31*** 0.57* Year 1994–1997 (0.25-0.72) (0.25-0.74) (0.16-0.61) (0.29-1.07) (0.15-0.61) (0.30-1.11) 
0.72 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.69 0.78 C
on
-
tr
ol
s 
Year 1998–2001 (0.42-1.21) (0.43-1.24) (0.37-1.31) (0.38-1.44) (0.36-1.31) (0.40-1.52) 
0.48 *** 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.54** 0.41*** 0.54** Previous self-
employment (0.31-0.73) (0.31-0.73) (0.24-0.73) (0.32-0.92) (0.23-0.73) (0.32-0.92) 
0.81 0.82 0.87 0.77 0.89 0.75 Parents self-
employed (0.47-1.40) (0.47-1.41) (0.43-1.76) (0.39-1.51) (0.43-1.82) (0.38-1.50) 
1.31 1.32 1.55 1.14 1.61 1.14 Social capital 
(weak) (0.83-2.06) (0.84-2.08) (0.88-2.74) (0.65-1.99) (0.91-2.86) (0.65-1.99) 
1.12 1.12 1.04 1.19 1.03 1.17 H
um
an
 a
nd
 so
ci
al
 
ca
pi
ta
l 
Social capital 
(strong) (0.73-1.72) (0.73-1.72) (0.60-1.80) (0.71-1.99) (0.59-1.80) (0.70-1.97) 
 0.85   0.74 0.93 Conscientious-
ness  (0.58-1.24)   (0.45-1.21) (0.59-1.48) 
 1.00   0.88 1.12 Extraversion  (0.69-1.44)   (0.55-1.42) (0.72-1.75) 
 1.05   0.91 1.21 Agreeableness  (0.73-1.52)   (0.56-1.45) (0.77-1.91) 
 1.07   1.16 1.00 Openness  (0.71-1.60)   (0.69-1.93) (0.61-1.64) 
 1.09   1.17 1.03 Neuroticism  (0.69-1.72)   (0.64-2.14) (0.60-1.79) 
0.99  0.98 0.99   
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 tr
ai
ts
 
Entr. personality 
profile (0.95-1.02)  (0.93-1.03) (0.95-1.04)   
1.08 1.07 1.31*** 0.87 1.30*** 0.86 Novelty (0.95-1.23) (0.94-1.22) (1.12-1.54) (0.73-1.03) (1.11-1.52) (0.72-1.03) 
0.83 0.83 0.78 0.86 0.76 0.86 
Ty
pe
 o
f 
st
ar
t-
up
 
Team start-up (0.54-1.27) (0.54-1.28) (0.45-1.36) (0.51-1.44) (0.44-1.32) (0.52-1.45) 
N 425 425 425 425 
LR chi2 29.21*** 29.74*** 52.65*** 56.81*** 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.051 0.063 0.145 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
OR = odd ratios (odds of belonging to Cluster 1 (Cluster 2) as compared to having no business assistance). 
95% confidence intervals are given within parentheses. 
Reference group in the multinomial logistic regression: No business assistance. 
Refusals for several variables reduce the number of observations to 425. 
Table 3.6: Logistic and multinomial logistic regressions describing selection into business assistance in 
general and into particular clusters of business assistance 
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Perceived usefulness 
We now turn to investigating predictors of founders’ perceived usefulness of the business 
assistance utilized. In a preliminary analysis, we test whether this usefulness differs 
between the two clusters. It does: perceived usefulness is significantly higher in Cluster 1 
(mean: 3.69, sd: 0.95) than in Cluster 2 (mean: 3.28, sd: 1.32)57, which can be interpreted 
as a result of the different kind of take-up. Founders’ dissatisfaction about first business 
assistance will most likely result in no further use of these services, partly explaining the 
take-up patterns described by Cluster 2. In other words, founders’ higher satisfaction in 
Cluster 1 might, on the one hand, be due to self-selection into intense assistance, or, on the 
other hand, it might result from benefiting from intense rather than one-time assistance. 
In a next step, we conduct three single regression analyses (again via two steps 
denoted by Roman numerals) to examine the influence of founders’ human and social 
capital, their personality, and the type of the start-up on the perceived usefulness of their 
utilized business assistance. The first regression analysis refers to the overall sample, i.e., 
to all founders who made use of any kind of business assistance; the second refers to 
founders in Cluster 1; and the third to founders in Cluster 2. This procedure allows to 
explore effects within the overall sample as well as cluster-specific effects. Independent 
variables are control variables and the same set of predictors that were used to predict type 
of take-up (Section 4.3.1). Note that we additionally consider founders’ Current life 
satisfaction as a control variable in order to adjust our results for a possible recall bias. As 
the dependent variable represents retrospective data, namely, founders’ current evaluations 
of business assistance they had utilized months or even years ago, this information could be 
biased by founders’ current state of mind, e.g., current life satisfaction (Rutter et al., 1998). 
Table 3.7 summarizes the results of the three regressions (overall sample and the 
subgroup analyses for Clusters 1 and 2). Founders’ Current life satisfaction positively 
predicts usefulness in Cluster 1. Thus, those founders in Cluster 1 who felt happy with their 
current life perceived the utilized business assistance as more useful. Among the study 
variables, previous self-employment, self-employed parents, social capital (weak), and 
personality (an entrepreneurial personality profile and openness, respectively) are relevant 
predictors in at least one of the groups. Specifically, Previous self-employment negatively 
predicts usefulness in the overall sample; Parents’ self-employment, Social capital (weak), 
and an Entrepreneurial personality profile negatively predict usefulness in Cluster 1.58 
                                                          
57 A two-sided t-test reveals significance at the 5 % level. 
58 Interestingly, we find that a lack of support from weak ties leads to higher perceived usefulness in Cluster 
1, whereas a lack of support from strong ties has no effect. This somewhat counterintuitive result might 
reflect that founders' fairly remote but larger networks within the venture creation process serve as bridges to 
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Furthermore, Openness negatively predicts usefulness in the overall sample and in Cluster 
1. Taken together, these results are in line with our expectations. Founders with low 
personal entrepreneurial resources perceived their utilized business assistance as more 
useful. This was particularly true within Cluster 1. Insignificant coefficients in the analysis 
of Cluster 2 indicate that the usefulness of one-off operational assistance does not depend 
on any of the personal entrepreneurial resources (apart from Previous self-employment) or 
the start-up characteristics we analyze. 
Interestingly, among the single broad personality traits studied, openness turned out 
to be relevant. Founders who lack creativity and openness to the new appear to have 
benefited from business assistance, particularly from intense assistance. As suggested by 
past research, higher levels of openness should be understood as a personal entrepreneurial 
resource (Zhao and Seibert, 2006). Openness could be a particularly valuable resource in 
the venture-founding process, which often demands high levels of creativity and openness 
to the new (Ardichvili et al., 2003). Moreover, as we already showed that founders who 
utilized business assistance were very often novice entrepreneurs without previous 
entrepreneurial experience, openness could have been particularly crucial for them, as they 
had to adapt to a new and complex occupational field – the entrepreneurial arena. While 
the novelty of the business idea has been shown to be a strong predictor of whether 
business assistance is taken up at all, insignificant coefficients indicate that start-ups’ 
innovativeness does not have an impact on the perceived usefulness of the assistance. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
various types of information and help, making more formal business assistance less useful (Granovetter, 
1973). 
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Business assistance 
in general Subgroup analysis for each cluster 
 
Overall (N=194) Cluster 1 (N=96) Cluster 2 (N=98) 
 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
Cons.  2.70*** 4.12 *** 1.99 *** 2.75 ** 3.10 ** 4.27 * 
Current life satisfaction  0.19  0.16  0.40 *** 0.33 ** 0.18  0.19  
Year 1994–1997  -0.02  -0.07  -0.28  -0.19  0.10  -0.14  Controls 
Year 1998–2001  0.06  0.08  -0.02  0.16  0.20  0.01  
Prev. self-employment  -0.37 * -0.38 * -0.40  -0.38  -0.34  -0.42  
Parents self-employed  -0.08  -0.15  -0.47  -0.60 * 0.35  0.38  
Social capital (weak)  -0.07  -0.07  -0.53 ** -0.57 ** 0.30  0.29  
Human 
and 
social 
capital Social capital (strong)  0.13  0.11  -0.13  -0.13  0.39  0.36  
Conscientiousness   0.02   0.05    0.06  
Extraversion   0.09   0.13    0.17  
Agreeableness   -0.08   0.23    -0.27  
Openness   -0.30 *  -0.37 **   -0.33  
Neuroticism   -0.27   -0.06    -0.37  
Personali
ty traits 
Entr. personality profile  -0.00   -0.03 *   0.03   
Novelty  0.01  0.02   -0.02  0.01  -0.12  -0.12  Type of 
start-up Team start-up  0.03  0.03  0.15  0.19  -0.17  -0.22  
      
R2  0.045 0.070 0.255 0.291 0.107 0.136
Adjusted R2  -0.013 -0.010 0.155 0.150 -0.003 -0.021
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Table 3.7: Prediction of perceived usefulness of business assistance (ordinary least squares 
regressions) 
 
Additionally, we test for interaction effects between each (independent) study variable and 
belonging to either Cluster 1 or Cluster 2. In other words, we test cluster membership as a 
moderator (Baron and Kenny, 1986). This procedure allows examining whether the effect 
of each independent study variable significantly differs between the two clusters. 
Employing moderated multiple regression analysis (for continuous independent variables) 
and ANOVA (for dichotomous independent variables), we find two significant interaction 
effects (p<0.10). The effect of Novelty and Social capital (weak) on perceived usefulness 
differs significantly depending on being in Cluster 1 or Cluster 2. These significant 
interactions thus support our initial conjecture that distinct differences in policy take-up, as 
depicted by our two clusters, deserve separate attention. Finally, we should note that none 
of the predictors achieved significance in Cluster 2, which can be explained by the various 
reasons given for having had only one-time assistance, again suggesting diverse predictors 
of perceived usefulness. 
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3.4.4 Economic effects 
The previous section highlighted a person-focused view of actual take-up of business 
assistance and its perceived usefulness. From an economic perspective (and abstracting 
away from policy efforts to promote the economic status of disadvantaged groups), 
business assistance is mainly justified by positive external effects accruing from superior 
business performance and thus must be evaluated accordingly.59 We approximate positive 
external effects by a start-up’s initial capital, its employment, and survival. First, business 
assistance might provide founders with the necessary commitments and signals to 
overcome alleged credit rationing (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008) and, therefore, business 
assistance might help founders to attract external finance. Initial firm size is consistently 
found to be associated with firm survival (Geroski, 1995; Sutton, 1997). Proxied by the 
amount of initial capital, it can thus be seen as an indicator for positive external effects. 
Cooper et al. (1994) argue that financial resources allow start-ups to pursue more capital-
intensive strategies (which might be more efficient and better protected from imitation) and 
to realize growth. Furthermore, financial resources constitute a buffer against random 
shocks. Start-ups with high endowments of financial capital are thus able to mount a 
greater challenge to incumbents and, in this way, will ensure efficiency and stimulate 
productivity (Fritsch, 2008). Second, business assistance should enable founders to manage 
and grow their enterprises. Employment growth is a prominent indicator of firm growth 
and prosperity and, moreover, constitutes an important policy goal itself. Third, the long-
run survival of a start-up indicates a sustainable policy intervention.60 
 
Matching approach 
Since the weaker founders seem more likely to make use of business assistance, the 
performance of assisted and nonassisted start-ups cannot be compared directly to identify 
the causal effect of business assistance. Therefore, the counterfactual outcome must be 
discovered, that is, the outcome of a nonassisted start-up if it took up business assistance. 
Nonparametric matching methods produce unbiased estimates of a treatment’s 
impact, for example, when estimating the effect of a particular policy intervention. The 
basic idea is to compare the mean outcome of assisted firms with those of nonassisted start-
ups that are similar in terms of a predefined set of ex-ante variables but that have not taken 
up any business assistance. Given that the selection into business assistance is completely 
                                                          
59 As already discussed in footnote 39 a lack of recognition and asymmetric information are also put forward 
as a rationale for the public provision of business assistance (Storey, 2003). 
60 However, as already pointed out by footnote 48 positive external effects can also emanate from failed start-
ups. 
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based on observable exogenous characteristics (i.e., not affected by the treatment), 
potential outcomes are independent of the treatment assignment (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
This assumption is known as the conditional independence assumption (CIA). Implicit in 
this matching approach is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which 
states that business assistance does not impact any start-ups other than those explicitly 
treated (Rubin, 1991). In the present context, this implies that business assistance does not 
impact nonassisted start-ups via market effects or knowledge spillovers. 
In principle, one can match on all covariates. However, this may be difficult to 
implement when the set of covariates is large. To reduce the size of the matching problem, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose using propensity score matching. The basic idea is 
not to match on covariates directly, but to match on a function of the covariates that 
describes the propensity to take-up assistance. As actual propensity scores are not known, 
the first step in a propensity score analysis is to estimate the individual scores, which is 
usually done by logistic regression. 
In a second step, a matching algorithm must be chosen that contrasts the outcome of 
an assisted start-up with a weighted average of the outcome of (some) nonassisted 
observations. There are various matching algorithms that, asymptotically, should all yield 
the same results (Smith, 2000). In the present analysis, we apply kernel matching. This 
method matches every assisted start-up with the weighted average of all nonassisted start-
ups. Thereby, the weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity 
scores of the assisted and nonassisted start-ups. When implementing kernel matching, a 
kernel function and a bandwidth parameter need to be chosen. The choice of the latter is of 
most importance in practice (DiNardo and Tobias, 2001) since the bandwidth parameter 
determines a tradeoff between a “few but good matches” (yielding higher variance) and 
“many but potentially bad matches” (leading to biased estimates). Here, Silverman’s 
(1986) rule of thumb is used to determine the bandwidth parameter and thus to balance bias 
and variance. The exact matching protocol is set out in Table 3.8. Estimations are made 
with the psmatch2 Stata ado package by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
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Step 1. A logit model for all three outcome variables (initial capital, employment, and credit rating) is specified 
and estimated. In this way, the propensity scores for each observation are obtained. The choice of variables and 
the estimation of the propensity score are explained in Appendix B.2. 
Step 2. The sample is restricted to the region of common support. The common support condition ensures that 
any set of characteristics of assisted start-ups (as captured by the propensity score) can also be observed for 
nonassisted ones. A minimum-maximum comparison of the distribution of the propensity score determines the 
region of common support. Its imposition requires dropping 3 (8, 7) observations from the analysis of business 
assistance overall (Cluster 1, Cluster 2). 
Step 3. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is the difference between the mean outcome of assisted 
start-ups and matched nonassisted start-ups. The average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) can be stated as 
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
−=
1 0
0
]),([1 01
1 Ii Ij
jNi YjiWYN
ATT , with 1iY  denoting the outcome of the assisted start-up i and 0jY  the 
outcome of nonassisted start-ups j.61 N1 (N0) is the number of observations in the assisted group I1 (control group 
I0). The outcome of i is thus contrasted with a weighted average outcome of the control group. Weights are given 
by ∑ ∈= 00 ),( Ik ik
ij
N G
G
jiW , with ikG  denoting a Gaussian kernel ]/)[( hPPG ki −  and Pi (Pk) standing for the 
propensity score of assisted (nonassisted) start-ups. Silverman (1986) developed the following rule of thumb for 
the choice of the bandwidth parameter: h : 2.09.0 −⋅⋅= nAh , in which n denotes the number of observations and 
the term )
34.1
,min( rangeileinterquartdeviationstandardA =  accounts for the distribution of the propensity score. 
Step 4. The standard error of the matching estimators is calculated using bootstrapping (200 replications).62 The 
estimates for the average treatment effect (ATT) as well as their bootstrapped standard errors and p-values are set 
out in Table 3.9. 
Step 5. The quality of the matching is assessed by analyzing the mean differences between nonassisted and 
assisted matched start-ups. After matching, there should be no significant differences regarding any 
characteristics that are assumed to have an impact on both the take-up of assistance and the respective outcome 
variable. Appendix B.4 shows mean comparisons between assisted and nonassisted start-ups. 
Step 6. Steps 1 to 5 are conducted for the following treatments: “business assistance in general” and, more 
specifically, the effectiveness of business assistance as characterized by Cluster 1 as well as by Cluster 2 is 
examined.  
Table 3.8: Matching protocol 
 
Results 
The matching results with respect to the three outcome variables for each sample (overall, 
Cluster 1, Cluster 2) are set out in Table 3.9. Looking first at the analysis of business 
assistance in general, we find that start-ups taking up business assistance have, on average, 
initial capital amounting to 3.28. Their matched nonassisted counterparts, however, have 
even higher initial capital (3.30), pointing to a negative effect of business assistance. This 
difference is not significant. Similarly, the employment growth of assisted start-ups 
exhibits an ATT of -1.69, i.e., the difference between the mean employment growth of 
assisted start-ups (8.19) and matched nonassisted start-ups (9.88). Again, the higher 
employment growth of assisted start-ups is not significant. Looking at the indicator for 
                                                          
61 This notation follows Caliendo (2006). 
62 Although a distribution theory for the cross-sectional and difference-in-difference kernel and local linear 
matching is derived in Heckman et al. (1998), standard errors for matching estimators are in practice 
generated using bootstrap resampling methods. The use of bootstrapping is supported by Abadie and Imbens 
(2008), who suggest that the standard bootstrap can be applied to assess the variability of kernel matching 
estimators. 
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survival, assisted start-ups have a mean credit rating of 287.66 compared to the mean rating 
of 285.56 for their nonassisted matched counterparts. However, the difference fails to reach 
significance. The same tendencies can be observed when we look at the effects of business 
assistance as characterized by cluster 1. Again, matching does not reveal any significant 
differences with respect to initial capital, employment, or credit rating. Business assistance 
as characterized by Cluster 2 does not significantly affect our outcome variables either. 
However, the amount of initial capital (the credit rating) is higher (better) for assisted start-
ups compared to their nonassisted counterparts (insignificantly, though). The use of other 
bandwidth parameters and other matching algorithms also results in insignificant estimates. 
Mean outcome of 
matched #Observations 
Outcome … 
Assisted 
start-ups 
… Non-
assisted 
start-ups 
ATT S.E. p-value 
Assisted Non-assisted 
Initial capital 3.28 3.30 -0.02 0.14 0.89 189 249 
Employment 8.19 9.88 -1.69 1.04 0.11 186 239 
O
ve
ra
ll 
Credit rating 287.66 285.56 2.09 7.15 0.77 161 202 
Initial capital 3.29 3.34 -0.05 0.19 0.80 93 239 
Employment 8.16 10.01 -1.85 1.16 0.11 91 229 
C
lu
st
er
 1
 
bu
sin
es
s 
as
sis
ta
nc
e 
Credit rating 293.37 286.87 6.50 10.51 0.54 82 192 
Initial capital 3.36 3.35 0.02 0.17 0.93 97 238 
Employment 8.35 9.91 -1.56 1.30 0.23 96 229 
C
lu
st
er
 2
 
bu
sin
es
s 
as
sis
ta
nc
e 
Credit rating 279.94 281.34 -1.40 9.15 0.88 80 193 
Please note that no estimate reaches the 0.1 significance level. 
Table 3.9: Overview of results obtained from kernel matching (employing optimal bandwidth 
parameters) 
 
 
The matching procedure thus cannot reveal any impact of business assistance on 
venture performance (measured by initial capital, employment, and credit rating) and thus 
cannot indicate any positive external effects created by business assistance schemes. 
Abstracting away from insignificant differences, the outcomes of matched assisted start-
ups are most of the times inferior to those of matched nonassisted start-ups (in terms of 
having lower initial capital, lower employment, and a worse credit rating). This tendency 
either suggests that business assistance induces start-ups to grow more slowly (leading to 
less employment after three years or to invest less capital). But, then, it also points to the 
conditional independence assumption, which might not be met in the present analysis. The 
validity of the conditional independence assumption relies crucially on the possibility of 
comparing assisted and nonassisted start-ups on the basis of a broad set of pre-treatment 
characteristics. We have a rich dataset and the matching succeeds in leveling out any 
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differences with regard to, e.g., being an academic spin-off, the degree of novelty, previous 
self-employment, and social capital. However, there might be yet unobserved 
characteristics that explain the weak performance of assisted start-ups. Unfortunately, the 
very nature of the conditional independence assumption means that it cannot be tested. 
However, unobserved differences between assisted and nonassisted start-ups would 
have to be very strong to be able to turn insignificant negative ATTs into significant 
positive ATTs. Therefore, we are confident in suggesting that business assistance does not 
impact on start-ups’ performance as measured by initial capital, employment growth, and 
credit rating. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions 
By providing business assistance to nascent entrepreneurs, policymakers intend to help 
nascent founders develop and grow viable businesses. Given that start-up quality matters 
for inducing positive external effects in the long-run, the hope is to “build winners” who 
will later contribute to structural change and economic growth. However, our analysis 
cannot identify any impact of business assistance in the nascent phase on subsequent 
business performance. Propensity score matching suggests that business assistance neither 
impacts the amount of initial capital at the beginning of the first business year, nor 
employment or credit rating after three years. Our analysis reveals distinct patterns in the 
use of business assistance – irrespective of particular assistance schemes. If founders make 
use of business assistance at all, it can be described either as intensive strategically-
oriented support (Cluster 1) or one-off operational assistance (Cluster 2). Even for the more 
intense and strategically-oriented business assistance described by Cluster 1, which is taken 
up by founders of more innovative start-ups (especially academic spin-offs), we could not 
find any effect on subsequent business performance. Starting up this type of venture can be 
expected to be the most difficult and at the same time the most socially desirable (yielding 
positive external effects), which explains the increased policy focus on this type of start-up. 
Our analysis suggests that this policy interest has been successfully implemented, since 
academic spin-offs and innovative start-ups are more likely to make use of Cluster 1. 
Therefore, the lack of impact on our three outcome measures is unlikely to be explained by 
a bad person-treatment-fit, i.e. by the fact that business assistance was not used by the 
target group but by clients towards whom the assistance is not oriented.  
We should note that our analyses do not indicate that every individual scheme is 
ineffective in improving clients’ start-up performance. We rather find that, on average, the 
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various kinds of business assistance schemes (which were delivered between 1994-2006 in 
Thuringia) do not impact performance (as measured by well-established and 
comprehensive indicators such as start-ups’ amount of initial capital, their employment, 
and credit rating). Given the volume of public expenditure on business assistance schemes, 
this finding should provide ample opportunity for discussing the scope and intensity of 
public business assistance schemes, their expected effects and the justification of their 
public funding. 
In addition to the economically-oriented focus on subsequent business performance, 
we also focus on founders’ perceived usefulness of the utilized business assistance. Against 
the backdrop that a lot of founders reported very useful assistance, concluding that business 
assistance (on average) is not helpful at all, or has no impact at all, might be premature – at 
least from the founders’ perspective. Note that the fact that intensive strategically-oriented 
assistance (Cluster 1) is, on average, perceived as more useful compared to less intensive 
operational assistance (Cluster 2) suggests a positive dose-response-relationship, which 
underscores the idea that business assistance indeed has an effect. Regarding the nature of 
this effect, we find that the weaker founders in Cluster 1 perceive business assistance as 
more useful. Entrepreneurial weakness was reflected by a lack of human and social capital, 
as well as by lack of an entrepreneurial personality make-up. Accordingly, business 
assistance could be, first and foremost, effective in supporting these weak founders in the 
nascent phase, helping them overcome barriers, continue the firm formation process, and, 
finally, to become actual entrepreneurs.  
Further research is thus urged to track nascent entrepreneurs along the founding 
process to estimate the effect of business assistance on getting start-up projects started (we 
cannot test for such a mechanism because we only have data on young entrepreneurs, i.e., 
those founders who finally succeeded in completing the nascent phase (survivor bias)). 
However, business assistance schemes should be considered successful only when they 
help weak nascent founders start and grow economically viable ventures. This implies that 
business assistance must sustainably compensate for and develop entrepreneurial resources 
that are argued to impact entrepreneurial success at the micro level (e.g., Markman and 
Baron, 2003) as well as fostering structural change and economic growth at the macro level 
(e.g., Fritsch and Schroeter, 2009). Otherwise, the provision of business assistance runs the 
risk of enabling weak founders to continue in the firm formation process when they 
otherwise would not have and who are most likely to run marginal businesses. This effect 
might be (although insignificantly) indicated by the lower employment growth of assisted 
start-ups in our sample. However, even if sociopolitical reasons for the public provision of 
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business assistance prevail (i.e. efforts to promote the economic status of disadvantaged 
groups), the impact of business assistance should translate into economically viable 
ventures. Therefore, it will be a fruitful approach to examine assistance schemes’ role in 
discouraging less promising start-up projects and thus allocating overall resources more 
efficiently. 
A closer look at actual policy take-up as identified by our clusters reveals further 
insights for policymakers. The provision of one-off operational assistance (Cluster 2) 
points either to an excessive focus on operational assistance, which lacks a clear rationale 
for public intervention, or to deficiencies in the delivery of strategic assistance, which thus 
yields too many dropouts. On the one hand, the public provision of operational advice is 
questionable from a theoretical point of view. In contrast to strategically-oriented 
assistance, one-off operational assistance is unlikely to impact on long-run business 
performance. Furthermore, operational services are hardly affected by ex-ante information 
asymmetries regarding the benefits of their use. Therefore, one-off operational assistance 
could be most likely effectively and efficiently provided by, e.g., private consultants, 
accountants, or lawyers (Hjalmarsson und Johansson, 2003). On the other hand, the use of 
business assistance as characterized by Cluster 2 might also indicate poor policy delivery 
of strategic assistance. The generally lower perceived usefulness of assistance in Cluster 2 
might be due to unsatisfied founders dropping out of assistance that was originally intended 
to be more strategically-oriented. Taken together, even when abstracting away from 
particular schemes, the explored take-up patterns suggest the potential for policy 
improvements. 
Our analysis has several limitations. First, our cross-sectional analysis is mainly 
based on retrospective data. Although we adopted the Life History Calendar method to 
facilitate the recall process and to ensure the validity of our data (Belli et al., 2004; Caspi et 
al., 1996), longitudinal data and experimental designs are needed to strengthen causal 
inferences of business assistance. Second, we suffer from small sample sizes, especially 
when analyzing cluster-specific effects of business assistance on subsequent business 
performance. Third, our analysis lacks data about the use of nonsubsidized assistance, such 
as lawyers or nonsubsidized business consultants, who are most likely substitutes for 
publicly financed business assistance. Likewise, we did not examine business assistance in 
the start-up and post-start-up phase. We thus cannot generalize our results for these types 
of business assistance. 
To sum up, on the one hand we cannot find effects of utilized business assistance on 
venture performance. On the other hand, intensive and strategically-oriented business 
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assistance was taken-up and was perceived as useful when founders had low 
entrepreneurial resources. In other words, some founders seem to benefit from particular 
assistance (i.e., they perceive business assistance as useful), whereas useful business 
assistance does not seem to translate into subsequent start-up performance. Our findings 
thus contribute to a better understanding of whether and, if yes, in which cases assistance 
might support the individual founder in the founding process. However, if further research 
cannot reveal that business assistance is finally reflected in superior business performance, 
the economic rationale for the public provision of business assistance breaks down.63 
Finally, we believe that our evaluation approach effectively tackled the bewildering 
range of ever-changing policy schemes. However, less fragmented business assistance 
schemes would clearly facilitate quantitative evaluations by providing a meaningful 
number of cases. Our analysis thus points to the need to restructure the overall provision of 
business assistance and to consider means of evaluating it when designing and 
implementing policies, e.g., by realizing more experimental designs to strengthen causal 
inferences. Therefore, a stronger “evaluation spirit and culture” at all levels of policy 
design, implementation, and delivery is needed. 
 
                                                          
63 This holds true when positive external effects accruing from innovative and economically viable start-ups 
are put forward as a rationale for policy intervention. 
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4. Picking the winner? Empirical evidence on the targeting of R&D subsidies to start-
ups64 
4.1 Introduction 
Policy measures which aim to foster innovative activity in young and/or small firms have 
become increasingly popular among policymakers. Screening relevant policy programs 
delivers a great variety of different schemes on the regional, national and European level65. 
This points to a major issue in policy making: the targeting of programs. Targeting is 
defined as designing policy programs with respect to certain target groups. Looking at both 
regional and national support schemes that are targeted at private research and 
development (R&D), Blanes and Busom (2004) find that funding authorities pursue 
different allocation rules.  
The allocation of subsidies has important implications for policy effectiveness and 
efficiency. First, the distinguishing characteristics of subsidized and nonsubsidized 
ventures have to be identified to estimate the effectiveness of R&D subsidies. Otherwise, 
better (worse) performance of subsidized projects might be attributable to different pre-
treatment characteristics. Second, the targeting of policy measures also decides the extent 
and the manner of crowding out effects. Subsidies give recipients an artificial competitive 
edge. Therefore, they have the potential to keep inefficient recipients alive and/or to induce 
a crowding out of nonsubsidized firms. In order to minimize these distortions, subsidies 
should be targeted at truly “good” firms (Shane, 2009). 
Previous studies analyzing subsidy allocation schemes mainly focus on one single 
program (e.g., Aschoff, 2008). Given the coexistence of various programs, we take an 
aggregate view on the allocation of R&D subsidies. Does this variety of programs with 
different target groups translate into systematic differences between subsidized and 
nonsubsidized start-ups and their founders? Or does the variety of programs conceal that 
there is actually no overall policy focus? 
These questions are addressed by this chapter’s focus on the allocation of R&D 
subsidies to start-ups in the East German state of Thuringia. Our representative sample 
allows us to take an aggregate view of the allocation of R&D subsidies and thus enables us 
to make generalizations from single programs which often change their designs over time. 
In order to get unbiased results only those subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups which 
are engaged in R&D are examined. Our analysis is structured as follows. Section 4.2 
describes the economic rationale for the targeting of R&D subsidies. Assuming a strategy 
                                                          
64 This chapter is based on Cantner and Kösters (2009a). 
65 An overview about programs that are currently available gives the online database 
http://www.foerderdatenbank.de/, administered by the German government. 
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of “picking the winner”, hypotheses regarding the characteristics of subsidized firms are 
derived. We use data from the Thuringian Founder Study which is introduced in Section 
4.3. The determinants of the receipt of R&D subsidies are examined with the help of a 
logistic regression (Section 4.4). Section 4.5 discusses the results and Section 4.6 
concludes. 
 
 
4.2 Targeting of R&D subsidies: Economic rationales and policy implementation 
This section begins with the rationale for the targeting of R&D subsidies and follows up 
with how policy targeting can be implemented in praxis. 
 
Economic rationales 
The rationale for R&D policy programs is found in the presumed existence of neoclassical 
market failures (Arrow, 1962; Hall, 2002). Conversely, system failures, as discussed in 
neo-Schumpeterian approaches, are held responsible for an insufficient amount of 
innovative activity, also justifying certain policy measures (Chaminade and Edquist, 2005; 
Lundvall et al., 2002). 
Referring to the somewhat traditional market failure approach, positive external 
effects resulting from innovative activity provide a first rationale for public policy 
intervention. A second rationale for policy intervention stems from capital market 
imperfections: mainly due to uninsurable risk and information asymmetries R&D projects 
are not likely to receive the same funding conditions as normal investment and not all R&D 
projects are likely to attract adequate funds from private sources. 
If entrepreneurs cannot completely appropriate the returns from innovative activity 
and/or cannot raise the funds for R&D investments at reasonable costs, they invest in R&D 
at a socially suboptimal level. This implies that firms either do not invest in R&D at all or 
conduct projects at a smaller scale. Then, subsidies reduce the costs and uncertainty of 
private R&D activity and thereby aim to induce firms to undertake R&D that would 
otherwise be unprofitable (Wallsten, 2000). The framework for most evaluations is 
captured by the concept of additionality which focuses on additional R&D activity that 
should be stimulated by public R&D funds (Luukkonen, 2000).  
Based on that reasoning, those projects should be funded, which yield high social 
returns (i.e. returns above the risk-adjusted opportunity costs of capital) but would not be 
started in the absence of subsidies, because the private returns are not expected to exceed 
the risk-adjusted opportunity costs of capital (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000). The funding of 
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inframarginal projects should be avoided because they are expected to be privately 
profitable and therefore are pursued anyway. In this case, the subsidization would just form 
a transfer payment (without any additionality) and would not have any allocative effect – 
thus constituting windfall gains. 
 However, the identification of the private and social returns of an R&D project 
requires detailed information about highly uncertain outcomes. Policymakers and program 
officials have to quantify private and social returns ex-ante, a monumental if not 
unsolvable task considering the uncertainty of R&D activities as well as the difficulties to 
identify and quantify diffuse spillovers (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000).  
Another line of reasoning considers cooperative or collective innovative activities 
being superior to those activities performed in isolation (Edquist, 2001). Such a systemic 
view claims that due to the division of labor, cooperative R&D projects with other 
companies, customers or researchers are more promising. Systemic failures in the sense 
that innovators do not actively search for a cooperation partner (problem of intermediation) 
or are afraid of a partner’s non-reciprocal behavior in knowledge exchange (problem of 
reciprocity) may serve an anchoring point for policy intervention. Subsidies for cooperative 
R&D projects would encourage the search for appropriate partners and/or dampen (or 
compensate for) any fear of non-reciprocity (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). Hence, R&D 
co-operations should be more liable to be subsidized. Here the focus is quite clearly on 
those marginal projects which do not get activated because of system failures. 
Equivalent to the problems raised by identifying private and social outcomes of 
R&D projects are the challenges of identifying and quantifying systemic failures. Again, 
considering the uncertainty involved in R&D projects as well as measuring the exchange of 
knowledge spillovers, this task is not easily, if at all, being performed in praxis. 
 
Policy implementation and “picking the winner strategy” 
Facing these information problems, we argue that the actual targeting of R&D support 
schemes does not focus on identifying malfunctions in markets or systems or on finding 
marginal projects, but rather follows a strategy of “picking the winner”. When first looking 
at established firms, evidence for a policy focus on the most promising and best-equipped 
firms has been found for a large German R&D project funding scheme (Aschhoff, 2008). 
Policymakers and program officials focus on ventures that promise to favorably contribute 
to employment growth and structural change.  
There are four additional arguments in favor of a policy approach of “picking the 
winner”. First, the focus of R&D funds to these presumably truly “good” firms intends to 
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minimize substitution effects, i.e. the crowding out of nonsubsidized competitors. 
Subsidies give beneficiaries an artificial competitive edge and in this way equalize ex-ante 
less efficient and more efficient firms. If only truly good firms receive subsidies (crowding 
out less efficient firms at any rate), the resulting market distortions will be minimal (Shane, 
2009)66. Second, the strategy of picking likely winners may direct funds to particular future 
technologies, e.g. biotechnology (Fier and Heneric, 2005). Third, R&D activity is 
inherently risky (Arrow, 1962). As a result from this stochastic effect, the subsidization of 
R&D projects will ineluctably include failures. Public choice theory suggests that a strong 
political commitment is required to justify the subsidization of failed projects. Therefore, 
policymakers and funding authorities are induced to pick winners, i.e. to focus on projects 
with a high probability of success rather than funding projects with higher expected returns 
but a lower probability of success (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000). Finally, the certification of 
“good” projects to potential private investors might be a side-effect of a selective policy 
approach. Lerner (1999) argues that public funds certify the quality of their recipients and 
thereby attract private investors. 
The suggested identification of good firms seems to be a task which can be 
performed rather easily in the case of already existing firms – just look at their performance 
in the past. However, when newly founded firms are on the policy agenda this does not 
work – except in the case of serial entrepreneurship. A look at a more general pattern of 
successful entrepreneurship is applicable here. Entrepreneurship research has identified 
various determinants of new venture success and thus provides guidelines for a strategy of 
“picking the winner” (Shane, 2009). Policymakers and funding authorities should allocate 
public R&D funds according to the following pre-treatment characteristics:  
 Novelty of the business idea: The innovativeness of a start-up can be regarded as a key 
determinant of positive external effects, since innovative ventures commercialize 
knowledge and thereby contribute to diversity, increase competition, and foster 
economic growth (Fritsch, 2008). This is reflected by their relatively higher 
contribution to structural change in the long-run (Baptista and Preto, 2006). In 
particular, academic spin-offs which are often headed by faculty or research staff of the 
originating research institution provide an effective means to apply scientific research to 
commercial ends (Roberts, 1991; Shane, 2004). 
 Ambitions at the beginning of the first business year: Small business managers’ 
aspirations to expand their business activities are positively related to actual growth 
                                                          
66 However, there are still distortions arising from raising taxpayer’s money to finance the subsidy as well as 
deadweight losses arising from screening applicants. 
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(Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). Similarly, Autio (2005) finds disproportional 
employment effects for high-expectation entrepreneurs67. Although these highly 
ambitious entrepreneurs represent only 3% to 17% of all entrepreneurs (depending on 
the country), they account for up to 80% of total expected jobs by all entrepreneurial 
activity (Autio, 2005). 
 Resource strength of the founding project: The accumulation of knowledge as captured 
by founders’ previous patents shows the resource-strength and the potential to innovate 
(Fier and Heneric, 2005; Czarnitzki et al., 2007). Additionally, the resource base of a 
start-up as proxied by the number of founders (single versus team start-ups) (Kamm et 
al., 1990; Lechler, 2001) and the size of initial capital is positively related to various 
performance measures (Van Praag et al., 2005). 
However, a potential emphasis on probable winners might be diluted by information 
asymmetries and distorted incentives of policymakers, funding authorities, and applicants 
(Public Choice considerations). First, applicants have much better information about their 
projects and expectantly present their project to increase the chances of approval (adverse 
selection). Second, rather than pursuing the public interest, the allocation of R&D subsidies 
might also follow specific interests in the policy process (Hart, 2003b; Stiglitz and 
Wallsten, 2000). The potential to focus public funds on particular industries might trigger 
rent-seeking activities which might be an explanation for an ongoing focus of policymakers 
on the manufacturing sector (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2001). In sum, information asymmetries 
as well as a Public Choice perspective suggest that a policy targeting of “picking the 
winner” might be blurred. 
 
 
                                                          
67 Autio (2005) defines high-expectation entrepreneurs as those nascent entrepreneurs who aim to employ at 
least 20 employees within five years’ time. 
 83 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Sample 
The Thuringian Founder Study 
Data for this study were collected within the Thuringian Founder Study (Thüringer 
Gründer Studie), an interdisciplinary project on the success and failure of innovative start-
ups in the East German state of Thuringia. The database draws from the commercial 
register for commercial and private companies (Handelsregister, Abteilung A/B) in 
Thuringia and includes 2,971 start-ups in innovative industries registered between 1994 
and 2006. Innovative industries, according to ZEW classification (Grupp and Legler, 
2000), comprise ‘advanced technology’ and ‘technology-oriented services’.  
The survey population consists of 4,215 founders (first registered owner-managers) 
who registered a new entry in the Handelsregister between 1994 and 2006. This design 
made it possible not only to interview founders of active companies but also founders of 
ventures that have failed since inception. We selected a random sample from the survey 
population so 3,671 founders of start-ups were contacted. Due to team start-ups this 
corresponds to 2,604 new ventures in innovative industries. Between January and October 
2008, we conducted 639 face-to-face interviews with solo entrepreneurs or with one 
member of a start-up team (a response rate of about 25%). The 76 start-ups that turned out 
not to be genuinely new (e.g., they were a new branch or new business area of an existing 
company) were removed. A further 13 interviews had to be deleted due to concerns over 
interview quality. In order to exclude any effects of the German reunification, only start-
ups with a first business year later than 1993 were considered68. This reduced the number 
of valid interviews to 450.  
The structured interviews were personally conducted by the members of the 
research project. We were supported by student research assistants, after being trained in 
various sessions in December 2007. On average, an interview took one and a half hours. 
The interviews covered a broad set of questions regarding socio-demographic and 
psychological data of the founder. Moreover, we asked for founder’s activities along the 
founding process. Economic data focused on the time before the first business year and the 
first three business years. Retrospective data relating to events in founder’s life and to the 
                                                          
68 We defined the first business year as the time when accounting started either because of obligations from 
the commercial register or because of first revenues. This does not necessarily correspond to the date of 
registration in the Handelsregister. 
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business history were collected using a modified version of the Life-History-Calendar 
(Belli et al., 2004, Caspi et al., 1996), which increases the validity of retrospective data.69 
 
The sample of investigation 
From the data of the Thuringian Founder Study, the majority of venture set ups in the 
sample (61.2%) reported having conducted R&D within the first three business years. Due 
to missing values for single variables and the exclusion of one outlier70 we arrive at 243 
R&D performing start-ups which constitute the sample of investigation in this chapter. 
Public funds in support of R&D were given to 106 firms (43.6% of all R&D performing 
start-ups).  
 
Additional data 
For the data on the patent stock, we accessed the database of the German patent 
information system (DEPATIS) provided by the German Patent and Trade Mark Office. 
For each interviewed start-up, we looked for patent applications where the founder(s) 
and/or partner(s) were named as inventors. We then calculated the sum of patent 
applications within the last five years before the first business year. Double counts 
resulting from co-patenting were eliminated. 
 
4.3.2 Variables 
The dependent variable R&D Subsidy describes the take-up of R&D subsidies within the 
first three business years. The dummy variable is coded 1 if the respective start-up received 
R&D subsidies and 0 otherwise. Table 4.1 shows the independent variables, their 
definitions and hypothesized directions:  
                                                          
69 The Life-History-Calendar is a method developed by psychologists and sociologists and is based on the 
principles of the autobiographic memory. This means that – in a first step – we asked interviewees about the 
timing of well-known events (e.g. marriage, birth of children). In a second step, these events served as 
anchors for less well represented events (e.g. first interest in entrepreneurship). 
70 We have to discard one outlier which has a patent stock of 148 patents, almost the triple amount of the 
start-up with the second highest patent stock. 
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Novelty 
(+) 
The novelty of the business idea refers to the scope of the newness of the business idea. 
Possible answers were no novelty (0), regional or local (1), supra-regional but national 
(2), European (3) or global novelty (4). 
Academic Spin-off 
(+) 
Academic spin-offs were coded as a dummy variable with 1 denoting start-ups where the 
business idea evolved from previous employment at a university or research institute 
(academic spin-off) and with 0 otherwise. 
Goals 
(+) 
Four items build up the variable goals at the beginning of the first business year. 
Interviewees were given four contradictory pairs with a 5 level scale in-between. They 
had to classify their goals at the beginning of the first business year given the following 
pairs: working entirely cost-covering vs. to realize much profit (1); to earn one’s living 
vs. to become rich (2); to be a small provider vs. to become market leader (3): to 
generate constant revenues vs. to generate constantly rising revenues (4). The mean of 
these answers was build for each observation. 
Team 
(+) 
Team start-ups were defined as new ventures where more than one person was actively 
involved in the founding process and was intended to become an owner of the company. 
We code a dummy variable with 0 in the case of a single founder, and with 1 in the case 
of a team start-up. 
Patent stock 
(+) 
The patent stock is the sum of patent applications of founders and partners within the last 
five years before venture set-up. 
Initial Capital 
(+) 
The amount of initial capital at the beginning of the first business year was asked for 
with the help of the following table: 1,000 EUR or less (1), more than 1,000 to 10,000 
EUR (2), more than 10,000 to 50,000 EUR (3), more than 50,000 to 100,000 EUR (4), 
more than 100,000 to 250,000 EUR (5), more than 250,000 to 500,000 EUR (6), more 
than 500,000 EUR (7). 
Cooperative R&D If R&D was performed in co-operation with others within the first three business years, 
this dummy variable is coded as 1, otherwise 0. 
Year 1994-1997 
Year 1998-2001 
Year 2002-2006 
Dummy variables that capture the time of business start, i.e. the first business year of the 
company when accounting started either because of obligations from the commercial 
register or because of first revenues. 
 
Nace 2………:::::.... 
Nace 3………:::::.... 
Nace 7……:::::…… 
Nace x……:::::…… 
Industry-dummies (NACE, 1 digit): 
Chemical industry, metalworking industry, engineering 
Electrical engineering, fine mechanics and optics 
Information and Communication Technology, R&D, Services 
Miscellaneous 
Product 
 
The value for the dummy variable Product is 1 if the start-up offered a product in the 
first three business years and the value is 0 in the case of service companies. 
Table 4.1: Definition and hypothesized direction of independent variables 
 
Descriptive statistics of each variable and the correlation matrix can be found in Table 4.2. 
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M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) R&D Subsidy 0.436 0.497 -                
(2) Novelty 1.794 1.688 0.279 *** -                 
(3) Academic Spin-off 0.173 0.379 0.256 *** 0.294 *** -              
(4) Goals 3.221 0.907 0.110 * 0.311 *** 0.058  -             
(5) Team 0.691 0.463 0.157 ** 0.095  0.258 *** 0.059  -            
(6) Patent Stock 1.407 4.555 0.165 ** 0.322 *** 0.231 *** 0.153 ** 0.086  -           
(7) Initial Capital 3.420 1.389 0.105  0.143 ** 0.047  0.125 * 0.084  0.149 ** -          
(8) Cooperative R&D 0.473 0.500 0.346 *** 0.243 *** 0.221 *** 0.026  0.116 * 0.199 *** 0.059  -         
(9) Year 1994-1997 0.391 0.489 0.027  -0.081  -0.188 *** -0.118 * -0.085  -0.013  -0.065  0.051  -        
(10) Year 1998-2001 0.337 0.474 0.092  -0.042  0.226 *** 0.024  0.062  0.098  0.038  0.021  -0.572 *** -       
(11) Year 2002-2006 0.272 0.446 -0.127 ** 0.134 ** -0.034  0.104  0.027  -0.090  0.031  -0.079  -0.489 *** -0.436 *** -      
(12) Nace 2 0.263 0.441 0.039  -0.095  -0.150 ** 0.048  0.015  0.065  0.160 ** 0.107 * 0.134 ** -0.091  0.050  -     
(13) Nace 3 0.272 0.446 0.097  0.245 *** 0.088  0.134 ** 0.027  0.157 ** 0.086  0.181 *** 0.099  0.014  -0.123 * -0.365 *** -    
(14) Nace 7 0.374 0.485 -0.063  -0.050  0.119 * -0.109 * 0.002  -0.116 * -0.257 *** -0.171 *** -0.184 *** 0.077  0.120 * -0.463 *** -0.473*** -   
(15) Nace x 0.091 0.288 -0.104  -0.150 ** -0.106 * -0.098  -0.069  -0.148 ** 0.055  -0.155 ** -0.047  -0.013  0.065  -0.189 *** -0.193 *** -0.244 *** -  
(16) Product 0.337 0.474 0.197 *** 0.196 *** -0.050  0.126 ** 0.025  0.118 * 0.260 *** 0.143 ** 0.053  -0.068  0.014  0.186 *** 0.327 *** -0.408 *** -0.104  - 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; N=243 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
0.290 *** 0.279 *** 0.292 *** 0.305 *** 0.283 *** 0.255 *** Novelty (0.093)  (0.096)  (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.093)  (0.096)  
1.220 *** 1.222 *** 1.079 ** 1.285 *** 1.220 *** 0.985 ** Academic Spin-off (0.416)  (0.416)  (0.427)  (0.425)  (0.417)  (0.435)  
  0.068       Goals   (0.165)       
   0.482      Team    (0.326)      
    -0.033    Patent Stock     (0.033)    
      0.088   Initial Capital       (0.109)   
       1.169 *** Cooperative R&D        (0.305)  
0.818 ** 0.836 ** 0.878 ** 0.796 ** 0.833 ** 0.756 * Year 1994-1997 (0.376)  (0.379)  (0.382)  (0.378)  (0.378)  (0.387)  
0.851 ** 0.853 ** 0.882 ** 0.847 ** 0.851 ** 0.833 ** Year 1998-2001 (0.387)  (0.387)  (0.391)  (0.387)  (0.387)  (0.396)  
0.343  0.329  0.312  0.378  0.331  0.018  Nace 2 (0.576)  (0.577)  (0.582)  (0.579)  (0.577)  (0.605)  
0.008  -0.007  -0.006  0.041  0.015  -0.327  Nace 3 (0.596)  (0.596)  (0.600)  (0.597)  (0.597)  (0.630)  
0.170  0.175  0.172  0.180  0.214  0.115  Nace 7 (0.559)  (0.559)  (0.565)  (0.560)  (0.563)  (0.583)  
0.825 ** 0.825 ** 0.829 ** 0.831 ** 0.774 ** 0.848 ** Product (0.335)  (0.335)  (0.337)  (0.336)  (0.341)  (0.347)  
-2.053 *** -2.256 *** -2.399 *** -2.061 *** -2.345 *** -2.296 *** Constant (0.575)  (0.759)  (0.636)  (0.575)  (0.683)  (0.601)  
           
N 243 243 243 243 243 243 
LR chi2 42.478 42.648 44.706 43.438 43.131 57.479 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mc Fadden´s R² 0.128 0.128 0.134 0.130 0.130 0.173 
Cox-Snell R² 0.160 0.161 0.168 0.164 0.163 0.211 
Nagelkerke R² 0.215 0.216 0.225 0.219 0.218 0.282 
Dependent variable: R&D Subsidy which describes whether start-up takes up R&D subsidies within the first three business years 
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4.4 Results 
The results of logistic regressions are displayed in Table 4.3. We run six different models 
which contain the same set of controls and the same two core independent variables 
Novelty and Academic Spin-off, but differ with respect to the other independent variables. 
In all six models we control for the period the new venture was founded, whether the start-
up offered a service or a product, and for the industry. The time dummies are always 
significant, indicating a decline in the R&D related subsidization of start-ups since 2002. 
Furthermore, the significantly positive dummy variable Product points to a lower 
likelihood of service companies to receive R&D subsidies.71 The industry dummies never 
show a significant coefficient, indicating that there are no sectors having been more likely 
to receive a R&D subsidy.  
Looking at all six models, the novelty of the business idea (Novelty) as well as the 
dummy variable Academic Spin-off turn out to have both a positive impact on the 
probability of receiving R&D subsidies. Their impact is significant at the 5% and 1% level 
throughout. As their coefficients change only slightly between the six models, we consider 
this a confirmation of the robustness of our results. Our results thus indicate that R&D 
programs allocate funds in favor of start-ups with more innovative/novel ideas and of 
academic spin-offs. The focus on more innovative start-ups is likely to be driven by the 
expectation that they show a comparatively higher competitiveness and in consequence 
success. Having generated a global novelty instead of a local novelty makes a start-up less 
vulnerable to competitors. This, however, may be also an argument for expected higher 
private returns and accordingly less need to be subsidized. Therefore, we find an indication 
for a “picking the winner strategy”. 
The case of a higher funding probability of academic spin-offs could be interpreted 
in the same way since basic new insights there show a high degree of novelty. 
Additionally, one has to take into account that supporting academic spin-offs ranks high on 
the policy agenda devoted to generating more economic value out of basic research in 
academia (Shane, 2004). However, by arguing that the step to found a new venture is much 
more difficult to do for a scientist in academia compared to someone having gained 
business experience elsewhere already, academic spin-offs can be interpreted as marginal 
projects – they would not come into existence without appropriate subsidization and an 
interpretation as a “picking the winner strategy” would not apply. 
                                                          
71 This focus of policymakers and economic research on the manufacturing sector has been also pointed out 
by Czarnitzki and Fier (2001). 
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Starting with model 1 as the base model, the previously described variables only, 
we add the independent variable Goal in model 2. The variable turns out to be 
insignificant, indicating no impact of the founders’ ambitions on the probability of being 
subsidized. This implies that the allocation of funds does not follow the expectations and 
goals of the applying entrepreneurs but looks for more hard facts. Those hard facts could 
be seen in the resource strength of the founding project, our third criterion. Models 3, 4 and 
5 test the impact of the start-ups’ resource strength as denoted by the variables Team, 
Patent Stock or Initial Capital. None of the characteristics of being a Team start-up, the 
extent of the Patent Stock, or the amount of Initial Capital exerts a significant impact on 
the probability of receiving R&D subsidies. Furthermore, likelihood-ratio tests do not 
indicate any higher explanatory power of the extended models 2 to 4 in comparison with 
the base model (model 1). This again does not sustain our “picking the winner” hypothesis. 
However, the resource strength of the founding project will be partly captured by the 
variable Academic Spin-off, since academic spin-offs are mainly launched by highly 
qualified teams and feature a high patent stock (Shane, 2004).  
In a last step, the variable Cooperative R&D is added (model 6). This variable has a 
highly significant positive impact on the probability of receiving R&D subsidies. A 
likelihood-ratio-test reveals that model 6 has a significant higher explanatory power than 
the base model. A founding project’s access to external resources, as indicated by its 
engagement in cooperative R&D, goes along with a higher probability to receive R&D 
support. This can be interpreted on the one hand in terms of expecting a higher probability 
of success, sustaining our hypothesis. On the other hand, it would not be sustained if firm 
founding based on collaborative R&D indicated comparatively higher returns. If 
collaborative R&D was essential for a new venture, but not pursued without a subsidy, the 
project was merely marginal; again not validating our “picking the winner” hypothesis but 
rather suggesting subsidies’ potential to build winners. However, the variable Cooperative 
R&D might be subject to interdependencies with the dependent variable. A considerable 
number of R&D support programs target cooperative R&D. Hence, cooperative R&D 
might be a result of the subsidy scheme, because the program criteria encourage potential 
applicants to engage in R&D co-operations. 
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4.5 Discussion 
When interpreting our ambiguous support for a policy strategy of “picking the winner”, we 
have to start by analyzing by whom the selectivity is exerted and then what this selectivity 
implies for policy effectiveness.  
 
Sources of selectivity 
Interpreting the positively significant coefficients of collaborative R&D, of academic spin-
offs, and of start-ups selling products versus services, one has to be aware that several 
R&D programs exclusively focus on those criteria and consequently fund only respective 
projects. Since our sample contains enough new ventures not satisfying one or all of these 
criteria that do not receive policy support, the coefficients of collaborative R&D, of 
academic spin-offs, and of start-ups selling products absolutely must show up significantly 
positive. Hence, our positive coefficient covers two conceptually different cases of 
selectivity, the first being that the bias is imposed prior to announcing the tender and a 
second instance where the bias shows up during the selection of projects by the 
committees. Since both mechanisms are exerted by policymakers and/or program officials, 
they are interchangeably termed as administrative (Storey, 2000), agency (Wallsten, 2000) 
or committee selection (Storey, 2003). More tendentiously, Bassi (1984) speaks of “cream-
skimming” by program administrators. However, we cannot verify whether there are well-
defined allocation rules behind particular programs, because we lack data on the basis of 
individual funding schemes. 
 Moreover, not only do policymakers and program officials select beneficiaries of 
R&D support programs but also founders and their start-ups might self-select into the 
programs (Storey, 2000). Since subsidization reduces the costs of R&D, we assume that 
everybody would apply whose expected benefits from the R&D subsidy exceed the costs of 
applying. Figure 4.1 shows the answers of nonsubsidized founders regarding the reasons 
why they did not make use of subsidies. The first two categories, “not available/known” 
and “no interest/need” (representing 38.7% of nonsubsidized founders), can be subsumed 
as self selection of founders and might be explained by founders’ (self-perceived) costs of 
applying for public R&D funds (e.g. time and effort spent on getting informed about 
funding schemes and application procedures). The other categories can be more or less 
regarded as committee selection. The highest fraction of nonsubsidized founders (35.0%) 
reported that overly complicated application procedures prevented them from applying. 
This category, to some extent, blurs with the fourth category (“not eligible, therefore not 
applied”) which both characterize different stages of dropping out along the information 
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and application process. The applications of 8.8% of nonsubsidized founders had been 
rejected, indicating clear-cut committee selection. The reasons for non-subsidization might 
be biased, because we only asked founders of nonsubsidized start-ups, who still conducted 
R&D. However, we do not have data about start-ups which applied unsuccessfully and, 
therefore, did not conduct R&D at all – the marginal projects. 
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Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% due to refusals; N=137. 
Figure 4.1: Reasons for non-subsidization 
 
Policy effectiveness and efficiency 
The analyzed allocation of R&D subsidies does not assert whether they could effectively 
promote additional R&D activity. Even if there was a clear focus on “picking the winner”, 
this approach does not promise to be the most effective and efficient. Although a selective 
subsidization of likely winners might minimize substitution effects, it runs the risk of 
enormous windfall gains: Likely winners will probably not only yield high social returns 
but also high private returns, rendering public policy intervention obsolete (Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007). Furthermore, selective policy approaches coincide with deadweight losses 
resulting from screening and selecting procedures of eligible applicants (Parker, 2007). 
However, the subsidy allocation process can also mobilize co-operative innovative activity 
and enable learning effects for policymakers when it is organized as a contest of initiatives 
for self-organized co-operation in R&D (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). 
The differences between subsidized and nonsubsidized firms analyzed in this article 
constitute a selection bias. This selection bias is taken into account when matching 
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procedures are applied to evaluate policy effectiveness72. These methods then facilitate 
causal analyses on the effectiveness and efficiency of support schemes which consider 
performance indicators like revenue, employment and survival. However, these 
effectiveness analyses focus primarily on private returns. They neglect the original 
rationale of the subsidization of private R&D, i.e. positive external effects. Realizing 
positive external effects effectively and efficiently requires the identification of projects 
that are privately unprofitable but socially beneficial, the very starting point of this chapter. 
Policy strategies like “picking the winner” are simply approaches to circumvent the 
monumental information requirements.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has drawn on new survey evidence to verify whether R&D subsidies are 
allocated according to a “picking the winner” approach. We argued that policymakers and 
program officials pursue a “picking the winner” strategy to circumvent fundamental 
information problems in identifying projects which yield high social returns but low private 
returns and thus would not be realized (to the full extent) in the absence of subsidies. As 
hypothesized, we find that a high degree of novelty and being an academic spin-off 
increases the likelihood of receiving R&D subsidies. However, other ex-ante indicators of 
likely winners like founder’s prior ambitions, being a team start-up, previous patent 
experience and the amount of initial capital do not increase the likelihood of receiving 
R&D subsidies.  
These ambiguous results point to difficulties in precise policy targeting which, in 
turn, fundamentally question the massive subsidization of private R&D73. Widespread 
subsidization lacks exclusivity and thus does not allow for the certification of good projects 
(as suggested by Lerner (1999)). Moreover, it absorbs the demand for R&D funds and, 
therefore, runs the risk of hampering the development of a market for private R&D 
funding. 
Our analysis is based on aggregate data on the receipt of R&D subsidies, i.e. we 
lack information on the take-up of particular schemes and we do not have information on 
the amount of the subsidy. Therefore, we necessarily mix up selectivity within and between 
                                                          
72 Examining the same data set with propensity score matching in Chapter 5, we find a high impact of R&D 
subsidies on start-up’s employment growth and patent output within the first three business years. 
73 Additional R&D funds of 6bn Euro between 2006 and 2009 have been announced by the promotional 
initiative “High-Tech Strategy for Germany” (BMBF, 2006). Fostering R&D and technology-oriented start-
ups is a stated aim of this initiative. The high public subsidization can be also seen in our sample: 43.6% of 
all R&D performing start-ups receive public R&D funds. 
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single policy schemes and cannot distinguish whether selectivity is exerted by any 
differential extent of subsidization. Although these data limitations are a clear shortcoming 
of this study, the overall subsidy allocation should still be consistent with the pursuit of 
enabling R&D activity which would not be carried out in the absence of subsidies. Our 
aggregate data on public R&D funding thus offers unique insights into the overall subsidy 
allocation for a random sample. Nevertheless, it is the dispersed and continuously changing 
subsidy environment that impedes more precise policy insights. 
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5. R&D subsidies to start-ups – Effective drivers of patent activity and employment 
growth?74 
5.1. Introduction 
Newborn firms as well as small and medium sized companies contribute crucially to 
technological change through research and development (R&D) and innovation (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1990; Audretsch, 2006). This has led to a rise in policy programs targeted at the 
R&D of (nascent) entrepreneurs and their newborn firms all over the world (Lerner, 1999). 
Fostering R&D and technology-oriented start-ups is a stated aim of promotional initiatives 
such as the “High-Tech Strategy for Germany”, which announced additional R&D funds of 
6bn Euro between 2006 and 2009 (BMBF, 2006). Especially in East Germany, R&D 
support schemes focus on small and medium enterprises as well as start-ups (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2005). 
Rather traditionally, the presumed existence of market failure provides a rationale 
for public R&D subsidies. The presence of R&D spillovers – which have been studied, for 
example, by Griliches (1992) and Jaffe (1996) – is one argument in favor of public 
intervention, since the limited appropriability of returns from R&D induces firms to invest 
below the social optimum in R&D. A second argument in favor of subsidizing R&D is 
based on information imperfections on the part of financial institutions. Sunk and firm-
specific investment, low collateral value, and the high uncertainty of returns impact the 
financing conditions for R&D projects. This holds especially true for newborn firms which 
lack the necessary size to cross-subsidize R&D projects and to diversify the risks from 
innovative activity. In addition, they lack a track record to signal their creditworthiness to 
private investors. However, their R&D activity might still be socially beneficial by 
inducing knowledge spillovers as well as by challenging incumbents and thus ensuring 
competitive markets. Based on these three failures, public intervention could be justified 
and public expenditures may help overcome a lack of private investment in uncertain R&D 
projects and at the same time may certify the high quality of the R&D projects for other 
potential investors (Lerner, 1999). 
However, the underlying reasons for policy intervention are not beyond dispute. 
The arguments opposing R&D subsidies and entrepreneurship policies are traditionally 
based on windfall gains and market distortions. First, windfall gains arise when companies 
would have performed the R&D project irrespective of public subsidies. Wallsten (2000) 
points out that efficient R&D subsidy should only be given to R&D projects that have 
                                                          
74 This chapter is based on Cantner and Kösters (2009b). 
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positive net social benefits but negative net profits for the innovating firm. Hence, R&D 
subsidies should complement rather than crowd out private R&D investments. Second, 
market distortions occur because public support schemes equalize ex-ante less efficient and 
more efficient firms and in this way distort market selection as well as the learning 
processes of founders. This means that subsidization is an ‘artificial seedbed’ for less 
efficient firms, which would have been induced to leave the market if they had not received 
assistance (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2006; Stam et al., 2009). This (potential) crowding out 
of nonsubsidized firms makes some authors oppose entrepreneurship policy schemes 
altogether (Parker, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments against public intervention, there is 
public money invested in R&D schemes. To ensure that taxpayer’s money is spent 
effectively and efficiently, as well as to guide further policy-making, they have to be 
evaluated. Although policy evaluation is commonplace and part of most policy initiatives, 
Lerner (1999, p. 285) notes that “public subsidization of small firms has attracted virtually 
no scrutiny”. Most evaluations only monitor the take-up of schemes and recipients’ 
opinions, especially their views of the differences made by the assistance, and not the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the intervention. In fact, this mere monitoring of R&D 
schemes is not able to reveal any causal effects.  
The present study attempts to overcome this gap and examines the effectiveness of 
R&D support schemes available to start-ups in innovative industries in the East German 
state of Thuringia. Doing so, we take an aggregate view and analyze the effectiveness of 
the subsidy environment – instead of a specific subsidy program – which young 
technology-oriented firms face. This perspective is especially promising when considering 
the great variety of different and often overlapping policy programs targeted at R&D75. 
Therefore, we evaluate a mixture of different but similar programs all available to 
Thuringian start-ups engaged in R&D within the first three business years. Our analysis is 
based on a random sample of innovative start-ups in innovative industries and focuses on 
those conducting R&D. We thus select those start-ups from which academics and 
policymakers expect the highest social returns accruing from innovation. Two different 
performance measures are examined, each capturing private returns of (subsidized) R&D 
activities: employment growth and innovation output (i.e. patent applications). We first 
argue that effective subsidies must lead to increasing R&D activity, which manifests in 
                                                          
75 Bundestag (2005) and Belitz (2001) provide insights into the volatile subsidy environment that East 
German firms face with regard to public R&D funds. 
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employment growth. Second, subsidies that foster the R&D activity of start-ups should also 
lead to higher innovation output measured by patent applications.  
Identifying the impact of R&D support schemes ideally would require a 
counterfactual analysis. As this is not possible, one compares assisted firms with an 
appropriate control group of other firms (Storey, 2000). The set-up of a control group must 
consider that the allocation of public R&D funds cannot be assumed to be arbitrary. On the 
one hand, a strategy of policymakers might be to grant public means to promising ventures 
(“picking the winner”). On the other hand, public R&D funds might back firms with less 
promising R&D projects. If those sources of potential selection are ignored, the evaluation 
of the effects of public assistance will be biased.  
In order to overcome that possible selection bias in our policy evaluation, we apply 
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The idea of this methodology is 
to assign to each assisted start-up a “statistical twin”, i.e. a start-up that has not been 
subsidized but that nevertheless has a similar probability of receiving public R&D funds. In 
this way, we create an adequate control group to estimate the causal effects of public R&D 
programs on employment growth and patent applications of subsidized firms. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Previous studies on the 
effectiveness of R&D support schemes are discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents 
the evaluation framework. The assumptions and the procedure of the potential outcome 
approach are then applied to our founder dataset in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the 
results and their robustness. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes. 
 
 
5.2 Literature review 
The rise of R&D support schemes is accompanied by a growing literature on the 
effectiveness of R&D-subsidies. These studies differ with regard to their data bases and the 
level of aggregation, ranging from country-, industry- and firm-level analyses to 
experimental studies.  
The straightforward approach in the typical econometric literature is regressing 
some measure of private R&D on public R&D to determine complementarity or 
substitutability of public R&D subsidies76. Here, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is 
related to firm-internal decision processes: Public R&D-funds might be either directed to 
projects that would have been undertaken anyway, leading to full or partial crowding out 
(substitution) of private investment, or they might stimulate additional private R&D effort, 
                                                          
76 David et al. (2000) and Klette et al. (2000) provide extensive surveys.  
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implying additionality or complementarity of R&D subsidies. For instance, González et al. 
(2005) find that Spanish manufacturing subsidies increase total R&D expenditure by 8%, 
resulting both from inducing firms to conduct R&D at all as well as from fostering the 
R&D activity of firms that would have been engaged in R&D anyway. Analyzing firms in 
East Germany, Czarnitzki (2001) finds that the average innovation intensity, i.e. the ratio 
between innovation expenses to sales, of subsidized firms adds up to 10% whereas the 
innovation intensity of matched nonsubsidized firms is only 5%. David et al. (2000) 
conclude that the evidence on the effectiveness of publicly funded R&D schemes is mixed. 
This can be attributed to methodological differences as well as to the fact that most studies 
concentrate on the evaluation of one specific program. As these schemes differ in, e.g., 
program design, extent of financial support and regional scope, different results from 
evaluations are to be expected. 
Alternatively, an increasing number of studies suggest a more indirect approach to 
the evaluation of the effectiveness of R&D schemes (David et al., 2000). These studies 
estimate the impact of R&D schemes on particular outcome variables, such as 
employment, patent applications and sales. In the absence of indicators for the social 
returns of subsidized R&D projects, these outcome variables indicate private returns and 
tend to capture effects beyond that level. On this basis, if subsidized firms reallocate public 
R&D funds to other means than publicly intended (namely additional R&D activities), 
subsidized firms and their nonsubsidized counterparts should not differ with respect to both 
the inputs to the R&D activity (e.g., measured by (R&D) employment growth) and the 
output of the R&D process (e.g., measured by patent applications). 
Analyzing the effectiveness of R&D subsidies with regard to employment is 
justified for primarily three reasons:  First, most R&D support programs focus on 
supporting R&D labor cost and other running costs, accounting for the fact that most R&D 
expenditure in small firms are spent for the salaries of scientists and engineers 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Hence, additional R&D activity should be best captured 
by R&D-related employment growth. Second, grants might not only impact employment 
directly related to the subsidized R&D project; if R&D subsidies increase commercial 
opportunities, firms might employ additional personnel to expand production (Wallsten, 
2000). Third, employment effects are regarded as a proxy for the social returns of R&D 
support schemes. High employment growth characterizes innovative high tech start-ups, 
which spur structural change and account for overall positive employment effects (Fritsch, 
2008). 
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The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) scheme, a US program targeted at 
R&D projects of small firms, has been evaluated with regard to its employment effects 
(Lerner (1999) and Wallsten (2000)). Lerner compares SBIR awardees with firms of 
similar size and industry as well as with firms of similar size from the same region that 
have not received SBIR funds. He finds that firms having obtained SBIR funds in the 
period 1983-1985 grew significantly faster with respect to employment and sales between 
1985 and 1995 (however, only in regions with substantial venture capital). Wallsten (2000) 
adopts a somewhat stronger experimental design and explicitly addresses the problem of 
endogeneity  –  the receipt of subsidies might induce employment growth, but at the same 
time high-performance firms might be also more likely to receive funds. Wallsten pursues 
an instrumental variable approach to address this selection bias and comes to a less 
favorable conclusion regarding the program’s effectiveness. He shows that firms with more 
employees and patents are more likely to receive SBIR funds. Wallsten points out that the 
average recipient exhibits annual sales of more than $4 million and employs more than 40 
people and is as a result far from being the stereotypical entrepreneur. Whereas firms with 
more employees are more likely to receive subsidies, these, in turn, do not affect 
employment. Moreover, Wallsten’s results suggest that public R&D funds lead to a 
crowding out of private investments in R&D. Studies explicitly distinguishing between the 
effects of the subsidy on aggregate employment and on aggregate expenditure suggest that 
subsidies affect wages of R&D personnel, since labor supply in R&D is strongly inelastic 
(Goolsbee, 1998; Wolff and Reinthaler, 2008). 
Other studies examine the effectiveness of R&D subsidies looking at patent 
applications of subsidized and nonsubsidized firms. Patents are a widely used measure for 
innovation output due to their availability and standardization. Furthermore, they have been 
found to be in close temporal proximity to actual R&D activity (Hall et al., 1986). 
However, the shortcomings of patent statistics, namely their heterogeneous – and often 
inconsiderable – economic value and varying propensities to patent across industries, are 
well known (see Griliches (1990) for a survey). Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) analyze the 
additionality of R&D subsidies with respect to innovation input (measured as private R&D 
expenditure) and innovation output (proxied by patent applications) for German firms in 
the mid to late 1990s. In a first step, they find that R&D grants positively impact private 
R&D investment. In a second step, they investigate whether additional R&D investments 
induced by subsidies improve innovation results. Subsidized firms in East Germany turn 
out to have both a significantly higher likelihood of having applied for a patent and a 
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higher number of patent applications. Hence, for East Germany, there is no evidence that 
government-induced R&D is less productive than purely privately financed R&D activity. 
Czarnitzki et al. (2007) analyze the impact of R&D subsidies and collaboration on 
the patenting activity for a sample of Finnish and Western German firms in the mid to late 
1990s. They interpret R&D collaboration and subsidies as heterogeneous and conduct 
econometric matching to account for selection bias. Looking at firms not engaged in R&D 
cooperation, subsidies stimulate only the patent output of Finnish firms. (Western) German 
firms receiving R&D subsidies for individual research do not show a higher patent output 
(measured by a dummy which indicates if a firm has filed at least one patent). However, 
collaborative R&D activity (both subsidized and nonsubsidized) stimulates patent activity 
as well as R&D intensity (R&D expenditure / sales) in both countries. 
The studies reviewed so far look at the effectiveness of R&D support schemes at 
the level of established firms. There are only a few studies assessing the effectiveness of 
R&D schemes at the level of newborn firms. Koga (2005) analyzes panel data of Japanese 
high-technology firms that were all founded after 1989. He finds that the receipt of public 
R&D funds impacts positively on the (natural logarithm of) company-funded R&D. This 
complementary relationship between public and private R&D investment holds with and 
without considering a time lag between the receipt of R&D subsidies and private R&D 
investment one year later. However, when the dataset is split and only start-ups younger 
than six years are considered, R&D subsidies no longer show positive effects on private 
R&D investment. Koga’s results suggest that newborn firms do not have a strong incentive 
to conduct additional R&D, as they are confined by their initial funds. Instead, mature 
firms and growth-oriented young firms are more likely to allocate public R&D funds to 
additional R&D. Lerner (1999) offers a similar explanation when he asks for more studies 
to analyze the long-run effects of R&D grants. He puts forward the proposition that small 
high-technology firms are often organized around one key researcher. For these small 
and/or young firms, it may not be possible to accelerate the project’s progress by 
employing more researchers or technicians. Conversely, Lach (2002) finds that R&D 
subsidies only stimulate private R&D expenditure in small firms. R&D subsidies might 
enable small firms to conduct additional R&D projects which could not be realized before 
because of the comparatively higher costs of raising capital for small firms. 
R&D conducting start-ups in innovative industries form a subset of start-ups which 
are expected to contribute most to structural change and long-run economic growth (Acs, 
2008). On the one hand, this selection of well-equipped research-oriented start-ups 
concludes likely winners that have been found to outperform non-innovative entries 
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(Almus et al., 1999). This obviously questions the necessity of subsidization suggesting 
that subsidies will constitute deadweight losses. On the other hand, these start-ups will be 
particularly affected by lacking appropriability of returns from R&D and potential credit 
market failure (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000). R&D subsidies might thus induce additional 
R&D activity. Based on the literature just reviewed, our analysis focuses on young, R&D 
conducting start-up firms in innovative industries and takes the indirect approach of 
evaluating the effectiveness of R&D support schemes. The outcome variables considered 
are employment growth and patent applications. 
 
 
5.3 The evaluation framework 
Evaluating the effectiveness of R&D support schemes for start-up firms requires a 
methodological approach allowing us to compare the performance of a firm with and 
without having received the support. Since the latter, counterfactual outcome, is not 
available, a special method has been developed to tackle this issue, this being the 
application of so-called matching models.  
 
The potential outcome approach 
When estimating causal effects with observational data, the problem arises that individual 
treatment effects are impossible to determine since we cannot observe the subsidized firm’s 
performance if it had not been subsidized, and vice versa. We follow Roy (1951) and 
Rubin (1974) in their formalization of the potential outcome approach. We are interested in 
the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT), i.e. the expected differential economic 
performance of subsidized firms which can be attributed to the receipt of public subsidies. 
The treatment indicator, D, equals 1 if the firm receives subsidies; the indicator is coded 0 
otherwise. The outcome for each firm is then defined as Y1 if a firm’s R&D is subsidized; a 
firm’s outcome is denoted Y0 in the case of no subsidies. With E as the expectation 
operator, the ATT can thus be defined as 
(ATT) )1()1()1( 0101 =Ε−=Ε==−Ε DYDYDYY  (1) 
A firm can only be subsidized or nonsubsidized, so only one of the outcomes is 
observed. The outcome that cannot be observed is termed the counterfactual outcome. With 
non-experimental data, this counterfactual outcome )1( 0 =Ε DY  cannot be substituted 
with )0( 0 =Ε DY , because subsidized firms are supposed to be a selective group that 
would show different performance even in the absence of any subsidization. 
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In order to approach the counterfactual outcome, the selection of firms into 
treatment is assumed to be based on observables. The conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) states that, given a set of observable exogenous (not affected by the 
treatment) characteristics, X, potential outcomes are independent of the treatment 
assignment: 
(CIA)  XXYYD ∀⊥ ),( 01  (2) 
To put it another way, if one can fully control for observable differences in 
characteristics between the subsidized and nonsubsidized firms, the outcome that would 
result in the absence of any subsidies is the same in both cases. Consequently, if the CIA 
holds, the matching process can be compared to creating an experimental dataset, in that, 
conditional on observed characteristics, the selection process is random. Obviously, the 
CIA is a strong assumption. Since we employ a rich dataset which should contain 
comprehensive information on the determinants of both subsidization and outcome, we are 
confident in maintaining such a strong assumption.  
Implicit in this notation is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) 
which states that the subsidization does not impact on any firms other than those that are 
explicitly treated and whose outcome is denoted Y1 (Rubin, 1991). In our context, this 
implies that R&D subsidies do not impact on nonsubsidized firms by market effects or 
knowledge spillovers. Thus, SUTVA rules out general equilibrium effects of R&D 
subsidies. However, interaction effects can both over- and underestimate the ATT. On the 
one hand, the ATT is overestimated when the employment growth of subsidized firms is 
realized at the expense of nonsubsidized firms. On the other hand, nonsubsidized firms 
might profit from knowledge spillovers generated in subsidized firms, which leads to an 
underestimation of the subsidy’s impact. Since these mechanisms of action are difficult to 
identify empirically, we follow the SUTVA and ignore general equilibrium effects. 
However, we indirectly account for different interaction effects by examining employment 
growth and patent output as outcome variables. 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
Subsidized and nonsubsidized firms are matched on the basis of important, exogenous 
characteristics, X. Increasing the number of observable covariates constitutes a practical 
constraint, because the chances of finding a control unit decrease the greater the number of 
characteristics used in the match. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose the use of 
propensity score matching to solve this problem of dimensionality. The basic idea is not to 
match on covariates directly, but to match on a function of the covariates X which 
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describes the propensity to receive treatment, i.e. )()|1( XPXDP == . This predicted 
probability of group membership )(XP  – i.e., subsidization vs. non-subsidization – is 
usually obtained from logistic regression. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that 
matching on a single index, which reflects the probability of participation, could result in 
consistent estimates of the treatment effect in the same way as matching on all covariates. 
The CIA based on the propensity score is then given by 
(CIA based on propensity score)  XXPYYD ∀⊥ )(),( 01  (3) 
Propensity score matching, however, cannot entirely solve the problem of having no 
appropriate matches, because propensity scores might strongly differ between subsidized 
and nonsubsidized firms. The additional assumption of common support ensures that the 
propensity scores of subsidized and nonsubsidized firms overlap, i.e. persons with the same 
X values have a positive probability of being either subsidized or nonsubsidized. More 
technically, observations are only regarded if their propensity score values show a positive 
density within the group of subsidized as well as nonsubsidized firms. The region of 
common support should be substantial. Failing this, a considerable error may be 
introduced. This might happen, if only the worst cases from the nonsubsidized 
“comparison” group are compared with only the best cases of all subsidized firms. 
 
Matching algorithms 
There are various matching algorithms which all contrast the outcome of a treated firm 
1Ii ∈  with a weighted average of the outcome of (some) control group observations, 
0Ij ∈ . Following the notation of Caliendo (2006), the average treatment effect for the 
treated (ATT) can be stated as 
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
−=
1 0
0
]),([1 01
1 Ii Ij
jNi YjiWYN
ATT  (4) 
with 1iY  denoting the outcome of the treated firm i  and 
0
jY  the outcome of untreated firms 
j. 1N ( 0N ) is the number of observations in the treatment group 1I  (control group 0I ). 
The outcome of i  is contrasted with the average weighted outcome of the control group, 
where the weights are given by ),(
0
jiWN . Usually, the weights the weighting function 
assigns to the untreated firms are higher the closer the untreated firms and the treated firm 
are with respect to the observed characteristics. The total weight of all controls adds up to 
one for each treated firm, i.e. ∑
∈
∀=
0
0
1),(
Ij
N ijiW .  
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The matching algorithms differ in terms of the construction of the weighting 
functions and the definition of potential “neighborhoods” which restrict the number of 
observations that serve as a comparison unit. An overview of different matching algorithms 
can be found in Heckman et al. (1998) as well as in Smith and Todd (2005). Smith (2000) 
points out that all matching estimators asymptotically yield the same results, since they all 
approach only exact matches as the sample size grows. However, the results from different 
matching algorithms can differ in small samples, pointing to a trade-off between quality 
and quantity of the matches. A matching algorithm yielding few but good matches will lead 
to biased estimates, whereas a matching procedure with many but poor matches yields 
higher variance. Thus, the choice of the matching algorithm depends on the available data 
structure. 
In our evaluation, we apply kernel matching. This matching estimator uses all units 
in the control group to construct a match for each treated firm. Therefore, it promises to 
exploit our data best, since the sample is relatively small and there are almost as many 
subsidized firms as nonsubsidized control firms (see Section 5.4.1). The major advantage 
of kernel matching is the lower variance, since more information for the construction of the 
counterfactual is used. However, the use of more information is at risk to include bad 
matches. Kernel matching employs the following weigths,  
∑ ∈= 00 ),( Ik ik
ij
N G
G
jiW  (5) 
with ikG  denoting a kernel function ]/)[( hPPG ki − . The implementation of kernel 
matching involves two choices: the choice of the kernel function ikG  as well as the choice 
of the bandwidth parameter h . If a symmetric, nonnegative, unimodal kernel is employed, 
higher weights are attached to observations close in terms of the propensity score P . 
DiNardo and Tobias (2001) note that the kernel employed is relatively unimportant in 
practice, but the choice of the bandwidth parameter matters. The bandwidth parameter h  
determines a trade-off between a small variance and an unbiased estimate of the true 
underlying density function (DiNardo and Tobias, 2001). On the one hand, the higher the 
bandwidth parameter, the smoother is the estimated density function, which leads to a 
better fit and a decreasing variance between the estimated and the true underlying density 
function. On the other hand, a high bandwidth parameter risks biased estimates, because 
underlying features of the true density function might be smoothed away. There are two 
methods of bandwidth selection: the method of cross-validation and the plug-in-method 
(Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008). We employ the latter and follow Silverman’s (1986) 
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frequently used rule-of-thumb to determine the bandwidth h  and thus balance bias and 
variance. 5
1
9.0 −⋅⋅= nAh  is the optimal bandwidth for a Gaussian (normal) kernel. Herein 
n denotes the number of observations and the term 
)
34.1
,min( rangeileinterquartdeviationstandardA =  accounts for the distribution of the 
propensity score. 
 
 
5.4. Empirical analysis 
After introducing our database and the employed variables (Section 5.4.1), we estimate the 
propensity score and look for the region of common support (Section 5.4.2). In Section 
5.4.3, Kernel matching is performed and the matching quality is assessed. 
 
5.4.1 The data 
Data for this study were collected within the Thuringian Founder Study (Thüringer 
Gründer Studie), which is an interdisciplinary project on the success and failure of 
innovative start-ups in the eastern German state of Thuringia. The survey population 
consists of 4,215 founders (first registered owner-managers) who registered 2,971 start-ups 
in innovative industries in the Thuringian Handelsregister between 1994 and 2006. 
Innovative industries, according to ZEW classification (Grupp and Legler, 2000), comprise 
‘advanced technology’ and ‘technology-oriented services’. This design made it possible to 
interview not only founders of active companies but also founders of ventures that had 
failed. From the survey population, we selected a random sample so that 3,671 founders of 
start-ups were contacted. Due to team ventures, this corresponds to 2,604 start-ups in 
innovative industries. Between January and October 2008, we conducted 639 face-to-face 
interviews with solo entrepreneurs or with one member of a start-up team (a response rate 
of about 25%). The 71 start-ups that turned out not to be genuinely new (e.g. they were a 
new branch or new business area of an existing company) were removed. A further 17 
interviews had to be deleted due to concerns over interview quality. In order to exclude any 
effects of the German reunification, only start-ups with a first business year later than 1993 
were considered77. This reduced the number of valid interviews to 450.  
                                                          
77 We defined the first business year as the time when accounting started either because of obligations from 
the commercial register or because of first revenues. This does not necessarily correspond to the date of 
registration in the Handelsregister. 
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The structured interviews were conducted by the members of the research project. 
We were supported by student research assistants who were trained in various sessions in 
December 2007. On average, an interview took one and a half hours. The interviews 
covered a broad set of questions regarding socio-demographic and psychological data of 
the founder. Moreover, we asked for founder’s activities along the founding process. 
Economic data focused on the time before the first business year and the first three 
business years. Retrospective data relating to events in the founder’s life and to the 
business history were collected using a modified version of the Life-History-Calendar 
(Belli et al., 2004), which increases the validity of retrospective data.78 
The majority of venture set ups in the sample, i.e. 273 start-ups (61.2%), reported 
having conducted R&D within the first three business years. These R&D performing start-
ups constitute the unit of investigation in this article. Public funds in support of R&D were 
given to 116 firms (42.5% of all R&D performing start-ups) anytime within the first three 
business years.79 Similarly to Czarnitzki (2001) we neither have information about the 
specific subsidy scheme nor on the amount of subsidization. We do know, however, that 
R&D subsidies comprise mainly wage subsidies for R&D personnel, project-specific 
funding and start-up incentives (Belitz et al., 2001). Figure 5.1 shows the first business 
year of all interviewed start-ups and pictures the shares of those start-ups that performed 
R&D as well as received R&D subsidies. 
                                                          
78 The Life-History-Calendar is a method developed by psychologists and sociologists and is based on the 
principles of the autobiographic memory. This means that – in a first step – we asked interviewees about the 
timing of well-known events (e.g., marriage, birth of children). In a second step, these events served as 
anchors for less well represented events (e.g., first interest in entrepreneurship). 
79 Due to missing values for specific variables, 28 observations had to be dropped. Six of these start-ups did 
not survive the first three business years. Furthermore, two outliers were discarded which showed an 
employment growth of 5500% and 158 patent applications within the first four business years, respectively. 
We thus ended with 243 common observations, analyzed with regard to both outcome variables. 
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Figure 5.1: First business year of interviewed start-ups (overall), R&D-performing start-ups and those 
start-ups that received R&D subsidies 
 
Variables 
We examine the effectiveness of R&D subsidies on employment growth and patent output, 
which are captured by the following variables: 
Founders were asked about the employment trend of their start-ups. Employment 
growth within the first three business years is then defined as  
yearst
yearstyearrd
yearsessbu Employment
EmploymentEmployment
growthEmployment
1
13
sin3
−=  
Here Employment comprises different kind of employment relationships, such as the 
working time of founders, active partners, conventional employees, hired labor and 
trainees. The measure is normalized on full-time positions, thereby considering part-time 
jobs. 
For the patent output, we accessed the database of the German patent information 
system (DEPATIS) provided by the German Patent and Trade Mark Office. For each 
interviewed start-up, we looked for patent applications where the founder(s) and/or 
partner(s) were named as inventors. Furthermore, we looked for patents which were 
applied for directly by the start-ups in our sample. This procedure captures potential 
patents of employees working for the start-ups. We then calculated the sum of patent 
applications in the years before the first business year as well as the sum of patent 
applications in each business year. Double counts resulting from co-patenting were 
eliminated. Our outcome variable Patent output covers the patent applications that can be 
attributed to the start-up’s R&D activity within the first three years.  
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Patents have been found to be applied in close temporal proximity to actual R&D 
activity (Hall et al., 1986). Scherer (1984) provides survey evidence from the U.S. and the 
former West Germany suggesting a lag of nine months between the initial conception of an 
invention and the application for a patent. Therefore, we allow for a time lag of one year to 
capture patent applications that are still related to R&D activity of the first three business 
years. In short, the patent outcome can be depicted as follows: 
upsStartPartnersFoundersyearsessbu PPPoutputPatent −∪∪=sin3  with  
∑
=
=
4
1t
tFounders FoundersofPatentsP , ∑
=
=
4
1t
tPartners PartnersofPatentsP  and 
∑
=
− −=
4
1t
tupsStart upsStartofPatentsP . 
 
For the matching approach, our dataset allows us to base the conditional 
independence assumption on a broad set of variables which characterize the start-up before 
the first business year. We describe these variables in Table 5.1. 
Novelty The Novelty of the business idea refers to the scope of the newness of the business 
idea. Five categories were given: no novelty (0), regional or local (1), supra-
regional but national (2), European (3) and global novelty (4). 
Academic spin-off Academic spin-offs are start-ups where the business idea evolved from previous 
employment at a university or research institute. We code a start-up by a dummy 
variable with 1 in the case of an academic spin-off and with 0 otherwise. 
Product The value for the dummy variable Product is 1 if the start-up offered a product in 
the first three business years and the value is 0 in the case of service companies. 
Team Team start-ups were defined as venture set-ups where more than one person was 
actively involved in the founding process and was intended to become an owner of 
the company. We code a dummy variable with 0 in the case of a single founder, and 
with 1 in the case of a team start-up). 
Patent stock The patent stock is the sum of patent applications of founders and partners within 
five years before venture set-up. The variable is built up in the same way as the 
variable “patent output”.  
Target market The scope of the Target market ranges from 0 to 3 – 0 denoting a regional or local 
target market, 1 denoting a supra-regional but national target market, 2 denoting a 
European market, and 3 indicating a global market. 
Year 1994-1997 
Year 1998-2001 
Year 2002-2006 
Dummy variables that capture the time of business start, i.e. the first business year 
of the company when accounting started either because of obligations from the 
commercial register or because of first revenues. 
 
Nace 2…………... 
Nace 3…………... 
Nace 7…………... 
Nace x…………… 
Industry-dummies (NACE, 1 digit): 
Chemical industry, metalworking industry, engineering 
Electrical engineering, fine mechanics and optics 
Information and Communication Technology, R&D, Services 
Miscellaneous 
Table 5.1: Variables describing pre-treatment characteristics of the start-ups 
 
The correlation matrix is given in Table 5.2. Mean differences in the pre-treatment 
characteristics between subsidized and nonsubsidized firms are depicted in the first column 
block of Table 5.3. 
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Employ-
ment 
growth 
Patent 
output 
Take-up of 
R&D 
subsidies 
Academic 
spin-off Novelty 
Patent 
stock Product 
Target 
market Team 
Year 1994-
1997 
Year 1998-
2001 
Year 2002-
2006 Nace 2 Nace 3 Nace 7 Nace x 
Employment growth -     
Patent output 0.1169 * -     
Take-up of R&D 
subsidies 0.1932 ** 0.2155 *** -     
Academic spin-off 0.1907 ** 0.2725 *** 0.2268 *** -    
Novelty 0.1278 ** 0.3153 *** 0.2821 *** 0.2685 *** -    
Patent stock 0.1243 * 0.5534 *** 0.1878 ** 0.2835 *** 0.3510 *** -    
Product 0.0639  0.2539 *** 0.1995 ** -0.0509  0.1965 ** 0.1020 -    
Target market 0.1579 ** 0.1415 ** 0.0853  0.0765  0.2178 *** 0.1385 ** 0.3151 *** -   
Team 0.1373 ** 0.0653  0.1404 ** 0.2386 *** 0.0855  0.0914  0.0173  0.0677  -   
Year 1994-1997 -0.0113  0.0352  0.0172  -0.2193 * -0.0990  -0.0053  0.0392  -0.1462 * -0.0846 -   
Year 1998-2001 -0.0484  0.0118  0.0966  0.2500 * -0.0162  0.0719  -0.0856  0.0149  0.0846 -0.5777 * -   
Year 2002-2006 0.0647  -0.0513  -0.1233 * -0.0298  0.1259 ** -0.0718  0.0495  0.1441 ** 0.0012 -0.4717 *** -0.4472 *** -   
Nace 2 0.0419  -0.0287  0.0404  -0.1422 ** -0.0944  0.0377  0.2023 ** 0.1442 ** 0.0196 0.1182 * -0.0971 -0.0246  -   
Nace 3 0.0694  0.2789 *** 0.1110 * 0.1027  0.2434 *** 0.1815 ** 0.3119 *** 0.1253 * 0.0152 0.0919  0.0068 -0.1081 * -0.3727 *** -   
Nace 7 -0.0921  -0.1435 ** -0.0817  0.0960  -0.0634  -0.1120 * -0.4089 *** -0.1412 ** -0.0098 -0.1707 ** 0.0983 0.0809  -0.4739 *** -0.4546 *** -  
Nace x -0.0175  -0.1423 * -0.0965  -0.0964  -0.1195 * -0.1495 * -0.1087 * -0.1810 * -0.0376 -0.0393 -0.0236 0.0685  -0.1967 *** -0.1887 ** -0.2399 *** - 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 5.2: Correlation matrix; N=243 
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Employment growth Patent output Before Matching 
After Matching After Matching 
Mean of… Mean of matched… Mean of matched… 
… subsidized 
start-ups  
… non-
subsidized 
start-ups 
(potential 
controls) 
… 
subsidized 
start-ups 
… non-
subsidized 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
… subsidized 
start-ups  
… non-
subsidized 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
 
N=103  N=140 N=103 
 
N=139 N=93  N=140 
Academic spin-off  0.2524  0.0857 0.2524  0.2382 0.1720  0.1572 
Novelty  2.2913  1.3286 2.2913  2.2488 2.129  2.0703 
Patent stock  1.6796  1.2143 1.6796  1.9601 1.5699  1.7291 
Product  0.4563  0.2643 0.4563  0.2549 0.3979  0.4178 
Target market  1.3884  1.2357 1.3883  1.3307 1.3656  1.489 
Team  0.7670  0.6357 0.7670  0.7794 0.7527  0.6867 
Year 1994-1997  0.3883  0.3714 0.3884  0.3095 0.4194  0.3364 
Year 1998-2001  0.4078  0.3143 0.4078  0.3276 0.3763  0.2980 
Year 2002-2006  0.2039  0.3143 0.2039  0.3629 0.2043  0.3656 
Nace 2  0.3010  0.2643 0.3010  0.2320 0.3333  0.2891 
Nace 3  0.3204  0.2214 0.3204  0.2512 0.2473  0.2982 
Nace 7  0.3204  0.4000 0.3204  0.4270 0.3548  0.3406 
Nace x  0.0583  0.1143 0.0583  0.0898 0.0645  0.0721 
 
 
Employment 
growth 
 1.3101  0.8271 1.3101  0.7894 1.2829  0.8580 
Patent output  3.5728  0.7571 3.5728  1.3373 2.7312  0.9632 
Propensity score 
(employment 
growth) 
 
0.4892  0.3758 0.4892  0.4827 -  - 
Propensity score 
(patent output) 
 0.5031  0.3655 -  - 0.4664  0.4585 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is depicted after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers 
indicate significant different means between observation from subsidized start-ups and nonsubsidized start-ups before and 
after matching in a two-sided t-test (5%-significance level). 
Table 5.3: Group differences between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups before and after 
matching 
 
 
5.4.2 Estimation of the propensity score and common support 
Table 5.3 shows that subsidized and nonsubsidized firms exhibit significant differences 
regarding, e.g., the novelty of their business idea, the kind of business (product vs. service) 
and the origin of the business idea (Academic spin-off). Subsidized start-ups are 
significantly more often team start-ups. This indicates that self selection into R&D support 
schemes and committee selection of program officials make the group of subsidized 
ventures a selective one. As a consequence, if the distinguishing characteristics of 
subsidized and nonsubsidized firms have an impact on the outcome variable (employment 
growth and patent output, respectively), a direct comparison between the two groups will 
be biased. A priori the direction of the bias is unknown.  
Consequently, those variables should be included in the estimation of the propensity 
score which influence both the receipt of R&D subsidies as well as the respective outcome 
variable. We estimate a propensity score model for each outcome variable. Therefore, we 
look for variables which correlate with the receipt of R&D subsidies and simultaneously 
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with the respective success measure (employment growth and patent output) (Table 5.2). 
Moreover, we conduct multivariate analyses to identify other distinguishing characteristics 
between subsidized and nonsubsidized firms which have an impact at the same time on 
employment growth and patenting, respectively. In the following, the variable choice for 
each propensity score model is explained. 
 
Employment growth. Table 5.2 shows that the variables Academic spin-off, Novelty, 
Patent stock and Team are all correlated with both the Take-up of R&D subsidies as well as 
Employment growth. A high degree of Novelty (which is also reflected in many prior patent 
applications), being an Academic spin-off and a Team start-up are all characteristics of 
innovative start-ups.80 At the same time, the positive correlation of these variables with the 
receipt of R&D subsidies points to a policy strategy of “picking the winner”.81 
The provision of products instead of services (Product) is correlated with the Take-
up of R&D subsidies but not correlated with Employment growth. Apart from univariate 
statistics, we therefore run ordinary least squares regressions to find evidence whether 
Product, particular founding years and the industry influence employment growth. These 
regressions cannot reveal further determinants of employment growth. 
 
Patent output. The variables Academic spin-off, Novelty, Patent stock and Product 
are all correlated with both Take-up of R&D subsidies as well as with Patent output (Table 
5.2). Additionally, operating in electrical engineering, fine mechanics and optics (Nace 3) 
is positively correlated with the receipt of R&D subsidies and patent output. The patent 
applications, which are attributed to a start-up in each year, are highly correlated with one 
another, indicating path dependency of patent activity. We balance subsidized and 
nonsubsidized firms on the basis of previous patent experience by introducing the number 
of patent applications in the last five years before founding (measured by the variable 
Patent stock) in the estimation of the propensity score. Since negative binomial regression 
models cannot display any further determinants of patent output, which also differentiate 
between subsidized and nonsubsidized firms, we estimate the propensity score with the 
variables Academic spin-off, Novelty, Patent stock, Product and the industry dummies.82 
 
                                                          
80 Our data is thus in line with Almus et al. (1999), who analyze the employment growth of start-ups in East 
Germany. They find that innovative start-ups grow on average faster than non-innovative start-ups. 
81 For an in-depth discussion of the allocation of R&D subsidies see Chapter 4, or alternatively, Cantner and 
Kösters (2009a). 
82 The results from both multivariate analyses can be obtained from the authors. 
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The propensity to take up public R&D assistance is estimated with a logit model 
(Table 5.4). Following the discussion above, the selected variables for each of the two 
models are regressed on the binary dependent variable Take-up of R&D subsidies. Since 
we are primarily interested in prediction and data reduction, redundancy and collinearity 
are of little account (Smith, 1997). However, this limits the interpretation of the 
coefficients, which are not further discussed here. 
 
 Employment growth  Patent output 
Dependent variable: 
Take-up of R&D subsidies    
0.8986**  1.2087*** Academic spin-off 
(0.4121)  (0.4205) 
0.3186***  0.2796*** Novelty (0.0865)  (0.0899) 
-0.0275  -0.0322 Patent stock (0.0309)  (0.0314) 
   0.7050** Product    (0.3288) 
0.4301    Team (0.3115)    
   0.4871 Nace 2    (0.5638) 
   0.3004 Nace 3    (0.5828) 
   0.1841 Nace 7    (0.5513) 
-1.2822***  -1.4898*** Constant (0.2957)  (0.5059) 
N 243  243 
LR chi2 (k) (4) 28.48  (7) 35.02 
Prob > LR 0.0000  0.0000 
McFadden’s R2 0. 0860  0.1057 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses 
Table 5.4: Estimation of the propensity score 
 
The common support condition ensures that any set of characteristics of subsidized 
firms (captured by the propensity score) can also be observed for nonsubsidized ones. 
Especially for kernel matching, the condition of common support is important. Otherwise, 
nonsubsidized firms that lack a potential matching partner are inevitably taken to construct 
the counterfactual. We determine the region of common support with a minimum-
maximum comparison of the distribution of the propensity score. Figure 5.2 depicts the 
distribution of the propensity score for subsidized and nonsubsidized firms. The region of 
common support is given by the overlap and requires discarding one nonsubsidized (10 
subsidized observations) from the analysis of employment growth (patent output). 
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 Employment growth  Patent output  
 
Please note: Observations outside the region of common support are highlighted in dark. 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of the propensity score – separately for the analysis of employment growth 
(left column) and the analysis of the patent output (right column) 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Matching and matching quality 
Calculating the optimal bandwidth for our sample, we arrive at 0500.0=h  for employment 
growth and 0502.0=h  for patent output83. We thus perform kernel matching employing a 
Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.0500 and 0.0502, respectively.84 
The second and third column block of Table 5.3 show the characteristics of our 
control groups after matching. After matching, the nonsubsidized and subsidized matched 
firms do not exhibit any significant differences regarding any characteristics which are 
assumed to have an impact on both, the receipt of R&D subsidies as well as on 
employment growth and patent output. Although industry dummies are not included in the 
                                                          
83 The calculation is as follows. For the analysis of employment growth, 
166685.0)
34.1
2990019.05259101.0,166685.0min( =−=A  is inserted in 512429.0 −⋅⋅= Ah . Hence, the 
optimal bandwidth is 0500.0=h . Analogous to the previous calculation, the optimal bandwidth for the 
analysis of the patent output is derived by estimating 
11658171.0)
34.1
2638597.05289473.0,1658171.0min( =−=A  and 0502.02339.0 51 =⋅⋅= −Ah . 
84 Estimations are done using the psmatch2 Stata ado package by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) and the att Stata 
ado package by Becker and Ichino (2002). 
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propensity score estimation for the study of employment growth, the matching procedure 
manages to equalize subsidized and nonsubsidized firms in terms of their industry 
classification. 
As recommended by Sianesi (2004), we re-estimate the propensity scores on the 
matched samples to compare the pseudo-R2s before and after matching. The pseudo-R2 
tells how well the variables that were included in the estimation of the propensity score 
explain the receipt of R&D subsidies. Before matching, the pseudo-R2 should be high, and 
after matching fairly low. Moreover, a likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all 
the regressors before and after matching is performed. As required, the tests are rejected 
before but not rejected after matching. 
 
5.5 Results and their robustness 
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) (Table 5.5) is the difference between the 
mean outcome of subsidized firms and matched nonsubsidized firms. We use bootstrapping 
(200 replications) to calculate the standard error of the matching estimator.85 The 
employment growth of subsidized start-ups exhibits an ATT of 0.5207, i.e. the difference 
between the mean employment growth of subsidized firms (=1.3101) and matched 
nonsubsidized firms (=0.7894). In other words, R&D subsidies lead to an increase in 
employment growth of about 66%. The ATT turns out to be significant at the 0.01 
significance level. Looking at patent applications, we note that subsidized firms show a 
more than 2.8 times higher patent output compared to their nonsubsidized matched 
counterparts. This corresponds to an ATT of 1.7680, which is significant at the 0.05 level.  
We employ other matching algorithms to estimate the sensitivity of the results on 
the employment of the kernel matching estimator86. Table 5.5 shows that alternative 
bandwidth parameters for kernel matching, k-nearest neighbor matching, as well as radius 
matching87 yield qualitatively similar results. The estimates for the increase in employment 
growth range between 56% and 85%88. The patent output of subsidized start-ups is about 
2.6 to 3.3 times higher. Our kernel estimates with the optimal bandwidth fit quite well in 
                                                          
85 Although a distribution theory for the cross-sectional and difference-in-difference kernel and local linear 
matching is derived in Heckman et al. (1998), standard errors for matching estimators are in practice 
generated using bootstrap resampling methods. The use of bootstrapping is backed by Abadie and Imbens 
(2008), who suggest that the standard bootstrap can be applied to assess the variability of kernel or local 
linear matching estimators. However, they show that standard bootstrap resampling methods are not valid for 
assessing the variability of nearest neighbor estimators. 
86 See Caliendo (2006) for an overview of these matching algorithms. 
87 Radius matching means that a subsidized start-up is matched to all nonsubsidized firms within the caliper. 
The caliper is defined symmetrically and restricts the propensity score distance between the subsidized start-
ups and the nonsubsidized control units.  
88 We do not consider the estimate from radius matching with caliper size 0.01 here, since it excludes 10 
subsidized observations and is only significant at the 0.1 significance level. 
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these ranges of estimates. Again, we check the matching quality analogous to the 
proceeding for kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. The distribution of the 
covariates after matching, the pseudo-R2 from logit estimation and the p-value of the 
likelihood-ratio test indicate a good matching quality for all these estimations.  
 
Mean outcome of matched # Observations 
Matching algorithm …subsidized 
start-ups 
…non-
subsidized 
start-ups 
ATT S.E. Sub-
sidized 
Non-
subsidized
Kernel 
Optimal bandwidth (=0.0500) 1.3101 0.7894 0.5207*** 0.1892 103 139 
Bandwidth 0.02 1.3101 0.7983 0.5118** 0.2039 103 139 
Bandwidth 0.04 1.3101 0.7843 0.5258*** 0.1728 103 139 
Bandwidth 0.06 1.3101 0.7971 0.5130*** 0.1906 103 139 
Bandwidth 0.08 1.3101 0.8132 0.4969*** 0.1898 103 139 
 
Bandwidth 0.10 1.3101 0.8244 0.4857** 0.2106 103 139 
K-NN 
2 NN 1.3101 0.8220 0.4881 0.3178 103 139 
5 NN 1.3101 0.7066 0.6035** 0.2463 103 139 
 
10 NN 1.3101 0.7521 0.5580** 0.2358 103 139 
Radius 
Caliper 0.01 1.2909 0.8544 0.4365* 0.2277 93 139 
Caliper 0.03 1.3022 0.8363 0.4660** 0.2158 102 139 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t g
ro
w
th
 
 
Caliper 0.10 1.3101 0.7711 0.5390** 0.2087 103 139 
Kernel 
Optimal bandwidth (=0.0502) 2.7312 0.9632 1.7680** 0.8583 93 140 
Bandwidth 0.02 2.7312 0.8890 1.8421** 0.8321 93 140 
Bandwidth 0.04 2.7312 0.9474 1.7838** 0.7900 93 140 
Bandwidth 0.06 2.7312 0.9757 1.7555** 0.8628 93 140 
Bandwidth 0.08 2.7312 0.9849 1.7462** 0.8326 93 140 
 
Bandwidth 0.10 2.7312 0.9726 1.7585** 0.8101 93 140 
K-NN 
2 NN 2.7312 0.7527 1.9785** 0.9115 93 140 
5 NN 2.7312 0.8882 1.8430** 0.8198 93 140 
 
10 NN 2.7312 0.8688 1.8624** 0.8541 93 140 
Radius 
Caliper 0.01 2.5955 0.7903 1.8052** 0.8396 89 140 
Caliper 0.03 2.7312 0.8237 1.9075** 0.8600 93 140 
Pa
te
nt
 o
ut
pu
t 
 
Caliper 0.10 2.7312 1.0201 1.7110** 0.8409 93 140 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 5.5: Overview of results obtained by different matching algorithms 
 
Matching relies on strong untestable assumptions, particularly the conditional 
independence assumption. The validity of the conditional independence assumption relies 
crucially on the possibility to compare subsidized and nonsubsidized firms on the basis of 
pre-treatment characteristics. Given our rich dataset, which concludes personal data of the 
founder and the founder team as well as characteristics of the start-up and the business 
idea, it is plausible to assume that the outcomes and the allocation of R&D subsidies are 
independent, conditional on observed attributes. Heckman et al. (1997) point out that 
matching methods substantially reduce biases when, first, all information is collected with 
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the same questionnaire for both the subsidized and nonsubsidized firms and, second, these 
are drawn from the same random sample (which is supported by the experimental evidence 
of Michalopoulos et al. (2004)). Both requisites are fulfilled in our dataset. Moreover, the 
sample is considerably homogenous, since we only consider genuinely new start-ups in 
innovative industries in the Free State of Thuringia that were actually engaged in R&D. 
Ten subsidized start-ups lie outside the region of common support (Figure 5.2) and 
were thus excluded from the analysis of the patent output. For them, there are no potential 
matching partners, i.e. start-ups with similar pre-treatment characteristics that are not 
subsidized. Table 5.6 shows that these 10 subsidized start-ups outside the common support 
form a special group, even in the group of subsidized start-ups. They are different because 
they are all academic spin-offs that offer products in the field of electrical engineering, fine 
mechanics and optics (Nace 3). Compared to matched subsidized start-ups, they differ 
significantly with regard to patent output, number of patents before founding and novelty 
of the business idea. They were significantly more often set up between 1998 and 2001. 
The outlier we had to exclude in the very beginning of the analysis (see footnote 79) 
follows the same pattern. It is another academic spin-off offering a product that constitutes 
a global novelty. 
 
 
Mean of 
subsidized firms 
outside common 
support (N=10) 
Mean of subsidized 
firms inside 
common support 
(N=93) 
Employment growth (3 business years) 1.5633 1 .2828 
Patent output (4 business years)  11.4 2 .7312 
Academic spin-off 1.0 0 .1720 
Novelty 3.8 2 .1290 
Patent stock 2.7 1 .5699 
Product 1.0 0 .3978 
Target market 1.6 1 .3656 
Team 0.9 0 .7527 
Year 1994-1997 0.1 0 .4194 
Year 1998-2001 0.7 0 .3763 
Year 2002-2006 0.2 0 .2043 
Nace 2 0.0 0 .3333 
Nace 3 1.0 0 .2473 
Nace 7 0.0 0 .3548 
Nace x 0.0 0 .0571 
Please note: Bold numbers indicate significant different means between subsidized firms inside and 
outside the region of common support (two-sided t-test, 5% significance level) 
Table 5.6: Characteristics of subsidized firms – inside and outside the region of common 
support 
 
Our results are also backed by the self-report of windfall gains of the respective 
founders. We asked each founder of a start-up with subsidized R&D activity, “Would you 
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have been engaged in R&D anyway?”. Only 19.2% answered “yes, readily”, 47.5% 
returned “yes, perhaps or on a reduced scale” and the remaining third (32.3%) said “no”. 
The latter two answer categories point to the additionality of R&D subsidies. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
High-tech and high-growth start-ups take a pivotal role in innovation and entrepreneurship 
policies. Investigating the effectiveness of appropriate policy programs, our analysis 
provides evidence for the additionality of public R&D subsidies to research-based start-ups 
in innovative industries. Public R&D subsidies account for an employment growth 66% 
greater than without such intervention. Furthermore, subsidized start-ups have a 2.8 times 
higher patent output than their nonsubsidized matched counterparts. These estimates take 
account of selection bias, which distinguishes ex-ante subsidized from nonsubsidized 
firms. Our results are thus in line with Czarnitzki (2001) as well as Czarnitzki and Licht 
(2006), who also find additionality of public R&D schemes in East Germany. However, 
our analysis focuses on a subset of highly innovative start-ups and thus suggests that 
newborn firms are capable of conducting additional R&D when they obtain public funds. 
R&D subsidies allow them to increase their R&D activity both in terms of additional 
employment and heightened patent applications. So our results conflict with the 
presumption that the research in start-ups cannot be scaled up since it is organized around a 
key researcher (or fixed research team, respectively) with a preassigned project scope. 
Policy initiatives regularly focus on academic spin-offs, supposedly very effective 
in transferring knowledge from university or research institutes to industrial applications. 
This focus on academic spin-offs and its success can be nicely observed in our data. We 
had to exclude ten subsidized academic spin-offs from our analysis of the patent output  –  
they all developed products and were outstanding in terms of the novelty of their business 
idea, so that we could not find any nonsubsidized counterparts in the matching procedure. 
Hence, the observed funding of academic spin-offs can be regarded as policy success, since 
highly innovative start-ups are expected to offer the highest social benefits. However, these 
observations only stand out when the impact of subsidies on patent output is regarded. 
Their employment growth does not differ from other subsidized start-ups. This points to 
the early development of the spin-offs with respect to the marketability of their products. 
Qualifying our result, we put forward a couple of limitations, which in turn point to 
future research opportunities. First, the quality of the patent applications which form the 
outcome variable patent output has not been considered. The patent quality determines 
crucially the social returns from the R&D activity. A lower patent quality in subsidized 
  117
firms would put the higher quantity of patent applications in perspective. Public funds 
might pay the expenses for the patent applications of subsidized firms, so that they might 
be induced to file applications for low-value patents. Subsidized firms might also file for 
patents strategically, since patents serve as a justification to funding authorities. However, 
these are just presumptions which need empirical scrutiny.  
Second, we define the receipt of R&D subsidies as a dummy variable, which thus 
accounts for heterogeneous intensity of public support. This limits our estimations to 
overall qualitative results. Although our approach of taking an aggregate view on the 
subsidy environment has its merits when looking at the almost bewildering range of 
funding schemes, a more detailed look at the design of support programs is needed for 
more precise policy recommendations. Especially, one has to account for likely changes in 
program design that might have occurred between 1994 and 2006 (see Belitz et al., 2001). 
Third, we focus on those start-ups that conduct R&D within the first three business 
years. While this restriction allows us to match subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups in a 
very homogeneous sample, it neglects the potential impact of R&D subsidies in inducing 
firms to conduct R&D at all. Furthermore, it limits our findings to an innovative research-
based subset of start-ups. 
Fourth, the most general limitation to our analysis is probably the SUTVA and the 
restriction to short-term private returns. However, we analyze two outcome variables in 
different stages of the innovation process, which makes us confident that we can tentatively 
infer from the additional R&D effort (proxied by employment growth) to additionally 
generated knowledge (captured by patents) and finally to social benefits reached by 
knowledge spillovers and market effects. Moreover, the neglect of interactions between 
subsidized and nonsubsidized firms and a missing proxy for social returns, although in line 
with the concurrent literature, should motivate further research.  
In view of our result suggesting a high and positive impact of R&D policy schemes 
on start-up performance, the effective selectivity of these schemes requires a more 
fundamental question about R&D subsidies to start-ups. The economic rationale for R&D 
subsidies is to facilitate R&D projects that are privately not profitable, but yield at the same 
time social returns in excess of the opportunity cost of capital. However, the identification 
of social benefits should be as difficult for policy makers and program officials as for 
evaluation studies such as this one. In addition to that, Lerner (1999) points to public 
choice considerations which cast doubt on policy makers’ and program officials’ incentives 
to fund marginal projects. They are rather inclined to support projects that are likely 
winners, so that they can credit themselves with the success of subsidized start-ups, even 
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though their marginal contribution might be small. For our analysis, we cannot exclude 
those effects, as we use only variables indicating private returns. However, on this basis, 
the selection bias seems to be weak since, on the one hand, the support of the propensity 
scores for the subsidized and nonsubsidized firms overlap to a very high degree (Figure 
5.2), while on the other hand, in a companion study (Cantner and Kösters (2009a) or 
Chapter 4, respectively) we find that selectivity is mainly based on novelty and the 
availability of appropriate programs (favoring academic spin-offs and product start-ups). 
In addition, the sheer enormity of subsidization (remember that 42.6% of R&D-
performing start-ups receive public R&D funds in our sample) points to likely market 
distortions. This generous availability of public R&D funds may thwart the development of 
a market for private R&D funding, since the highly innovative subset of start-ups analyzed 
here should be also of interest for private venture capital firms. In this way, the fact of 
existing subsidies is the rationale for the need of ongoing subsidization. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This thesis is comprised of four empirical studies analyzing policy measures that are 
offered to nascent and young entrepreneurs along the founding process. All empirical 
analyses are based on interview data collected in the East German state of Thuringia. This 
chapter summarizes the main results (Section 6.1) and highlights implications (Section 
6.2). 
 
6.1 Main results 
The first study (Chapter 2) demonstrates that the rationale for financial subsidies to new 
firms is not soundly based in theory or on evidence. Therefore the policy recommendations 
as to the targeting of policy measures are ambiguous. Analyzing financial support schemes 
in the form of general grants, soft loans, and loan guarantees, (multinomial) logistic 
regressions show that the actual allocation of financial subsidies neither follows the 
rationale of positive external effects nor the rationale of capital market imperfections. A 
policy allocation that does not target potential market failure is argued to be ineffective 
because start-ups receive subsidies even though they do not need them. A matching 
approach supports this conjecture: financial support in the form of grants, soft loans, and 
loan guarantees does not appear to affect employment growth and credit rating after three 
business years. However, this does not mean that ineffective subsidies have no effect at all. 
In addition to distortions resulting from the taxation needed for such policy intervention, 
these subsidies are likely to distort market selection because they confer upon their 
recipients an artificial competitive edge. 
Policy support measures are not only justified on the basis of alleged incidences of 
market failure but are also provided for sociopolitical reasons. Start-up subsidies to the 
unemployed have been evaluated favorably to date, suggesting that they lead to higher 
employment and higher earnings of formerly unemployed recipients (Caliendo et al., 
2008). Nevertheless, these results stem from partial analyses and a more comprehensive 
evaluation should take into consideration overall economic effects and potential market 
distortions. 
Public business assistance in the founding process is analyzed in Chapter 3. This 
policy instrument circumvents the problem of market distortions since it targets individual 
nascent entrepreneurs before they enter the market. Despite their focus on various target 
groups, business assistance schemes are generally open to nearly everyone since they aim 
to “build winners” who will later contribute to structural change and economic growth. 
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Therefore, policy induced selectivity in this arena can be considered low, whereas we find 
distinct evidence of self-selection by founders into particular forms of business assistance. 
The analysis suggests that a lack of entrepreneurial resources is the chief impetus for 
selecting into intensive strategically-oriented business assistance and for perceiving such 
assistance as useful. Low entrepreneurial resources are defined as a lack of entrepreneurial 
experience or role models, a lack of social capital, or a weak entrepreneurial personality 
profile. However, propensity score matching cannot identify any effect of business 
assistance on subsequent business performance as proxied by initial capital (at the 
beginning of the first business year), employment, and credit rating (in the third business 
year). 
Chapters 4 and 5 analyze R&D subsidies. The rationale for public support of R&D 
is less problematic than the rationales offered for other types of policy support because 
private R&D activity has been shown to be hampered by both credit constraints and a lack 
of appropriability. To ensure that R&D subsidies are effective and efficient, policymakers 
and program officials should identify ex-ante those projects that promise high social 
returns but that, in the absence of a subsidy, would not be undertaken (either not at all or at 
a smaller scale) because the expected private returns are too low. Hence, projects expected 
to be privately profitable and, therefore, those that will be undertaken anyway, should not 
receive public support. Given fundamental information problems in identifying incidences 
of market failure ex-ante, the discussion in Chapter 4 suggests that policymakers and 
program officials do, at least to some degree, pursue a strategy of “picking the winner”, 
i.e., award subsidies to start-ups with promising ex-ante characteristics (e.g., an innovative 
business idea). Considering this selection bias between subsidized and non-subsidized 
start-ups, we find that R&D subsidies are highly effective in inducing higher employment 
growth and higher patent activity (Chapter 5). Moreover, the analysis points to the policy 
focus on academic spin-offs since for some of these highly innovative start-ups, no non-
subsidized counterparts can be found in the matching procedure. 
 
What are the general “take away” points from these separate analyses? First, the rationale 
behind policy making must clearly justify policy intervention. Chapter 2 suggests the need 
of more scrutiny of the positive external effects and capital market imperfections rationales 
used to justify subsidization of start-up activity since neither is theoretically or empirically 
devoid of controversy. Additionally, Chapter 3 throws doubt on the need for the public 
provision of operationally-oriented business assistance since its usefulness is unlikely to be 
affected by either asymmetric information or by a lack of appropriability. Although 
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sociopolitical reasons for policy intervention (i.e., policy intended to improve the economic 
status of disadvantaged groups) are unlikely to dominate in the innovative industries 
covered by this thesis, such reasons might well explain the lack of targeting assistance 
toward the avoidance of market failure. 
Having a clear-cut rationale for policy intervention is the only way precise policy 
targeting becomes possible. Precise policy targeting toward incidences of market failure 
will direct public funds where they are most needed and thus where they will be most 
effective and efficient. This thesis emphasizes the difficulties of policy targeting toward 
incidences of market failure in that policymakers and program officials have to identify 
such situations ex-ante. The difficulty of this task calls into question the advisability of 
ever subsidizing entrepreneurial activity because such subsidization runs the risk of 
blocking the emergence of a private market for start-up financing (e.g., venture capital). It 
could turn out that by providing public funds in the first place, the government will be 
doomed to forever provide public funds. Two different approaches to policy targeting deal 
with these ex-ante information problems and aim to minimize market distortions arising 
from public policy intervention. The first of these, providing business assistance schemes 
in the founding process, aims at “building winners”. These schemes demonstrate little if 
any ex-ante selectivity but are, instead, open to nearly everyone (Chapter 3). Therefore, 
non-selective business assistance can be viewed as an enabling policy that focuses on 
individual nascent entrepreneurs prior to their respective start-ups entering the market (i.e., 
before the time when subsidies can cause distortions). The second approach, what is called 
“picking the winner”, aims at allocating public funds in favor of those founders and start-
ups that have, ex-ante, the most promising characteristics (Chapter 4). The strategy of 
“picking the winner” minimizes market distortions because it allocates public funds to 
those start-ups that are already highly competitive and thus the receipt of public funds does 
not constitute a decisive artificial competitive edge. 
The rationale behind any public policy intervention and the ability to allocate funds 
accordingly is likely to affect policy effectiveness. The rationale behind public policy 
intervention in R&D is the clearest of all those studied in this thesis because R&D activity 
is known to be affected by capital market imperfections and a lack of appropriability 
(Arrow, 1962; Hall, 2002). Consistently, the analyses conducted in Chapter 5 provide 
evidence of the effectiveness of R&D subsidies in inducing additional employment and 
patent activity. The economic rationale behind financial subsidies such as grants, soft 
loans, and loan guarantees is far more controversial. As discussed in Chapter 2, these 
subsidies seem to be ineffective in targeting either capital market imperfections or positive 
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external effects. Insignificant estimates from propensity score matching suggest that these 
policy measures do not impact business performance but, instead, constitute windfall gains. 
 
 
6.2 Implications 
The studies contained in this thesis do not evaluate single policy schemes but aggregate 
measures of different, albeit similar, programs. This is an effective evaluation approach in 
light of the bewildering range of ever-changing policy schemes. However, less fragmented 
business assistance schemes would clearly facilitate quantitative evaluations by providing a 
meaningful number of cases. This thesis thus points out the necessity of restructuring the 
provision of assistance throughout the entrepreneurial process and the high desirability of 
taking into consideration how policies will be evaluated at the time the policies are being 
designed, e.g., by realizing more experimental designs to strengthen causal inferences. In 
short, a stronger “evaluation spirit and culture” at all levels of policy design, 
implementation, and delivery is needed. This is all the more important, since evaluations 
have to investigate long-run effects of policy interventions. Like most other evaluations, 
only short-run effects are investigated in this thesis. For example, in Chapters 2 and 5, the 
simultaneous impact of financial subsidies is investigated, since the subsidization had 
occurred sometime between the first and third business year and the outcome variables 
were measured in the third business year. The effect of business assistance in the nascent 
phase was studied with respect to performance differences in the third business year 
(Chapter 3). 
In addition to having a sound rationale for policy intervention (either positive 
external effects, capital market imperfections, or sociopolitical reasons in case of labor 
market policies) and estimating the effectiveness of policy support, policymakers must 
consider the opportunity costs of interventions. Hence, the efficiency of existing policy 
schemes must be investigated, which was not attempted in this thesis. Future evaluations 
should consider not only the direct effects of policy intervention but also the costs of 
programs, including the costs of higher taxes to fund the programs and the market 
distortions arising due to the rich subsidy environment. Information about indirect effects 
of public policy intervention would shed light on whether, in aggregate, policy schemes 
really do improve the overall situation for nascent and young entrepreneurs. However, 
indirect effects like market distortions arising on input or output markets of subsidized 
start-ups are virtually impossible to track – let alone distortions resulting from the tax 
system and their influence on entrepreneurial activity. 
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Furthermore, policymakers need to acknowledge the scope of support policies for 
entrepreneurs along the founding process. Sternberg (1996) points out that many policy 
initiatives are oriented toward backward regions in an effort to spur high-tech growth, but 
policy support measures for innovative entrepreneurship will not level out regional 
disparities for two reasons. 
First, the strategy of stimulating innovative entrepreneurship in backward regions 
will be hampered by the high persistence and path-dependency of start-up-rates over time. 
Analyzing data from West Germany for the period from 1983 to 2002, Fritsch and Mueller 
(2007) find that a region’s entrepreneurial culture and its level of innovative activity exert a 
strong impact on subsequent new firm formation. Therefore, changes in regional start-up 
activity are small and emerge only over a long time period. Similarly, Minniti (2005) 
highlights the importance of a community’s entrepreneurial history in explaining the 
effectiveness of entrepreneurship policy measures, since an entrepreneurial climate (as 
indicated by a large concentration of entrepreneurs) encourages individuals to become 
entrepreneurs themselves. The long-run time horizon of policy intervention supports the 
use of enabling policies that pursue a strategy of “building winners”. Such a policy focus 
would require a major shift in actual policymaking – away from targeting start-ups and 
established firms and toward empowering the individual (potential) entrepreneur. Enabling 
policies could encompass the kind of programs suggested by Schmitt-Rodermund and 
Vondracek (2002). Since career interests are formed early in adolescence, these scholars 
recommend helping adolescents to discover their interests and abilities and making them 
aware of entrepreneurship as a career option. To effectively “build winners”, this kind of 
entrepreneurship education should be offered to all adolescents, i.e., all potential future 
entrepreneurs. Thereafter, special training should be provided for those who have the right 
combination of personality and entrepreneurial orientation. 
Second, not only is it difficult to change the level of path-dependent entrepreneurial 
activity over time, but the effects of entrepreneurial activity also differ across regions. 
Since the impact of new firm formation is strongly dependent on the interplay between 
contextual factors and firms, the impact of start-ups can be expected to be shaped by the 
regional availability of, e.g., venture capital, a qualified workforce, and other innovative 
firms, as well as by a supportive infrastructure (Fritsch, 2008). Fritsch and Mueller (2008) 
find distinct interregional differences in the effects of start-up activity. Their analyses 
suggest that start-ups exert a higher impact in agglomerations as well as in regions with a 
high level of labor productivity. 
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In summary, policymakers need to be aware that entrepreneurial activity is of a 
long-term nature, and can barely be “created” in the short-run. Moreover, the effects of 
entrepreneurial activity also are only observable in the very long-run and depend on 
regional characteristics. Therefore, the effectiveness and efficiency of policy support 
measures for innovative entrepreneurship differ across regions. To date, policymakers have 
been mainly in favor of balanced regional growth, which is reflected in start-up subsidies 
given for sociopolitical reasons. However, Sternberg (1996) points out that policy support 
for high-tech regions that strengthens international competitive advantage has to accept the 
fact of increasing interregional disparities between growing and lagging regions. 
 
 
Public choice considerations 
In contrast to welfare economics, public choice scholars do not assume a benevolent 
dictator as the single policymaker, but instead consider utility-maximizing politicians, 
bureaucrats, and voters interacting on a political market. Rooted in this very different 
assumption, public choice theory offers several explanations for the subsidy environment 
currently experienced by entrepreneurs (i.e., potential, nascent or young entrepreneurs). 
First, public choice theory suggests that policymakers and funding authorities may 
have incentives that actually conflict with a policy targeting market failure. For instance, 
policymakers and program officials may wish to be seen as the engineers of success 
(Lerner, 1999) and thus they choose projects that have a high probability of success instead 
of funding projects which are likely to be affected by market failure (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 
2000). The frequent absence of specific objectives in entrepreneurship policy programs (as 
criticized by Storey, 2000) can also be explained by public choice theory. Policymakers 
with only fuzzy objectives, if they have any at all, can more easily emphasize the 
successful parts of their programs and even reinterpret its goals in a self-serving manner 
during an election period to maximize votes. 
Second, the multitude and extent of policy schemes (coming from innovation 
policy, SME policy, entrepreneurship policy, and labor market policy) which are delivered 
at the local, Länder, federal, and European level finds some explanation in Niskanen’s 
(1971) model of the budget maximizing bureaucrat. According to Niskanen, rational 
bureaucrats maximize – among other things – influence, reputation, and power, which are 
in total approximated by budget size. Increases of budgets (and the consequent increase in 
influence, reputation, and power) can be achieved by promoting and implementing more 
and more policy schemes targeted at the entrepreneurial process. Pages et al. (2003, p. 256) 
label this phenomenon “program-itis” and it has the potential to result in redundancy and 
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ineffectiveness when these schemes are not part of a comprehensive entrepreneurship 
strategy. 
Third, in contrast to economic development strategies that target established firms, 
policy support of innovative entrepreneurship encompasses measures targeted at the 
individual (potential, nascent, or young) entrepreneur. These enabling policies can take a 
very long time before they eventually may manifest in increased start-up rates. Moreover, 
their effects are difficult to track and are often not obvious to the public. The theory of 
political business cycles (e.g., Nordhaus, 1975) suggests that opportunistic utility-
maximizing incumbent policymakers try to use expansionary economic policy to create 
favorable macroeconomic conditions so as to increase their chances of re-election. 
However, entrepreneurship policies with their very long lead times and no obvious impact 
cannot be timed to have a positive effect on the economy at the end of a specific legislative 
period. Therefore, Pages et al. (2003) suggest that policymakers will favor more direct 
types of policy intervention, which explains why enabling policies focused on “soft” policy 
measures like consulting and awareness building still constitute a tiny fraction of economic 
policy measures. 
Future researchers making policy recommendations for effectively supporting 
innovative entrepreneurship should thus consider the potentially distortive policy response 
to their advice (Jones and Cullis, 1993). Since the “policy process always influences the 
content of policy” (Pages et al., 2003, p. 228), taking this precaution will ensure that 
alleged market failure (which is accused of hampering innovative entrepreneurial activity) 
does not result in proven policy failure. 
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A—Appendix to Chapter 2 
A.1 Exploring self-selection and program selection 
Table A.1 shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression which analyzes the 
relationship between start-ups’ ex-ante characteristics (independent variables) and the 
status of subsidization which distinguishes between “Receipt of subsidies” (base outcome), 
“Self-selection out of subsidization” and “Refusal / Program selection”.89 
 Multinomial logistic regression 
Base outcome: subsidization 
Dependent variable Self-selection out of 
subsidization 
Refusal / Program 
selection 
Novelty -0.166 0.077 
Growth goals 0.504 0.589 
University degree -0.536 0.527 
Previous self-employment 0.443 0.981 
Team start-up -0.359 -0.487 
Initial capital -0.606*** -0.455 
Year 1998–2001 -0.772* -0.830 
Year 2002–2006 -0.884* -1.087 
Nace 2 -1.549** -2.836** 
Nace 3 -0.156 -1.684* 
Nace 7 0.656 -1.742** 
Constant -2.979*** 1.066 
66 22 
Number of observations 
158 
Log likelihood -135.389 
Pseudo-R2 0.1430 
Note: Due to one refusal for the reasons of non-take-up the estimations are based on 158 observations. 
Base outcome: Receipt of subsidies 
Table A.1: Multinomial logistic regression estimating predictors of self-selection and program 
selection 
The multinomial logistic regression reveals that if a start-up is operating in the chemical 
industry, metalworking industry and engineering (Nace 2) the more likely it is subsidized 
rather than being subject to self-selection or program selection. The significant industry 
dummies in the third column suggest that start-ups from miscellaneous industries – which 
cannot be assigned to well established industries – are more likely to be rejected during the 
application procedure rather than being subsidized. All other variables which might 
distinguish subsidized start-ups from start-ups whose applications were rejected are 
                                                          
89 These categories were built based on nonsubsidized founders' responses to the question why they have not 
been subsidized (cf. Section 2.3.2). 
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insignificant. Hence, program selection seems to be solely based on industry characteristics 
suggesting that policymakers and program officials either cannot identify or cannot target 
start-ups according to characteristics as captured by variables like, e.g., Novelty, Growth 
goals and University degree. 
Start-ups are less likely to self-select out of subsidization the younger they are (i.e. 
founded after 1998) which might be explained by the increased range of subsidies which 
have become available over time. Start-ups are also more likely to abstain from subsidy 
programs rather than being subsidized when they have only little initial capital. Perhaps, 
these founders see no need for a higher capital base and, therefore, no need for subsidies 
which might explain their self-selection. 
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A.2 Variable choice and estimation of the propensity score 
A propensity score model must be estimated for each outcome variable, including those 
variables that influence both the receipt of subsidies as well as the respective outcome 
variable. To identify these variables, I look for variables that correlate with the receipt of 
subsidies and simultaneously with the respective success measure (employment growth and 
survival) (Table 2.3). Moreover, I conduct multivariate analyses to identify other 
distinguishing characteristics between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups that have an 
impact at the same time on employment growth and survival, respectively. In the 
following, the variable choice for each propensity score model is explained. 
Employment growth. Table 2.3 shows that the variables Previous self-employment 
and Nace 2 are correlated with both the take-up of subsidies as well as employment 
growth. Initial capital varies greatly between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups. 
Although not in line with the present data, previous studies suggest that initial capital 
impacts on employment growth (e.g., Cooper et al., 1994). I thus include Initial capital as a 
balancing variable. Initial matching procedures show that the matched samples differed in 
founders’ Growth goals. Since ambitions have also been found to impact on realized 
employment growth (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003), this variable is also included.90 
Ordinary least squares regressions cannot identify other joint influencing factors of 
subsidization and employment growth, so that the propensity score is finally estimated with 
the variables Initial capital, Previous self-employment, Growth goals, and the industry 
dummies. 
Credit rating. Only the variable Previous self-employment is correlated with both 
the receipt of subsidies as well as with survival as proxied by the credit rating (Table 2.3). 
Additionally, I balance subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups on the basis of Initial 
capital and industry because financial endowment and industry characteristics strongly 
differentiate between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups and have been shown to 
impact on the survival probability of start-ups (e.g., Cooper et al., 1994). Since ordinary 
least squares regression models cannot reveal any further predictors of credit rating that 
distinguish between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups, the propensity score model is 
estimated with the variables Previous self-employment, Initial capital, and the industry 
dummies. 
 
                                                          
90 This approach follows Rubin and Thomas (1996, p. 253), who recommend including a variable in doubt 
“unless […] it can be excluded because there is a consensus that it is unrelated to the outcome variables or 
not a proper covariate”. 
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The propensity to receive subsidies is estimated with a logit model (Table A.2). In 
accordance with the discussion above, the selected variables for each of the two models are 
regressed on the binary dependent variable Subsidy (i.e., take-up of financial subsidies 
within the first three business years). Since we are primarily interested in prediction and 
data reduction, redundancy and collinearity are of little account (Smith, 1997). However, 
this limits the interpretation of the coefficients, which are not further discussed here. 
 
 Employment growth  Credit rating – Survival  
Dependent variable: Subsidy     
Growth goals -0.450   
Previous self-employment -0.492  -0.479  
Initial capital 0.515 ***  0.397 **  
Nace 2 1.827 ***  1.586 **  
Nace 3 0.469  0.248  
Nace 7 0.975 **  0.912 *  
Constant -2.113 ***  -1.851 **  
N 159  125  
LR chi2 (k) (6) 27.54  (5) 16.28  
Prob > LR 0.0001  0.0061  
McFadden’s R2 0.1263  0.0943  
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01  
Table A.2: Estimation of the propensity score 
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A.3 Imposition of the common support 
The common support condition ensures that any set of characteristics of subsidized start-
ups (captured by the propensity score) can also be observed for nonsubsidized ones. The 
kernel density functions (Figure A.1) illustrate the distribution of the propensity score for 
subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups.91 The region of common support is found in the 
overlap and requires discarding 11 (4) observations from the analysis of employment 
growth (credit rating). 
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Please note: Observations inside the region of common support lie within the black box. All observations outside the box 
are excluded from matching. 
Figure A.1: Distribution of the propensity score: employment growth (top), credit rating (bottom) 
                                                          
91 The kernel density estimate is calculated using a Gaussian kernel function. The bandwidth is specified by 
Stata, using the kdensity function. 
Nonsubsidized start-ups Subsidized start-ups
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A.4 Matching quality 
T-tests for equality of means in the subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups indicate the 
balancing of the variables before and after matching (Table A.3). 
Employment growth Credit rating Before matching 
After matching After matching 
Mean of… Mean of matched… Mean of matched… 
… subsidized 
start-ups  
… 
nonsubsidized 
start-ups 
(potential 
controls) 
… subsidized 
start-ups 
… 
nonsubsidized 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
… subsidized 
start-ups  
… 
nonsubsidized 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
 
N = 70  N = 89 N = 66 
 
N = 84 
 
N = 54  N = 67 
Novelty  0.61  0.62 0.52 0.58  0.56  0.57 
Growth goals  0.57  0.62 0.55 0.59  0.52  0.66 
University degree  0.73  0.67 0.73 0.63  0.74  0.69 
Previous self-
employment 
 0.31  0.45 0.34 0.37  0.35  0.39 
Team start-up  0.69  0.63 0.70 0.61  0.67  0.61 
Initial capital  3.47  2.89 3.20 3.21  3.28  3.35 
Year 1994–1997  0.37  0.49 0.34 0.50  0.37  0.48 
Year 1998–2001  0.39  0.35 0.41 0.34  0.43  0.35 
Year 2002–2006  0.24  0.16 0.25 0.16  0.20  0.17 
Nace 2  0.27  0.08 0.20 0.19  0.20  0.18 
Nace 3  0.19  0.20 0.20 0.21  0.20  0.21 
Nace 7  0.36  0.30 0.39 0.39  0.39  0.38 
Nace x  0.19  0.42 0.20 0.21  0.20  0.23 
 
 
Employment 
growth 
 0.96  0.83 0.95 0.61  0.97  0.60 
Rating  298.16  292.15 303.97 283.41  302.63  291.45 
Propensity score 
(Employment 
growth) 
 
0.53  0.37 0.49 0.48 
 
-  - 
Propensity score 
(Rating) 
 0.53  0.41 - -  0.50  0.49 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is shown after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers 
indicate significant different means between observation from subsidized start-ups and nonsubsidized start-ups before and 
after matching in a two-sided t-test (10% significance level). Because of the imposition of the common support (see 
Appendix A.3), the matched samples have fewer observations. 
Table A.3: Group differences between subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups before and after matching 
 
After matching, subsidized and nonsubsidized start-ups differ only with respect to Year 
1994–1997 in the analysis of employment growth. This should not be of concern since 
there is no evidence that this variable impacts on employment growth. 
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B—Appendix to Chapter 3
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B.1 Correlation tables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(1) Bus. assistance (General) - 
 
               
 
       
(2) Usefulness - -                
 
       
(3) Initial capital 0.00 0.18** -               
 
       
(4) Employment -0.04 0.07 0.28*** -              
 
       
(5) Rating 0.03 -0.14 0.02 -0.13** -             
 
       
(6) Academic spin-off 0.15*** -0.01 0.04 0.10** 0.06 -            
 
       
(7) Novelty 0.05 0.03 0.11** -0.01 0.11** 0.31*** -           
 
       
(8) Previous self-employment -0.18*** -0.11 0.06 -0.07 0.10* -0.06 0.09* -          
 
       
(9) Self-employed parents -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.12** -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.11** -         
 
       
(10) Social capital (weak) 0.09* -0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.11** -0.07 -        
 
       
(11) Social capital (strong) 0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.25*** -       
 
       
(12) Team start-up -0.02 -0.02 0.09* 0.13*** 0.00 0.20*** 0.07 0.03  0.02 0.01 0.08 -      
 
       
(13) Conscientious-ness -0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.08* -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -     
 
       
(14) Extraversion -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.08* -0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.19*** -    
 
       
(15) Agreeableness  0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.09* -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.16*** 0.05 -   
 
       
(16) Openness  0.04 -0.10 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.14*** 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.12** 0.31*** 0.04 -  
 
       
(17) Neuroticism  0.01 -0.12* 0.01 -0.13*** 0.12** -0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.16*** -0.25*** - 
 
       
(18) Entr. Personality profile -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.08* 0.10** 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.37*** 0.60*** -0.48*** 0.54*** -0.43*** -        
(19) Current life satisfaction -0.01 0.18** 0.02 0.01 -0.18*** 0.05 0.09* 0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.05 0.07 -0.23*** 0.16*** -       
(20) Year 1994–1997 -0.15*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.09* -0.10** 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.08* 0.03 0.05 0.03 -      
(21) Year 1998–2001  0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.12*** -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09* -0.11** 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12** -0.04 -0.61*** -     
(22) Year 2002–2006  0.13*** -0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.19*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.15*** 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.47*** -0.42*** -    
(23) Nace 2 -0.04 -0.06 0.16*** 0.24*** -0.12** -0.11** 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -   
(24) Nace 3  0.01 0.03 0.11**  0.06 -0.02 0.14*** 0.23*** -0.04 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.08 -0.09** 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.09* -0.05 -0.05 -0.30*** -  
(25) Nace 7  0.06 0.04 -0.17*** -0.17*** 0.13** 0.09* -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 0.00 0.12** -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.15*** 0.07 0.09* -0.41*** -0.42*** - 
(26) Nace x -0.04 -0.03 -0.08* -0.11** -0.00 -0.15*** -0.21*** 0.02 0.02 -0.09* 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.35** 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The correlations with the variable Usefulness include only those 194 observations that took up business assistance.  
Table B.1: Correlation matrix for the overall sample (N=425; pairwise deletions because of refusals for several variables) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(1) Bus. assistance (Cluster 1) - 
 
               
 
       
(2) Usefulness - -                
 
       
(3) Initial capital -0.02  0.14 -               
 
       
(4) Employment  0.00  0.15  0.26*** -              
 
       
(5) Rating  0.09 -0.14  0.04 -0.15** -             
 
       
(6) Academic spin-off 0.27***  0.05  0.03  0.11**  0.04 -            
 
       
(7) Novelty  0.17***  0.11  0.15***  0.03  0.09  0.31*** -           
 
       
(8) Previous self-employment -0.17*** -0.16  0.03 -0.11*  0.12** -0.08  0.04 -          
 
       
(9) Self-employed parents -0.05 -0.16 0.00  0.12**  0.00 -0.04 -0.03  0.08 -         
 
       
(10) Social capital (weak)  0.12** -0.23**  0.04  0.05  0.00  0.05  0.05 -0.13** -0.03 -        
 
       
(11) Social capital (strong)  0.04 -0.09 -0.07  0.01 -0.02  0.03 -0.02 -0.06  0.00  0.24*** -       
 
       
(12) Team start-up -0.01  0.02  0.12**  0.14**  0.02  0.22***  0.07 -0.01  0.00  0.03  0.07 -      
 
       
(13) Conscientious-ness -0.05  0.04  0.03  0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01 -     
 
       
(14) Extraversion -0.04  0.06 -0.08  0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02  0.03  0.03 -0.04  0.02 -0.02  0.19*** -    
 
       
(15) Agreeableness  0.00  0.07 -0.06 0.00 -0.08  0.10* -0.09* -0.03  0.04  0.05 -0.01  0.06  0.11*  0.03 -   
 
       
(16) Openness  0.07 -0.21**  0.05 -0.01  0.04  0.04  0.13**  0.02 -0.10*  0.06 -0.01  0.06  0.15***  0.29***  0.04 -  
 
       
(17) Neuroticism  0.03 -0.14  0.03 -0.14**  0.10*  0.00 -0.02  0.08  0.01 -0.06 -0.04  0.08 -0.27*** -0.31*** -0.17*** -0.27*** - 
 
       
(18) Entr. Personality profile -0.03 -0.09  0.03  0.10* -0.01 -0.09  0.10* -0.01 -0.06  0.01  0.02 -0.05  0.40***  0.61*** -0.49***  0.54*** -0.43*** -        
(19) Current life satisfaction -0.06  0.31***  0.07  0.02 -0.16***  0.08  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02 -0.04  0.21***  0.17***  0.02  0.03 -0.21***  0.18*** -       
(20) Year 1994–1997 -0.20***  0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.13** -0.16*** -0.08 -0.09*  0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04  0.03  0.04 -0.03 -0.10*  0.08  0.02  0.05 -      
(21) Year 1998–2001  0.05 -0.02 -0.03  0.04 -0.06  0.15*** -0.01  0.05 -0.01  0.04  0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07  0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11** -0.03 -0.61*** -     
(22) Year 2002–2006  0.17*** -0.01  0.05  0.05  0.21***  0.01  0.10*  0.05 -0.03  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.01  0.02 -0.01  0.15*** -0.05  0.10* -0.02 -0.46*** -0.42*** -    
(23) Nace 2 -0.13** -0.11  0.10*  0.20*** -0.11* -0.11**  0.00 -0.02  0.06  0.00 -0.08 -0.06  0.09*  0.04  0.06 -0.12**  0.03 -0.05  0.01  0.09* -0.01 -0.09* -   
(24) Nace 3  0.06 -0.01  0.13**  0.08  0.03  0.16***  0.25*** -0.10* -0.10*  0.09* 0.00  0.05  0.02 -0.08 -0.11**  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.06 -0.07  0.00 -0.30*** -  
(25) Nace 7   0.10*  0.11 -0.17*** -0.18***  0.11*  0.07 -0.04  0.06  0.01 -0.02  0.02  0.03 -0.16*** -0.01 -0.02  0.06 -0.05  0.00  0.05 -0.19***  0.12**  0.08 -0.39*** -0.44*** - 
(26) Nace x -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.15*** -0.24***  0.05  0.04 -0.08  0.06 -0.03  0.08  0.06  0.09* -0.01 -0.01  0.02 -0.09  0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.35*** 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; The correlations with the variable “usefulness” include only those 96 observations which took up business assistance (Cluster 1).  
Table B.2: Correlation matrix for the Cluster 1 sample (i.e., all nonassisted and all Cluster 1 observations; N=347; pairwise deletions because of refusals for several variables) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(1) Bus. assistance (Cluster 2 - 
 
               
 
       
(2) Usefulness - -                
 
       
(3) Initial capital 0.02 0.24** -               
 
       
(4) Employment -0.06 0.01 0.35*** -              
 
       
(5) Rating -0.04 -0.20* 0.02 -0.10* -             
 
       
(6) Academic spin-off -0.02 -0.21** -0.01 0.09* 0.06 -            
 
       
(7) Novelty -0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.03 0.11* 0.21*** -           
 
       
(8) Previous self-employment -0.15*** -0.10 0.07 -0.08 0.13** 0.01 0.14*** -          
 
       
(9) Self-employed parents -0.06 0.06 0.01 0.14** -0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.05 -         
 
       
(10) Social capital (weak) 0.05 0.11 0.11** 0.13** 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -        
 
       
(11) Social capital (strong) 0.08 0.14 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.24*** -       
 
       
(12) Team start-up -0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.14*** -0.03 0.14*** 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.07 -      
 
       
(13) Conscientious-ness -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -     
 
       
(14) Extraversion 0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.09* -0.08 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.21*** -    
 
       
(15) Agreeableness 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 0.13** -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.19*** 0.09* -   
 
       
(16) Openness -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.12** 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.12** 0.33*** 0.06 -  
 
       
(17) Neuroticism -0.01 -0.14 0.02 -0.17*** 0.16*** 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.33*** -0.35*** -0.15*** -0.26*** - 
 
       
(18) Entr. Personality profile -0.06 0.14 0.02 0.10* -0.04 -0.05 0.10* 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.37*** 0.60*** -0.45*** 0.55*** -0.47*** -        
(19) Current life satisfaction 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.21*** 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.06 0.07 -0.18*** 0.14*** -       
(20) Year 1994–1997 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.15*** -0.08 -0.08 -0.14*** 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -      
(21) Year 1998–2001 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 -0.64*** -     
(22) Year 2002–2006 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.16*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.08 -0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.16*** 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.47*** -0.38*** -    
(23) Nace 2 0.04 0.02 0.21*** 0.26*** -0.11* -0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.13** -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -   
(24) Nace 3 -0.04 0.05 0.10* 0.07 0.01 0.10* 0.17*** 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.11** 0.07 -0.06 -0.11** -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.31*** -  
(25) Nace 7 0.01 -0.03 -0.21*** -0.22*** 0.11* 0.09* -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.16*** -0.02 0.03 0.11** 0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.14*** 0.07 0.08 -0.42*** -0.38*** - 
(26) Nace x -0.02 -0.03 -0.09* -0.11* 0.00 -0.13** -0.20*** 0.00  0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.28*** -0.25*** -0.34*** 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; The correlations with the variable “usefulness” include only those 98 observations which took up business assistance (Cluster 2).  
Table B.3: Correlation matrix for the Cluster 2 sample (i.e., all nonassisted and all Cluster 2 observations; N=349; pairwise deletions because of refusals for several variables) 
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B.2 Variable choice and estimation of the propensity score 
A propensity score model must be estimated for each outcome variable, including those 
variables that influence both the take-up of assistance as well as the respective outcome 
variable. These variables can be expected to account for the selection bias (Caliendo, 
2006). To identify these variables, we look for variables that correlate with the take-up of 
business assistance and simultaneously with the respective success measure (initial capital, 
employment growth, and credit rating). Moreover, we conduct multivariate analyses to 
identify other distinguishing characteristics between assisted and nonassisted start-ups that 
have an impact at the same time on initial capital, employment growth, and credit rating, 
respectively. In the following, the variable choice for the propensity score of each sample 
is explained. 
Overall. Table B.1 shows that the variables Previous self-employment and the time 
dummies correlate both with the take-up of business assistance in general and our outcome 
variable Credit rating. Similarly, being an Academic spin-off correlates with both take-up 
of business assistance and Employment. Since the time dummies are a significant predictor 
of policy take-up and the industry dummies are correlated with most outcome variables, we 
include these dummies as balancing variables.92 Similarly, we include the personality traits 
Extraversion and Neurocitism. Extraversion correlates positively, and the trait Neuroticism 
correlates negatively, with most outcome variables, which is in line with research on the 
personality-career success-link (Judge et al., 1999). Hence, we estimate the propensity 
score with the variables Academic spin-off, Previous self-employment, Extraversion, 
Neuroticism, and the year and industry dummies. 
Cluster 1. Table B.2 shows that the variables Academic spin-off, Previous self-
employment, Novelty, Nace 2, and Nace 7 are correlated with both the take-up of Cluster 1 
business assistance as well as various outcome variables. Similar to the analysis of overall 
assistance, the Big Five trait Neuroticism correlates significantly with Employment and 
Credit rating. Again, the year dummies correlate strongly with the take-up of business 
assistance (as described by Cluster 1) and the industry dummies correlate with most 
outcomes. Since ordinary least squares regressions cannot identify other joint predictors of 
the take-up of business assistance characterized by Cluster 1 and our outcome variables and 
following again the recommendation of Rubin and Thomas (1996, as explained in footnote 
                                                          
92 This approach follows Rubin and Thomas (1996, p. 253), who recommend including a variable in doubt 
“unless … it can be excluded because there is a consensus that it is unrelated to the outcome variables or not 
a proper covariate.” 
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92) the propensity score is finally estimated with the variables Novelty, Academic spin-off, 
Previous self-employment, Extraversion, Neuroticism, the year and industry dummies. 
Cluster 2. Previous self-employment is the only variable that is correlated with the 
take-up of Cluster 2 business assistance (Table B.3). However, similar to the correlations 
described above, the variables Novelty, Academic spin-off, Extraversion, and Neuroticism 
correlate with various outcomes and are thus included in the propensity score. 
Additionally, we have to balance Cluster 2 assisted start-ups and nonassisted start-ups on 
the basis of Social capital (weak) because preliminary matching procedures indicated that 
the matched samples will significantly differ in their weak social capital. Since ordinary 
least squares regression models cannot reveal any further characteristics which influence 
our outcome variables and that distinguish between assisted and nonassisted start-ups, the 
propensity score model is finally estimated with the variables Novelty, Academic spin-off, 
Previous self-employment, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Social capital (weak), as well as 
with the year and industry dummies. 
The propensity to take-up business assistance is estimated with a logit model (Table 
B.4). In accordance with the discussion above, the selected variables are regressed on 
either the take-up of business assistance in general, Cluster 1 business assistance, or Cluster 
2 business assistance. Since we are primarily interested in prediction and data reduction, 
redundancy and collinearity are of little account (Smith, 1997). However, this limits the 
interpretation of the coefficients, which are not further discussed here. 
 Overall 
Cluster 1 
business assistance 
Cluster 2 
business assistance 
Academic spin-off 0.7600** 1.1654 *** 0.0439  
Novelty 0.1499 * -0.1688 * 
Previous self-employment -0.8270*** -0.8779 *** -0.7157 *** 
Social capital (weak)  0.1878  
Extraversion 0.0109 0.0036  0.0673  
Neuroticism 0.1117 0.3281  0.0034  
Year 1994–1997 -0.9093*** -1.2090 *** -0.7447 ** 
Year 1998–2001 -0.4200  -0.5573 * -0.4186  
Nace 2 -0.0051  -0.5698  0.2807  
Nace 3 0.0844 -0.1331  0.0674  
Nace 7 0.1703  0.1698  0.1041  
Constant 0.1859  -0.8186  -0.4240  
N 441 340 342
LR chi2 (k) (9) 35.64 (10) 51.62 (11) 16.63
Prob > LR 0.0000 0.0000 0.1192
Pseudo R2 0.0591 0.1294 0.0408
Table B.4: Estimation of the propensity score 
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B.3 Imposition of the common support 
The common support condition ensures that any set of characteristics of assisted founders 
and their start-ups (which is captured by the propensity score) can be also observed for 
nonassisted ones. The kernel density functions (Figure B.1) illustrate the distribution of the 
propensity score for assisted and nonassisted observations – overall and separately for each 
cluster-specific analysis. The region of common support lies within the overlap 
(highlighted by the black boxes). The condition of common support requires discarding 3 
(8, 7) observations from the analysis of business assistance overall (Cluster 1, Cluster 2). 
O
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Note: Observations inside the region of common support lie within the black box. All observations outside the 
box are excluded from the matching procedure. 
Figure B.1: Distribution of the propensity score for the analysis of business assistance overall, Cluster 1 
business assistance, and Cluster 2 business assistance 
 
Assisted founders Nonassisted founders 
  139
B.4 Matching quality 
T-tests for equality of means in the assisted and nonassisted start-ups indicate the balancing 
of the variables before and after matching (Tables B.5-B.7). After matching, assisted and 
nonassisted start-ups differ only with respect to strong social capital in the analysis of 
business assistance in general (Overall take-up, Table B.5). This should not be of concern 
since there is no evidence that this variable impacts on our outcome variables. 
 
Overall take-up of business assistance 
 
Initial capital Employment Credit rating Before matching 
After matching After matching After matching 
Mean of… Mean of matched… Mean of matched… Mean of matched… 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(potential 
controls) 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
 
N = 194  N = 251 N = 189 N = 249 N = 186 N = 239 
 
N = 161 N = 202 
Academic 
spin-off 0.16  0.07 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 
 
0.18 0.17 
Novelty 1.38  1.25 1.41 1.36 1.42 1.34  1.51 1.40 
Previous self-
employment 0.28  0.45 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.28 
 
0.27 0.27 
Parents self-
employed 0.14  0.19 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.17 
 
0.13 0.17 
Social capital 
(weak) 0.33  0.24 0.34 0.27 0.34 0.28 
 
0.35 0.28 
Social capital 
(strong) 0.40  0.34 0.41 0.32 0.41 0.31 
 
0.42 0.31 
Team start-up 0.66  0.69 0.67 0.72 0.67 0.72  0.68 0.74 
Conscientious-
ness 3.62  3.67 3.60 3.67 3.61 3.67 
 
3.58 3.65 
Extraversion 3.19  3.22 3.19 3.22 3.18 3.21  3.20 3.23 
Agreeableness 3.11  3.07 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10  3.11 3.07 
Openness 3.20  3.16 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.19  3.22 3.20 
Neuroticism 1.38  1.37 1.40 1.36 1.40 1.36  1.40 1.37 
Entr. person. 
profile -21.75  -21.04 -21.78 -21.04 -21.81 -21.10 
 
-21.73 -20.91 
Year 1994–97 0.32  0.47 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.35  0.29 0.32 
Year 1998–01 0.37  0.34 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.37  0.36 0.35 
Year 2002–06 0.31  0.20 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.29  0.35 0.33 
Nace 2 0.21  0.24 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21  0.20 0.22 
Nace 3 0.24  0.24 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.28  0.27 0.30 
Nace 7 0.39  0.33 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.36  0.39 0.34 
Nace x 0.16  0.19 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.15  0.14 0.14 
 
 
Propensity score 0.48  0.40 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.47  0.49 0.48 
 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is shown after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers 
indicate significant different means between observation from assisted start-ups and nonassisted start-ups before and after 
matching in a two-sided t-test (10% significance level). Because of the imposition of the common support (see Appendix 
B.3) and missing values for each outcome variable, the matched samples have fewer observations. Furthermore, each t-test 
might lack observations because of refusals for several variables. 
Table B.5: Group differences between assisted and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching 
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Take-up of Cluster 1 business assistance 
 
Initial capital Employment Credit rating Before matching 
After matching After matching After matching 
Mean of… Mean of matched… Mean of matched… Mean of matched… 
… assisted 
start-ups  
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(potential 
controls) 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
… assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
 
N = 96  N = 251 N = 93 N = 239 N = 91 N = 229 
 
N = 82 N = 192 
Academic 
spin-off 0.27  0.07 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.25 
 
0.28 0.25 
Novelty 1.86  1.25 1.90 1.88 1.92 1.86  2.01 1.97 
Previous self-
employment 0.27  0.45 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.30 
 
0.29 0.31 
Parents self-
employed 0.15  0.19 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.15 
 
0.16 0.14 
Social capital 
(weak) 0.36  0.24 0.36 0.29 0.37 0.30 
 
0.36 0.29 
Social capital 
(strong) 0.38  0.34 0.40 0.33 0.40 0.32 
 
0.39 0.31 
Team start-up 0.68  0.69 0.68 0.75 0.68 0.75  0.68 0.78 
Conscientious-
ness 3.56  3.67 3.56 3.64 3.55 3.64 
 
3.54 3.64 
Extraversion 3.15  3.22 3.16 3.19 3.16 3.18  3.17 3.22 
Agreeableness 3.08  3.07 3.07 3.08 3.06 3.09  3.07 3.06 
Openness 3.25  3.16 3.24 3.23 3.25 3.22  3.28 3.23 
Neuroticism 1.40  1.37 1.40 1.39 1.41 1.38  1.39 1.36 
Entr. person. 
profile -21.92  -21.04 -21.83 -21.21 -21.86 -21.25 
 
-21.62 -20.88 
Year 1994–
1997 0.25  0.47 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.27 
 
0.21 0.23 
Year 1998–
2001 0.40  0.34 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 
 
0.40 0.40 
Year 2002–
2006 0.35  0.20 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.33 
 
0.39 0.36 
Nace 2 0.13  0.24 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13  0.13 0.14 
Nace 3 0.29  0.24 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.28  0.30 0.30 
Nace 7 0.44  0.33 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.46  0.43 0.44 
Nace x 0.15  0.19 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13  0.13 0.12 
 
 
Propensity score 0.38  0.23 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.37  0.40 0.38 
 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is shown after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers 
indicate significant different means between observation from assisted start-ups and nonassisted start-ups before and after 
matching in a two-sided t-test (10% significance level). Because of the imposition of the common support (see Appendix 
B.3) and missing values for each outcome variable, the matched samples have fewer observations. Furthermore, each t-test 
might lack observations because of refusals for several variables. 
Table B.6: Group differences between assisted and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching 
 
  141
 
Take-up of Cluster 2 business assistance 
 
Initial capital Employment Credit rating Before matching 
After matching After matching After matching 
Mean of… Mean of matched… Mean of matched… Mean of matched… 
… assisted 
start-ups  
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(potential 
controls) 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
… 
assisted 
start-ups 
… non-
assisted 
start-ups 
(actual 
controls) 
 
N = 98  N = 251 N = 97 N = 238 N = 96 N = 229 
 
N = 80 N = 193 
Academic 
spin-off 0.06  0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 
0.08 0.07 
Novelty 0.91  1.25 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92  0.96 0.94 
Previous self-
employment 0.29  0.45 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.29 
 
0.28 0.28 
Parents self-
employed 0.14  0.19 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.18 
 
0.12 0.19 
Social capital 
(weak) 0.30  0.24 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 
 
0.33 0.30 
Social capital 
(strong) 0.42  0.34 0.41 0.34 0.41 0.33 
 
0.45 0.35 
Team start-up 0.65  0.69 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.68  0.66 0.71 
Conscientious-
ness 3.67  3.67 3.67 3.67 3.68 3.66 
 
3.65 3.63 
Extraversion 3.23  3.22 3.23 3.24 3.22 3.23  3.26 3.24 
Agreeableness 3.14  3.07 3.14 3.07 3.15 3.07  3.16 3.03 
Openness 3.16  3.16 3.16 3.15 3.15 3.15  3.16 3.15 
Neuroticism 1.36  1.37 1.36 1.34 1.36 1.34  1.37 1.37 
Entr. person. 
profile -21.59  -21.04 -21.59 -20.95 -21.64 -20.95 
 
-21.69 -20.89 
Year 1994–
1997 0.39  0.47 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 
 
0.38 0.36 
Year 1998–
2001 0.35  0.34 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.38 
 
0.31 0.36 
Year 2002–
2006 0.27  0.20 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.24 
 
0.31 0.28 
Nace 2 0.29  0.24 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.27  0.30 0.30 
Nace 3 0.19  0.24 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.22  0.21 0.22 
Nace 7 0.35  0.33 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.33  0.35 0.31 
Nace x 0.17  0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18  0.14 0.17 
 
 
Propensity score 0.32  0.27 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31  0.33 0.32 
 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is shown after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers 
indicate significant different means between observation from assisted start-ups and nonassisted start-ups before and after 
matching in a two-sided t-test (10% significance level). Because of the imposition of the common support (see Appendix 
B.3) and missing values for each outcome variable, the matched samples have fewer observations. Furthermore, each t-test 
might lack observations because of refusals for several variables. 
Table B.7: Group differences between assisted and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching 
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